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 FOREWORD TO THE 2021 EDITION 
 
This Guide was last significantly updated in 2012 – nine years ago.  In 2012, I wrote 
about how many developments there had been in the “crimmigration” field since the 2010 update 
to this Guide.  Those developments pale in comparison to the developments that have occurred 
since 2012, however, both in terms of numbers and significance. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has been a major player in this area since 2012, 
weighing in with a number of significant decisions during that period of time.  In fact, two of 
those decisions, Moncrieffe v. Holder and Descamps v. U.S., fundamentally altered the way in 
which state statutes must be analyzed in order to determine if they carry immigration 
consequences for non-citizens.  I have included a detailed discussion of these and other Supreme 
Court cases in the text of this edition and incorporated the holdings of those cases in the analyses 
of the Nebraska criminal statutes that accompany this edition of the Guide. 
 
The Nebraska Supreme Court has also issued some interesting opinions in the last several 
years regarding post conviction relief in cases involving either failure of a court to give the 
immigration advisement to a defendant, as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02, or as the 
result of criminal defense counsel failing to give Padilla advice to a non-citizen client entering a 
guilty plea.  This edition of the Guide includes my take on those state cases as well. 
 
In an effort to make this Guide more user-friendly for criminal law practitioners, I have 
significantly altered the format of the statutory analysis appendix.  Now, as you will see, the 
appendix takes the form of a chart that discusses the most important aspects of immigration 
consequences.  My inspiration for this format came from the superb work being done by Kathy 
Brady and her folks with the Immigrant Legal Resource Center in their analysis of immigration 
consequences of selected California offenses.  I was struck by the compact nature and 
succinctness of this format.  I hope that you will find this chart format to be easier and quicker 
to use on a day-to-day basis, whether it be in the courtroom, the courthouse hallway, or your 
office.  The major downside I see to this new format is that it is essential that you carefully read 
the introductory text in order to sus out the immigration consequences for your particular clients. 
For example, my chart does not consider immigration consequences peculiar to DACA recipients 
– but that issue is explored in detail in the introductory text. 
 
As with each past edition of this Guide, I invite your comments, critiques, thoughts and 
contributions.  As it has been from the beginning, my goal is to be as helpful to criminal 
practitioners as possible.  Your input certainly makes it more likely I will achieve that goal. 
 
As I have done in all past editions, I would like to take a point of personal privilege to 
thank all of those who have supported me in the latest endeavor, from my family to my co-
workers in the Clinic to the College of Law itself, without whose help and encouragement none 
ii 
of this could have happened.  Dean Richard Moberly was gracious enough to approve my 
sabbatical request for the fall semester of 2020, during which most of the updates to this Guide 
were completed.  Those tireless advocates who work, day in and day out, in the Douglas County 
and Lancaster County Public Defender’s offices were very helpful in steering me toward the 
most frequently-charged offenses to analyze.  It was also the idea of Ally Mendoza and her 
colleagues in the Douglas County Public Defender’s office to analyze some of the more 
frequently-charged municipal code ordinances.  Mark Carraher from the Lancaster County 
Public Defender’s office weighed in on Lincoln ordinances that his office sees with some 
frequency.  As both Ally and Mark are alums of the College of Law’s Immigration Clinic, I am 
particularly gratified for their input. 
 
My research assistants, Chelsey Borchardt, Jordan Klein, and Max Tierney, along with 
Stefanie Pearlman, who steered both Chelsey and Max my way through her legal research 
fellowship program here at the College of Law, were instrumental in keeping me on track and 
making this Guide significantly better than it would have otherwise been without their help.  
Jordan in particular, exhibited much courage in agreeing to work with me, since he was an 
undergraduate student at Doane University during the time he worked on this Guide, and had to 
summon up the courage to attempt legal research and analysis without having been to law 
school.  Thanks, Jordan.  You did great.  Sara Houston, Assistant Professor and Director of the 
Law, Politics and Society Program at Doane University, worked extensively with Chelsey and 
Jordan to get them up to speed and supervise much of their work during the time they helped 
with the Guide, and I very much appreciate not only her work with those folks, but also her 
substantive contributions to the contents of the Guide itself. 
 
To my co-workers and tireless proofreaders/editors, Deanna Lubken and Sydnee 
Schuyler, I owe more than I can ever count.  Deanna has worked with me in some fashion since 
our days together at Western Nebraska Legal Services in the early 1980’s, and has been saving 
me from myself for all of these years.  Most would question why she has chosen to put up with 
me for so long – and they would be right to do that.  But I remain grateful for both her poor 
judgment in associating with me for such a long time and her invaluable contributions.  Sydnee 
is a much more recent addition, but I have come to rely heavily on her good eye and discerning 
voice as well.  This Guide is far better than it would be without their involvement. 
 
Finally, to my wife, Sara Houston, thank you for all of your love, help, support, 
encouragement, and ideas that have improved not only this Guide, but me.  I could not have 
done it without you. 
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On March 31, 2010, the lives of criminal law practitioners changed dramatically.  On 
that day, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in the case of 
Padilla v. Kentucky,1 holding that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to 
be advised by their lawyers of the potential immigration consequences of guilty pleas 
they are contemplating.  It is my hope that this Guide will be of assistance to criminal 
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges as they negotiate the mine field that lies at the 
intersection of criminal and immigration law. 
 
The scope of this Guide is limited to potential immigration consequences of Nebraska 
state criminal proceedings.  And even with that limitation, this Guide is far from 
comprehensive in its treatment of Nebraska state criminal law.  The goals of this Guide 
are to give Nebraska criminal law practitioners and judges an overview of the federal 
immigration system, acquaint them with immigration issues that may arise as the result of 
state criminal proceedings, and analyze various Nebraska criminal statutes in terms of 
their potential immigration consequences.  Having said that, I readily admit that there are 
likely a number of issues this Guide does not address.  For that, I apologize in advance.  
I had to make choices about what to include and what to omit, and those choices will 
inevitably disappoint some. 
 
I invite those who use this Guide to give me feedback on how it could be improved.  I 
will continue to update this Guide periodically, and would like it to be as useful to 
Nebraska practitioners and judges as possible. 
 
B. Why This Stuff is Important. 
 
1. Changes in the Law. 
 
Although the Padilla decision certainly highlighted the “crimmigration” area, 
criminal convictions have always been a problem for individuals who are not  
citizens of the United States.  The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)2 has 
 
1  559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
2  The Immigration and Nationality Act, found at Title 8 of the United States Code, is the 
major piece of legislation governing federal immigration law.  The current version of the INA 
was enacted in 1952, but has been amended frequently since first being enacted. 
2 
always contained provisions that could result in the deportation of those non-
citizens convicted of a criminal offense.  However, as the Padilla opinion 
recognized,3 the stakes are as high today as they have ever been for non-citizens 
facing criminal proceedings. 
 
Two major pieces of legislation were enacted in 1996 that dramatically increased 
the negative consequences for non-citizens facing criminal proceedings.  Those 
laws are the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)4 and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).5 
This Guide will address specific changes wrought by those laws in the course of 
discussing individual topics.  However, suffice it to say that the AEDPA/IIRIRA 
combination was decidedly anti-immigrant.  Since April 1, 1997, the effective 
date of most of IIRIRA’s provisions, the working assumption of criminal defense 
lawyers should be that non-citizens charged with or convicted of most crimes will 
find themselves in deportation proceedings.6  Although this will not always hold 
true, it is now more often true than not.  Further, AEDPA and IIRIRA drastically 
restricted a non-citizen’s ability to avoid deportation if he or she is being deported 
because of a criminal conviction. 
 
Practically speaking, a client's immigration status will nearly always make a 
difference in the way a criminal prosecution proceeds.  Prosecutors are 
increasingly aware of a criminal defendant's immigration status, and undoubtedly 
will use that information in deciding how to prosecute a case, what type of plea 
bargains to accept, and what sentencing recommendations to make.  And in the 
wake of Padilla, criminal defense attorneys now have a constitutional duty to be 
well-informed.  Those who are not well-informed risk not only having 
convictions vacated by successful post conviction claims, but stand to do their 
non-citizen clients a huge disservice.  Furthermore, once a final criminal 
conviction is entered against a non-citizen, there are limited remedies an 
immigration attorney can invoke to ameliorate the immigration consequences of 
 
3  559 U.S. at 360. 
4  Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
5  Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
6  On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13768, establishing 
new enforcement priorities in the interior of the U.S.  This Executive Order expressly 
terminated all provisions of the November 20, 2014 memo issued by former DHS Secretary Jeh 
Johnson regarding ICE enforcement priorities.  In essence, this Executive Order made all 
undocumented or out of status immigrants fair game for deportation.  The Biden Administration 
has indicated that it will alter these priorities, and be more targeted in the approach it takes to 
deciding which immigrants to target for removal, but as of this writing, we are still awaiting 
further specifics about the Biden Administration’s removal priorities and what they might mean 
in practice. 
3 
such a conviction.  It is therefore mandatory that criminal law practitioners 
become familiar with immigration law so that they can try to minimize the impact 





The complexion of Nebraska's demographics is changing.  Once a nearly   
homogeneous state, in the past nearly four decades Nebraska has experienced a 
dramatic influx of foreign-born individuals.  Refugees from Vietnam, Sudan,  
Iraq, and various other countries from central and eastern Europe have settled in 
Nebraska.  But by far the greatest change has occurred in the area of Nebraska’s  
Latino population.  One need only look at figures from the United States Census  
Bureau to get a sense of the enormity of this change. 
 
In 1990, the U.S. Census Bureau put Nebraska’s total population at 1.57 million 
people.  Of that number, 36,969 individuals, or approximately 2.3%, were of 
Hispanic origin.7  The 2000 census indicated a total population in Nebraska of 
1.7 million people.  Yet the Hispanic population in Nebraska in 2000 totaled 
94,119 people, or approximately 5.5% of the population, making Nebraska’s 
Hispanic population the largest minority population in the state.8  Viewed 
another way, Nebraska’s Hispanic population increased by 57,150 during the 
decade of 1990-2000.  While Nebraska’s total population increased by 130,000 
during that decade, Nebraskans of Hispanic origin represented 44% of that 
population gain.  Nebraska’s population increased 8.3% between 1990 and 2000.   
 
Without the increase in the Hispanic population, Nebraska would have 
experienced a population growth of only 4.6% during this time.9 
 
This trend is also reflected by the 2010 census figures.  The 2010 census shows 
that Nebraska’s total population was 1.8 million people.  The total population 
increased by around 115,000 people, or 6.7%, between 2000 and 2010.  The 
white population of Nebraska increased by around 39,500 people, or by 2.6% 
from 2000 to 2010.  The Hispanic population increased by around nearly 73,000 
 
7  U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population (1992), 
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1990/cp-1/cp-1-1.pdf (last visited 
October 28, 2020). 
8  U.S. Bureau of the Census, Profiles of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000 
Census of Population & Housing (2001), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2001/dec/2khus.pdf (last 
visited October 28, 2020). 
9  All figures come from comparing the numbers of the 1990 U.S. Census with figures 
from the 2000 U.S. Census. 
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people, or by 77.3%.  The increase in Nebraska’s Hispanic population between 
2000 and 2010 accounted for 64% of Nebraska’s population gain between 2000 
and 2010.  Without the gain in Hispanic population, Nebraska would have grown 
by only 42,000 people, or 2.6%.10 
 
According to the 2020 census, Nebraska’s population stood at 1.96 million 
people, an increase of just a little over 135,000 (around 7%) since the 2010 
census.  Nebraska’s “white alone” population (not including Hispanics or 
Latinos) totaled around 1.67 million individuals.  Hispanics and Latinos 
accounted for 11.3% of the total population, or a total of approximately 219,000 
individuals.  So, since the most recent immigrant influx began in Nebraska in the 
1990s, Latinos have grown by a total of approximately 182,000 individuals, and 
by a percentage of over 9%.  That trend is likely to continue into the foreseeable 
future.11 
 
Of course, not all of the growth in Nebraska’s Hispanic community has been as 
the result of immigration.  But the numbers suggest that a large portion of that 
increase was because of immigrants coming to Nebraska to work in the 
meatpacking industry.  The 2019 Hispanic population exceeded the statewide 
average in 15 Nebraska counties.12  Many of those counties host or are adjacent 
to counties that host businesses related to and involved in the meatpacking 
industry.  In some of those counties, the increase in the Hispanic population 
during the 1990-2020 time period was nothing short of dramatic.13 
 
There is no reason to believe that the increase in Nebraska’s foreign-born and 
minority population, which began to take off during the 1990's, will slow down to 
an appreciable degree in the foreseeable future.  If Nebraska follows the national 
 
10  All figures come from the 2010 U.S. Census. U.S. Census Bureau, United States: 
2010 Summary Population & Housing Characteristics (2013), 
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2012/dec/cph-1-1.pdf (last visited October 28, 
2020).  
11  These statistics are taken from the last figures available on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
website: https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?g=0400000US31 (last visited May 24, 2021). 
12  Box Butte (12.5%), Chase (12.3%), Colfax (45.4%), Dakota (38.8%), Dawson 
(33.3%), Dixon (13.7%), Dodge (12.9%), Douglas (12.6%), Dundy (11.8%), Hall (27.7%), 
Madison (15%), Morrill (15.4%), Platte (19%), Saline (25.3%), and Scotts Bluff (23.8%). U.S. 
Census Bureau website, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?g=0400000US31 (last visited May 
25, 2021).  
13  Colfax County (Schuyler) is such an example.  The 1990 census indicated a Hispanic 
population in Colfax County of 224 people, which represented 2.5% of the total population.  By 
2019, there were approximately 4894 people of Hispanic origin living in Colfax County, 
representing approximately 45.4% of the total population. 
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trend, Nebraska’s Hispanic population will continue to increase.  While not all of 
this increase will be in the form of new immigrants, much of it could be, given 
recent history.  And, in general, with more people come more legal problems, so 
Nebraska criminal law practitioners will continue to confront the issue of how 
best to represent non-citizens facing criminal proceedings. 
 
C. How This Guide is Organized. 
 
This Guide is structured to provide an overview of the immigration agency structure and 
the procedures involved when various divisions of the Departments of Homeland 
Security and Justice attempt to remove a non-U.S. citizen from the United States.  
Following those overviews, the Guide provides a more detailed discussion of the specific 
immigration consequences that could flow from Nebraska state court criminal 
proceedings. 
 
The heart of this Guide are the charts containing analyses of immigration consequences 
of various Nebraska statutes and municipal ordinances.  Those charts contain my 
analyses of selected Nebraska criminal statutes in terms of the possible immigration 
consequences to a non-U.S. citizen client if the client is charged with or convicted of a 
crime under the statute or ordinance in question.  It is my hope that practitioners will, if 
nothing else, be able to use the charts to quickly access my analyses of potential 
immigration consequences of selected state and municipal criminal proceedings. 
 
There are also attachments at the end of this Guide that contain various forms or resource 
materials that I believe will be helpful to the criminal defense lawyer who represents a 
non-U.S. citizen in state court criminal proceedings. 
 
D. General Issues Facing Counsel Involved in Representing Non-U.S. Citizens in 
Criminal Proceedings. 
 
1. Nebraska Statutory Provisions. 
 
Although the immigration implications of criminal proceedings have always 
lurked in the background as an issue for Nebraska practitioners, they came to the 
forefront as the result of the passage of LB 82 in 2002, codified at Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 29-1819.02, et seq. 
 
The purpose of the law, as set forth in the statute itself, is to make certain that 
non-U.S. citizen criminal defendants are advised by a court that entry of a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere may have immigration consequences.  Further, the 
Legislature intended that, in the event a criminal defendant or his or her lawyer 
was unaware that a guilty or nolo plea might carry immigration consequences, the 
court should grant the defendant additional time to negotiate with the  
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prosecutor.14  In addition, the statute expressly provides that no defendant should 
be required to reveal his or her immigration status to the court.15 
 
Section 29-1819.02 requires courts to administer the following advisement to 
criminal defendants prior to the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere: 
 
“If you are not a United States citizen, you are hereby advised that 
conviction of the offense for which you have been charged may 
have the consequences of removal from the United States, or 
denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United 
States.”16 
 
Failure of a court to give this advisement after July 20, 2002, the effective date of 
the statute, requires a court, upon a motion by the defendant coupled with a 
showing that conviction may have immigration consequences of the type 
described in the statute, to vacate the judgment of conviction and permit the 
defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea.17  If no record is made that the 
advisement was given, there is a presumption that it was not given.18  Nebraska 
cases interpreting the provisions of this statutory scheme are discussed in further 
detail in Section I.D.2.b(2)., infra. 
 
2. Case Law –- Duty of Courts and Counsel to Advise. 
 
Before examining the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, it is 
useful to take a look at some of the federal and state jurisprudential history of the 
statutory and constitutional obligations of both courts and counsel to advise 
defendants of potential immigration consequences of guilty pleas. 
 
The case law in Nebraska has thus far focused on three questions when it comes 
to possible immigration consequences of criminal proceedings: (1) does a trial 
court have a constitutional duty to inform a criminal defendant of the possible 
 
14  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.03. 
15  Id.  In my experience, some judges routinely ask criminal defendants preparing to 
enter a guilty plea if they are U.S. citizens.  This question appears to violate the provisions of 
the statute.  And, in fact, there is no need to ask this question.  The statutory advisement should 
routinely be given to all criminal defendants, regardless of their immigration status. 
16  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02(1).  There is a limitation to the scope of this statute, 
however.  The advisement need not be given by the court if the offense in question is only an 
infraction.  Id. 
17  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02(2). 
18  Id. 
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immigration consequences of criminal proceedings; (2) what are the parameters of 
a court’s duty to give to defendants entering nolo or guilty pleas the statutory 
advisement found in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02 and what remedies are 
available to defendants if the statutory advisement is not given properly; and (3) 
what are the contours of criminal defense counsel’s Padilla obligations? 
 
a. Constitutional Duty of Courts to Advise. 
 
In State v. Schneider,19 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that trial courts 
have no constitutional obligation to inform criminal defendants of 
collateral consequences to their entry of guilty pleas.20  The defendant in 
Schneider contended that the trial court’s failure to advise him that he 
would have to register as a sex offender if he pled guilty to two counts of 
attempted sexual contact with a child rendered his guilty pleas 
unintelligent, unknowing, and involuntary.  As a result, Schneider sought 
leave to withdraw his pleas at his sentencing hearing. 
 
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that failure of the trial court to advise 
Schneider that he would have to register as a sex offender was a 
“collateral consequence” of the criminal proceedings, citing State v. 
Torres.21  The Court held that, given such a determination, there was no 
constitutional requirement for the trial court to advise Schneider that he 
would have to register as a sex offender, employing the Boykin test.22  As 
a result, the Court held that Schneider’s guilty pleas were intelligent, 
knowing, and voluntary, and further held that he had no right to withdraw 
them as a matter of constitutional principle.23 
 
19  263 Neb. 318, 324, 640 N.W.2d 8, 15 (2002). 
20  While the Schneider case did not involve an immigration issue, it is instructive 
because it discusses the collateral consequences doctrine. 
21  254 Neb. 247, 575 N.W.2d 861 (1998). 
22  Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).  In Boykin, the Supreme Court held that 
constitutional principles require an affirmative showing that any guilty plea entered into by a 
criminal defendant and accepted by a trial court be done knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily. 
23  The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow 
Schneider to withdraw his guilty pleas “for any fair and just reason.”  Schneider, 263 Neb. at 
325, 640. N.W.2d at 14.  It is interesting to contrast this holding with that of the court in United 
States v. Singh, 305 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004), where the court allowed the defendant to 
withdraw a guilty plea, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d), due to the fact that his being advised 
that he “might” be deported after pleading guilty to an aggravated felony constituted a “fair and 
just” reason for withdrawing the plea.  The defendant filed his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
Some courts have agreed with Singh (see, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 
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The Nebraska Supreme Court has also held that trial courts have no 
constitutional obligation to advise criminal defendants entering nolo or 
guilty pleas of the immigration consequences of those pleas.24  In Yos-
Chiguil, the court cited to a 2010 post-Padilla decision of the Georgia 
Supreme Court in support of this conclusion.  That decision, Smith v. 
State,25 expressly holds that, even in the wake of the Padilla decision, 
immigration consequences of criminal proceedings remain collateral 
consequences, at least for purposes of whether a trial court has a 
constitutional obligation to advise a defendant of such consequences.  The 
Georgia Supreme Court defined “collateral” consequences as those that do 
not lengthen or alter the sentence imposed by a trial court.  In the Georgia 
Supreme Court’s view, Padilla did not convert immigration consequences 
into direct consequences of criminal proceedings for purposes of a Fifth 
Amendment analysis; rather, the court opined, it simply held that the Sixth 
Amendment requires trial counsel to advise clients of potential 
immigration consequences because prevailing professional norms require 
such advice by effective defense counsel. 
 
One wonders about the underpinnings of this analysis.  Almost routinely 
before Padilla, courts held that the direct/collateral distinction meant 
something in the Sixth Amendment context.26  But that notion was 
shattered by Padilla: 
 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla's 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he 
sought about the risk of deportation concerned only 
collateral matters, i.e., those matters not within the 
sentencing authority of the state trial court.  In its view, 
“collateral consequences are outside the scope of 
representation required by the Sixth Amendment,” and, 
 
2002)), while others have not (see, e.g., Santo-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 
2008)).  A more recent decision of the Second Circuit expressly held that non-compliance with 
Rule 11's advisement requirements results in a constitutionally defective guilty plea.  United 
States v. Gonzalez, 884 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2018). 
24  State v. Yos-Chiguil, 281 Neb. 618, 626, 798 N.W.2d 832, 840 (2011). 
25  287 Ga. 391, 697 S.E.2d 177 (2010), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 
307 Ga. 363, 834 S.E.2d 769 (2019). 
26  For example, in a pre-Padilla decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in State v. 
Zarate, 264 Neb. 690, 651 N.W.2d 215 (2002), held that immigration consequences were 
collateral consequences of a criminal proceeding, and therefore effective criminal defense 
counsel did not have to advise a client of such consequences when counseling the client about 
whether to plead guilty to a crime.  Zarate has obviously been overruled by Padilla. 
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therefore, the “failure of defense counsel to advise the 
defendant of possible deportation consequences is not 
cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.” 
253 S.W.3d, at 483.  The Kentucky high court is far from 
alone in this view. 
 
We, however, have never applied a distinction between 
direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of 
constitutionally “reasonable professional assistance” 
required under Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.  
Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we 
need not consider in this case because of the unique nature 
of deportation.27 
 
So it is clear that, in an immigration context, the direct/collateral 
distinction is meaningless for purposes of a Sixth Amendment analysis.  
Rather, the touchstone inquiry is whether defense counsel’s advice is 
ineffective under a Strickland analysis.  In other words, the 
direct/collateral distinction is no longer applicable in the Sixth 
Amendment context, as the court made clear in Padilla.  But most courts 
would hold that the direct/collateral distinction is still alive and well in the 
Fifth Amendment context.  Why? 
 
One suspects that the answer to this question lies in the courts’ fear of the 
“slippery slope” – if the Fifth Amendment requires a court to advise of all 
collateral consequences of a guilty plea in order for that plea to be 
knowing and voluntary for Fifth Amendment purposes, where do courts 
draw the line?  Most courts would likely hold that a rule requiring a judge 
to advise a criminal defendant of all consequences to a guilty plea would 
simply be unworkable.28 
 
But is that a sufficient answer, particularly in the immigration context?  
Padilla makes it clear that there is something different and unique about 
immigration consequences of criminal proceedings, as compared to all 
other types of consequences flowing from a conviction or guilty plea: 
 
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly 
severe “penalty”; but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal 
 
27  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364-365 (internal footnotes omitted). 
28  The Georgia Supreme Court took comfort in the fact that the combination of (1) 
Padilla and (2) the existence of a Georgia statute requiring trial courts to give criminal 
defendants a general advisement regarding immigration consequences at the time of accepting a 
guilty plea likely provide adequate constitutional protection to defendants, thereby making their 
guilty pleas knowing and voluntary.  Smith v. State, 287 Ga. 391, 697 S.E.2d 177 (2010). 
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sanction.  Although removal proceedings are civil in 
nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the 
criminal process.  Our law has enmeshed criminal 
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a 
century.  And, importantly, recent changes in our 
immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic 
result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.  Thus, we 
find it “most difficult” to divorce the penalty from the 
conviction in the deportation context.  Moreover, we are 
quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of 
deportation for a particular offense find it even more 
difficult.29 
 
That difference – that uniqueness of immigration consequences – led the 
Padilla Court to hold that the direct/collateral distinction for purposes of 
Sixth Amendment analysis simply does not exist.  Given the Court’s 
recognition of the unique and severe nature of immigration consequences, 
does the direct/collateral distinction make sense in the Fifth Amendment 
context either?  And wouldn’t the answer to the “slippery slope” 
argument be that this one category of consequence, which is both unique 
and singularly severe, must be disclosed by a court to a defendant in order 
to make that defendant’s plea knowing and voluntary?30 
 
29  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365-366 (internal citations omitted). 
30  Indeed, the Court has held as much in the Sixth Amendment context in Lee v. United 
States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 198 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2017).  In that case, the government argued that the 
defendant demonstrated that he would not have pled guilty to a criminal offense had he known 
that it carried immigration consequences, even though the evidence of his guilt was strong and 
the likelihood that he would have been convicted at trial was high.  But the Court held the 
likelihood of conviction at trial was the wrong focus in a case where a defendant claimed that 
lack of information about immigration consequences affected his decision-making at the plea 
stage:   
When a defendant alleges his counsel's deficient performance led him to accept a 
guilty plea rather than go to trial, we do not ask whether, had he gone to trial, the 
result of that trial “would have been different” than the result of the plea bargain. 
That is because, while we ordinarily “apply a strong presumption of reliability to 
judicial proceedings,” “we cannot accord” any such presumption “to judicial 
proceedings that never took place.”  We instead consider whether the defendant 
was prejudiced by the “denial of the entire judicial proceeding ... to which he had 
a right.”  As we held in Hill v. Lockhart, when a defendant claims that his 
counsel's deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a 
plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable 




Here’s how the argument sets up.  Although it is undeniably a Sixth 
Amendment case, Padilla says that immigration consequences are actually 
part of the penalty faced by non-citizens in criminal proceedings: 
 
In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General's 
authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation, 110 
Stat. 3009–596, an authority that had been exercised to 
prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during 
the 5–year period prior to 1996.  Under contemporary law, 
if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the 
1996 effective date of these amendments, his removal is 
practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of 
limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the 
Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens 
convicted of particular classes of offenses.  Subject to 
limited exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available 
for an offense related to trafficking in a controlled 
substance. 
 
These changes to our immigration law have dramatically 
raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction.  The 
importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused 
of crimes has never been more important.  These changes 
confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, 
deportation is an integral part – indeed, sometimes the most 
important part – of the penalty that may be imposed on 
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified 
crimes.31 
 
If, at least in the immigration context, immigration consequences are 
indeed part of the penalty faced by non-citizen criminal defendants, then 
under the rationale of Boykin, courts receiving guilty pleas have a 
constitutional obligation under the Due Process clause to insure that 
defendants have been advised of such a penalty, in order to ascertain that a 
guilty plea has been entered voluntarily and understandingly.  At the 
federal level, courts have a duty to make certain defendants entering a 
guilty plea are aware of the possible maximum and minimum penalty they  
 
 
would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 1965, 198 L. Ed. 2d at 484-85 
(internal citations omitted). 
31  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363-364 (internal citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis 
supplied). 
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face.32  At the state level, Nebraska common law imposes this 
requirement on trial courts.33  So there is a plausible argument that trial 
courts are compelled not only by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02 to inquire 
into a defendant’s awareness of possible immigration consequences, but 
are also constitutionally compelled to make such an inquiry.34  
 
b. Statutory and Rule-Based Duty of Courts to Advise. 
 
(1) Fed. R. Crim. P., R. 11. 
 
A 2013 amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requires that federal courts accepting guilty pleas advise 
defendants that the plea may have immigration consequences.35  
In 2002, the Nebraska Legislature adopted LB 82, which is 
codified at Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02, requiring Nebraska 
courts to give a similar advisement. 
 
(2) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02. 
 
The Nebraska Supreme Court has decided several cases since 2002 
applying the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02 in the 
context of post conviction cases filed by non-citizens who sought 
to have their convictions vacated because, they argued, trial courts 
did not comply with the statute’s requirement that they give 







32  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).  See also, United States v. Gonzalez, 884 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 
2018). 
33  State v. Hays, 253 Neb. 467, 476-477, 570 N.W.2d 823, 829 (1997). 
34  In People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 189 (2013), the New York Court of Appeals held that 
a court’s duty to advise non-citizen criminal defendants of possible deportation consequences of 
guilty pleas does, in fact, have a constitutional dimension, both under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.  Other courts, however, disagree with Peque.  See, e.g., People v. Guzman, 43 
N.E.3d 954, 398 Ill.Dec. 44 (2015), where the Illinois Supreme Court held to the contrary.  As a 
practical matter, if a trial court in Nebraska complies with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02, any 
Fifth Amendment obligation will likely be satisfied.  So, at least in Nebraska or other states 
requiring a court advisement, whether by rule or by statute, this discussion is mostly academic. 
35  F. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(O). 
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(a)   State v. Rodriguez-Torres. 
 
In State v. Rodriguez-Torres,36 the Nebraska Supreme 
Court held that a defendant cannot use § 29-1819.02 to 
vacate a guilty plea that was entered before the effective 
date of the statute (July 20, 2002) once the defendant has 
completed his sentence: 
 
In § 29-1819.02, the Legislature gives a 
court discretion37 to vacate a judgment or 
withdraw a plea where a court has failed to 
provide the advisement required for pleas 
made on or after July 20, 2002.  It does not, 
however, convey upon a court jurisdiction to 
do so where a party has already completed 
his or her sentence.  Nor has the Legislature 
in any other statute allowed for a specific 
procedure whereby a person who has been 
convicted of a crime and has already served 
his or her sentence may later bring a motion 
to withdraw his or her plea and vacate the 
judgment.38   
 
The court held that, as a result, the trial court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s motion and 
dismissed the appeal. 
 
(b) State v. Yos-Chiguil (Yos-Chiguil I). 
 
The next significant post conviction case in an immigration 
context came one year later.  In State v. Yos-Chiguil39 
(Yos-Chiguil I), the defendant entered guilty pleas to one 
count of attempted second degree murder and one count of 
second degree assault in 2008.  The trial court accepted the 
guilty pleas and sentenced the defendant. 
 
 
36  275 Neb. 363, 746 N.W.2d 686 (2008). 
37  This choice of words is curious, since the statute says if the advisement is not given 
and the requisite prejudice is shown, a trial court shall vacate the judgment and permit the 
defendant to withdraw his guilty or nolo plea if he files a motion to do so. 
38  Id. at 367, 746 N.W.2d at 689 (emphasis supplied). 
39  278 Neb. 591, 772 N.W.2d 574 (2009). 
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After the judgment was final, but before the defendant had 
completed his sentence, he filed a motion requesting that 
the court vacate his guilty pleas pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§ 29-1819.02.  He argued that, although the trial court 
gave him a general advisement regarding immigration 
consequences at the time he pled guilty, the advisement did 
not strictly comply with the statutory language.  The trial 
court denied Yos-Chiguil’s motion to withdraw his pleas 
and he appealed denial of the motion to the supreme court.  
As an initial matter, the State raised a subject matter 
jurisdiction argument, pointing to language in Rodriguez-
Torres, and contended that since the judgment was final, 
statutory vacatur under § 29-1819.02 was not available to 
the defendant.  In effect, the State argued that the statutory 
vacatur procedure is only available to a defendant on direct 
appeal. 
 
The Nebraska Supreme Court held “that there is no 
language in the statute which would support such a limited 
construction.”40  As a result, the court held that the trial 
court had jurisdiction to consider a statutory vacatur motion 
raised by a defendant to whom the statute applies (i.e., one 
whose plea is entered on or after July 20, 2002), whose 
judgment is final, and who has not yet completed his 
sentence.  The court also reiterated that the statute has a 
two-part test before a defendant is entitled to vacatur of a 
plea: (1) the defendant must show that the advisement was 
not given by the court and (2) the defendant must show 
there is a more than theoretical chance that he faces adverse 
immigration consequences.  The second requirement was 
fatal to the defendant’s claim in this case, the court held, 
because he produced no evidence showing that he actually 
faced adverse immigration consequences of any kind; he 
only argued that the advisement was not in strict 
compliance with the statute.  That, the court held, was 
insufficient to trigger the vacatur provisions of the statute.  
The court held that a defendant seeking statutory vacatur 
must demonstrate that there is more than a merely 
hypothetical risk he will suffer negative immigration 
consequences. 
 
The court did not decide whether the vacatur procedure 
under § 29-1819.02 is available to defendants who have 
completed their sentences.  In Rodriguez-Torres, the 
 
40  Id. at 596, 772 N.W.2d at 579. 
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defendant also sought to use the statutory vacatur process – 
and only the statutory vacatur process – to withdraw a 
guilty plea that had been entered in 1997, long before the 
effective date of § 29-1819.02.  The court in that case held 
the statute did not apply to such a plea.  But in Yos-Chiguil 
I, the statute was in effect when the defendant entered his 
guilty plea in 2008.  In an apparent retreat from its 
language in Rodriguez-Torres, supra, the court did not 
foreclose the possibility that statutory vacatur is available 
to defendants who have completed their sentences, but did 
not decide the issue because of the lack of evidence from 
the defendant on the issue of prejudice.41 
 
The court also did not decide the issue of whether an 
advisement that does not parrot the statutory language 
requires vacatur of a guilty plea in cases where the 
defendant can show immigration-related prejudice.  But, as 
indicated above, the court held that a defendant must show 
that he faces more than a hypothetical possibility of 
specific immigration prejudice in order to entitle him to 
vacate the judgment and withdraw his plea.   
 
In Yos-Chiguil I, the trial court’s advisement was:  “If you 
are not a citizen of the United States, and if you are 
convicted of a crime, that conviction could adversely affect 
your ability to remain or work in this country.”42  Compare 
that to the statutory language:  “If you are not a United 
States citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the 
offense for which you have been charged may have the 
consequences of removal from the United States, or denial 
of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United 
States.”43  Those are very different advisements.  The trial 
court’s advisement in Yos-Chiguil I mentioned nothing 
about naturalization.  But because the defendant did not 
show any prejudice of any type from a failure by the trial 
court to adhere strictly to the language of the statute, the 
court did not reach the issue of whether such a variance 
requires vacatur under § 28-1819.02.  However, it did 
indicate that a defendant would have to show a nexus  
 
 
41  Id. at 597, 772 N.W.2d at 579. 
42  Id. at 594, 772 N.W.2d at 578. 
43  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02. 
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between the faulty advisement and the immigration 
prejudice he faces: 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has 
construed similar statutory language to mean that “a 
defendant must demonstrate more than a hypothetical risk 
of such a consequence, but that he actually faces the 
prospect of it occurring.”  Applying this principle, the 
court held that a convicted defendant who faced deportation 
and was warned that deportation was a possible 
consequence of his guilty plea was not entitled to withdraw 
the plea on the ground that he was not also given a 
statutorily required warning that conviction could result in 
“‘exclusion from admission to the United States.’”  The 
court reasoned that although the advisement given by the 
trial court did not cover all the immigration consequences 
enumerated in the statute, it would not construe the statute 
to impose the “extraordinary remedy” of vacating the 
judgment of conviction “in circumstances where the 
inadequacy complained of is immaterial to the harm for 
which the remedy is sought”. . . . We agree with the 
reasoning of the Massachusetts courts and hold that failure 
to give all or part of the advisement required by § 
29-1819.02(1) regarding the immigration consequences of 
a guilty or nolo contendere plea is not alone sufficient to 
entitle a convicted defendant to have the conviction vacated 
and the plea withdrawn pursuant to § 9-1819.02(2).  The 
defendant must also allege and show that he or she actually 
faces an immigration consequence which was not included 
in the advisement given.44 
 
(c) State v. Mena-Rivera. 
 
The defendant in State v. Mena-Rivera,45 was a lawful 
permanent resident who pled guilty to a Class III felony 
child abuse charge.  At the time of his arraignment and 
plea of not guilty, the court gave the defendant the 
advisement required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02.  The 
defendant later appeared before the court and, pursuant to a 
plea agreement, withdrew his not guilty plea and pled 
guilty to attempted child abuse, a Class IIIA felony.  The 
court did not re-administer the statutory immigration 
 
44 Yos-Chiguil I, 278 Neb. at 597-598, 772 N.W.2d at 580 (citations omitted). 
45 280 Neb. 948, 791 N.W.2d 613 (2010). 
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advisement at the hearing during which it accepted the 
defendant’s guilty plea, but the defendant did acknowledge 
at his second hearing that the court had arraigned him 
previously and that he understood his rights.  Around six 
months after the hearing at which the defendant pled guilty, 
and while he was still in state custody awaiting sentencing, 
he moved to withdraw his plea, alleging that because the 
court failed to re-read the immigration advisement at the 
plea hearing, he was entitled to withdraw his plea.  The 
defendant also offered evidence at that hearing that he was 
the subject of an immigration detainer, meaning that 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had sent a 
notification to state authorities that it wished to be notified 
at the time the defendant was to be released from state 
custody.  Such “ICE detainers” are routinely issued by ICE 
when they believe a state prisoner is removable from the 
United States.46 
 
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw 
his plea pursuant to the statute, holding that he had not 
shown prejudice related to the court’s failure to re-read the 
advisement to him, which is a requirement of the statute.  
The court then imposed sentence on the defendant related 
to his guilty plea.  The defendant appealed the denial of his 
motion to withdraw his plea, and the Nebraska Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the statute requires the trial 
court to give the immigration advisement to a defendant 
immediately before accepting his guilty plea.  The court 
also held that, by introducing a copy of the ICE detainer 
that had been lodged against him, Mena-Rivera had 
sufficiently demonstrated that he may suffer adverse 
immigration consequences, which is all the statute requires. 
 
(d) State v. Yos-Chiguil (Yos-Chiguil II). 
 
In State v. Yos-Chiguil47 (Yos-Chiguil II), the pro se 
defendant pursued a claim under the Nebraska Post-
Conviction Act.  (Yos-Chiguil I involved the same 
defendant’s attempt to withdraw his guilty plea under the 
more specific statutory procedures in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-
1819.02.)  One of the main claims raised by Yos-Chiguil 
in this second case was that his trial counsel was deficient 
 
46  See section IV.C., infra, for a more detailed discussion of ICE detainers. 
47  281 Neb. 618, 798 N.W.2d 832 (2011). 
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because he did not discuss with him the possibility of an 
intoxication defense to the charges Yos-Chiguil faced.  
Yos-Chiguil also claimed that trial counsel’s performance 
was deficient because counsel failed to argue that § 28-
1819.02 required strict adherence to the statutory language, 
as a matter of due process.  In other words, one of his 
claims in this second case was a classic ineffective 
assistance of counsel Sixth Amendment claim, unlike the 
argument he made in Yos-Chiguil I, which was premised 
only on § 28-1819.02.  But he also raised a Fifth 
Amendment due process claim directed at what he believed 
was the trial court’s duty to advise him of immigration 
consequences of his guilty plea. 
 
The trial court denied Yos-Chiguil an evidentiary hearing 
on his post conviction claims for various reasons, in two 
separate orders: one dated January 22, 2010, and one dated 
June 21, 2010.  The Supreme Court held that Yos-Chiguil 
had not timely appealed the trial court’s January 22 order, 
and that it therefore only had jurisdiction to consider the 
trial court’s ruling on the June 21 order – that involving 
counsel’s failure to advise him of the possibility of an 
intoxication defense.  The court held that Yos-Chiguil 
should have been granted an evidentiary hearing on this 
issue, and reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. 
 
There are two important features of the court’s holding that 
relate to a trial court’s duty to advise defendants of possible 
immigration consequences of nolo or guilty pleas.  First, as 
to the Fifth Amendment due process issue, the court 
explicitly held that a criminal defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to have a court advise him of possible 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.48  Second, the 
court made clear that a vacatur motion filed under § 29-
1819.02 can only relate to failure of a court to deliver the 
statutory advisement regarding possible immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea.  Such a motion is not a 








48  Id. at 626, 798 N.W.2d at 840. 
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(e) State v. Medina-Liborio (Medina-Liborio I). 
 
In State v. Medina-Liborio,49 the Nebraska Court of 
Appeals, in an unreported decision, held that a statutory 
motion to vacate is the only proper vehicle for raising error 
when a trial court fails to deliver the advisement required 
by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1819.02.  In that case, the trial 
court did not give the statutory advisement at the time it 
accepted the guilty plea from the defendant.  The 
defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court, alleging 
that the trial court abused its discretion by accepting his 
guilty plea without giving him the advisement.  The Court 
of Appeals held that the only way to raise the non-
advisement issue is by way of a motion to vacate the plea 
under the statutory provisions in § 28-1819.02.  So 
although it affirmed the judgment of the trial court, it 
pointed out to the defendant that he could still seek a 
statutory vacatur under § 28-1819.02 if he wished to do so. 
 
(f) State v. Medina-Liborio (Medina-Liborio II). 
 
He did.  But his motion was denied and he appealed.  This 
time, his appeal was heard by the Nebraska Supreme Court 
in State v. Medina-Liborio.50  At the hearing before the 
trial court, the State, over Medina-Liborio’s objection, 
introduced evidence in the form of jail recordings that he 
had had conversations about the immigration consequences 
of his guilty plea with his family.  His former counsel, also 
over objection, testified that he had discussed the possible 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea with Medina-
Liborio.  As the result of this evidence, the trial court held 
that the legislative intent of § 29-1819.02 had been satisfied 
since he was actually aware of the possible immigration 
consequences of his guilty plea, and denied Medina-
Liborio’s motion to vacate his plea.  The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the plain language of the statute 
entitled Medina-Liborio to withdraw his guilty plea since 
he had met both elements of the statute.  In response to the  
State’s claim that such a holding would allow criminal 




49  2011 WL 3615572 (2011). 
50  285 Neb. 626, 829 N.W.2d 96 (2013). 
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Finally, we do not share the district court's 
concern that applying § 29–1819.02 as it is 
written will somehow permit defendants to 
“game the system.” The statute makes the 
trial judge responsible for giving the 
advisement.  The prosecutor, in the interest 
of securing a valid plea-based conviction, 
also has a role in making certain that the 
advisement is given. A defendant can game 
the system only if both the court and the 
prosecutor fail to ensure that the defendant 
is afforded his or her statutory rights, i.e., 
actually given the advisement. If the 
advisement is given as the law requires, 
there is no game for a defendant to play.51 
 
(g) State v. Llerenas-Alvarado. 
 
In a decision handed down shortly before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Medina-Liborio, the Nebraska Court of 
Appeals, in State v. Llerenas-Alvarado,52 held that the 
defendant had no right to withdraw his guilty plea under    
§ 29-1819.02.  Because the facts are akin to those in 
Mena-Rivera, supra., they are reviewed in some detail here. 
 
Llerenas-Alvarado was charged with kidnapping, a Class 
IA felony.  Before his initial arraignment in county court, 
he was given a written advisory by an interpreter who read 
the advisory to him.  The advisory included language that 
essentially advised Llerenas-Alvarado of possible 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea, in language 
very similar to that in § 29-1819.02.  On June 7, he 
appeared before the county court and was advised of his 
rights, including the effect of conviction of noncitizens.53  
His case was then bound over to district court.  On July 14, 
Llerenas-Alvarado appeared before the district court for a 
group arraignment.  At that arraignment, the district court 
gave the advisement required by the statute.  On August 
29, Llerenas-Alvarado appeared again before the district 
 
51  Id. at 633-634, 829 N.W.2d at 101. 
52  20 Neb. App. 585, 827 N.W.2d 518 (2013). 
53  The opinion does not elaborate on the language used, so it is unclear if the statutory 
advisement was given to Llerenas-Alvarado in the language required by the statute. 
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court for a pretrial conference.  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, the State was granted leave to file an amended 
information, but withdrew it because Llerenas-Alvarado 
was not ready to enter a plea to the amended information.  
On September 1, the parties again appeared before the 
district court and indicated they had reached a plea 
agreement.  The district court asked Llerenas-Alvarado if 
he remembered the court explaining his rights to him on 
July 14, and asked if he wanted the court to repeat that 
information.  He said he did recall that court date and that 
he did not wish to have any of the information repeated to 
him, including “the possibility of deportation from the 
United States.”  The court then continued the hearing until 
the following day, September 2, at which time it accepted 
Llerenas-Alvarado’s guilty plea.  The court did not repeat 
the statutory immigration advisement at the September 2 
hearing. 
 
Before the date for sentencing, Llerenas-Alvarado filed a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, based on the failure of 
the court to give the statutory advisement.  A hearing on 
his motion was held in the district court on November 18.  
The district court denied his motion to vacate and Llerenas-
Alvarado appealed.  On appeal, he raised two arguments: 
(1) that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered 
(in essence, a Fifth Amendment argument) and (2) that the 
statutory advisement was not timely given to him as 
required under the Mena-Rivera opinion. 
 
Llerenas-Alvarado’s Fifth Amendment argument was not 
based on the fact that the trial court failed to advise him of 
the possible immigration consequences of his guilty plea.  
Instead, it dealt more with his contention that the court 
failed to adequately examine him to determine if he 
understood his rights and, specifically, that he had 
difficulty understanding his rights because, among other 
things, he required the assistance of an interpreter.  The 
Court of Appeals held that the record did not support this 
claim.  As to his claim that the statutory immigration 
advisement was not given to him immediately prior to the 
entry of his guilty plea, as required by Mena-Rivera, the 
Court of Appeals held that, although Llerenas-Alvarado 
had not been given the complete immigration advisement 
on either September 1 or 2, he had waived his statutory 
right to receive the advisement and therefore “the  
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legislative intent of the statute [was] not frustrated in this 
case.”54 
 
Given the strict way in which the Nebraska Supreme Court 
has interpreted the provisions of § 29-1819.02, one 
wonders about the holding in this case.  The facts certainly 
did not help Llerenas-Alvarado, given that he refused the 
court’s request to repeat its advisements just prior to taking 
his plea.  On the other hand, the statute, as interpreted by 
Mena-Rivera, is exacting in its requirements.  One senses 
that this was a close call. 
 
(h)    State v. Rodriguez. 
 
The Supreme Court next considered § 29-1819.02 in State 
v. Rodriguez.55  The precise issue in this case was whether 
a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear a motion 
by a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea even after he has 
completed his sentence related to the guilty plea.  The 
Supreme Court held that a trial court does, in fact, have 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear such a motion.  In order 
to reach this conclusion, however, the Supreme Court had 
to deal with some troubling language in its own Rodriguez-
Torres opinion from 2008 (discussed above).  That opinion 
stated, inter alia: 
 
In § 29-1819.02, the Legislature gives a 
court discretion to vacate a judgment or 
withdraw a plea where a court has failed to 
provide the advisement required for pleas 
made on or after July 20, 2002.  It does 
not, however, convey upon a court 
jurisdiction to do so where a party has 
already completed his or her sentence.56 
 
The Supreme Court attempted to dispatch this language, 
which is obviously inconsistent with the result it reached in 
this case, on a couple of theories: (1) Rodriguez-Torres 
dealt with a pre-July 20, 2002 plea and (2) the language  
 
 
54  Id. at 596, 827 N.W.2d at 526. 
55  288 Neb. 714, 850 N.W.2d 788 (2014). 
56  Rodriguez-Torres, 275 Neb. at 367, 746 N.W.2d at 689 (emphasis supplied). 
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was dictum.  Ultimately, however, the court distanced 
itself from the language: 
 
To the extent that our statement in 
Rodriguez-Torres can be interpreted to limit 
the relief provided in § 29-1819.02 to a 
defendant whose sentence has not been 
completed, such interpretation is expressly 
disapproved.57 
 
There is another interesting issue presented by this case, 
however, that was first raised in the Yos-Chiguil cases – an 
issue that has not yet been resolved by the Nebraska 
Supreme Court.  If a trial court’s advisement does not 
conform exactly to the statutory language, does that mean 
that the advisement has not been given as required by the 
statute, and that a defendant therefore has a right to 
withdraw a guilty plea, provided the other elements of the 
statute are met?  The court did not have to address that 
issue directly in Yos-Chiguil, and in this case the court 
simply remanded the issue to the trial court, having found 
that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motion to 
vacate.58  Justice Cassel, in his concurrence, hinted that the 
Supreme Court would not look favorably on an advisement 
that does not track the statutory language: 
 
I write separately only to make plain an 
important matter inherent in the court’s 
opinion.  There is no excuse for failing to 
administer the statutory advisement.  It 
takes only a moment.  The wording is 
succinct.  The statute specifies the precise 
language.  Judges have no reason to 
improvise or summarize.  The “cost” of 
timely giving advisements is minuscule 
compared to the “benefit” of avoiding plea 
withdrawals years after the resulting 
judgments have been fully executed.   
Judges should fully and timely comply with 
 
57  Rodriguez, 288 Neb. at 723, 850 N.W.2d at 794. 
58  According to a Justice search, on remand the district court did allow Mr. Rodriguez to 
withdraw his guilty plea, but the basis for the trial court’s ruling is not set forth in its order.  
However, one must assume that the basis for the ruling is that the text of the court’s advisement 
did not conform exactly to the language of the statute. 
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the statutory mandate.  And the practicing 
bar should ensure that judges do so.59 
 
Although not of constitutional dimension, this opinion, and 
the shot across the bow from Justice Cassel contained in it, 
echo the language used by Justice Stevens in Padilla, 
which is that the responsibility for seeing that the Sixth 
Amendment’s requirement of competent counsel is 
complied with is the responsibility of not only defense 
counsel, but also the prosecutor and the judge.60  Justice 
Cassel’s language makes it clear that all participants in a 
criminal proceeding have an interest in seeing that § 29-
1819.02 is complied with. 
 
(i) State v. Gach. 
 
In this case61, the Supreme Court built on its holdings in 
Yos-Chiguil I and Mena-Rivera in denying post conviction 
relief to the non-citizen defendant, who filed a claim to 
withdraw his guilty plea under § 29-1819.02, arguing that 
the trial court’s advisement did not exactly track the 
statutory language. 
 
The trial court’s advisement certainly did not track the 
statutory language: 
 
[Deputy county attorney]: Your Honor, 
before I give the factual basis I just remind 
the Court that perhaps before [Gach] entered 
the plea you could do the immigration 
advisory, of any potential impact on that.  
Would you like me to do that or would you 
like to do the — 
 
THE COURT: Let me do that right now, sir.  
In addition to the penalty of 1 to 50 years’ 
imprisonment, 50 being the max, one year 
being the minimum, your immigration status 
with the United States could be affected.  
Do you understand that, sir? 
 
59  Id. at 727, 850 N.W.2d at 796-797. 
60  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373. 
61  297 Neb. 96, 898 N.W.2d 360 (2017). 
25 
 
[Gach]: (No response.) 
 





THE COURT: In other words, you could be 




In his post conviction claim, the defendant argued that he 
should be allowed to withdraw his plea, since ICE had 
lodged a detainer against him and was seeking to remove 
him from the United States.  At the post conviction hearing 
before the trial court, the parties stipulated that the 
defendant was not a U.S. citizen either at the time of the 
plea hearing or at the time of the post conviction hearing. 
 
The Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court’s denial of 
the motion to vacate the guilty plea, held, following its 
holding in Yos-Chiguil I, that the defendant had not carried 
his burden to show that he actually faced an immigration 
consequence that was not included in the advisement 
actually given by the trial court.  The court held that, 
although the advisement given by the trial court did not 
track the statutory language, it did fairly advise the 
defendant that his guilty plea could result in his 
“deportation” from the United States and that the failure of 
the trial court to also advise him that it could affect his 
ability to naturalize was not a material omission. 
 
The court did not address the issue of whether the trial 
court’s failure to track exactly the statutory language in     
§ 29-1819.02 was sufficient to allow a defendant to vacate 
a plea under the statute, given its holding that Gach did not 
carry his burden on the second element under the statute.  
But the court did mention, again, Justice Cassel’s 
concurrence in State v. Rodriguez about the importance of 
giving the verbatim advisement.62  And, given the court’s 
 
62  The Court also stated, as a general principle of law, that the right to withdraw a plea 
previously entered is not absolute, and then cites to a case (State v. Ortega, 290 Neb. 172 (2015)) 
that was not decided under § 29-1819.02.  That general statement of law appears to be incorrect 
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holding that the defendant had carried his burden of proof 
on the first element of his claim – that the trial court failed 
to give “all or part of” the advisement required by the 
statute63 – it seems unlikely that anything other than a 
verbatim recitation of the statutory language will suffice. 
 
(j) State v. Garcia.  
 
In State v. Garcia,64 the Nebraska Supreme Court 
confronted an argument by the defendant that asserted § 
29-1819.02 was not complied with because a key word in 
the advisement was not properly interpreted into Spanish, 
the defendant’s primary language. 
 
The court held that there is nothing in the language of the 
statute itself that requires correct interpretation of the 
statutory advisement: 
 
Indeed, if we were to find that § 29-
1819.02(2) allows for the withdrawal of a 
plea based on inadequate translation, we 
would have to read substantial content into 
the statute that does not appear in its text. 
Were we to hold that the statute extends to 
translation inadequacies, subsidiary 
questions such as when is translation 
required, by what standards are alleged 
translation errors to be evaluated, and by 
what evidence are they to be proved would 
inevitably follow. There is nothing in the 
text of the statute that addresses those 
questions, and we are neither well-equipped 
nor authorized to develop answers to them 
on our own.  See, Neb. Const. art. II, § 1; 
Heckman v. Marchio, 296 Neb. 458, 466, 
894 N.W.2d 296, 302 (2017) (explaining 
that “ ‘judicial legislation’ ” violates article 
II, § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution). 
 
when applied to post conviction claims brought under § 29-1819.02, which states that, if the 
defendant carries his burden under both prongs of the statute, the trial court shall vacate the 
judgment of conviction. 
63  Id. at 102, 898 N.W.2d at 364. 
64  301 Neb. 912, 920 N.W.2d 708 (2018). 
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Id. at 922-923; 920 N.W.2d at 715.  And although, at oral argument, 
Garcia contended that the inaccurate translation violated his due process 
rights, the court did not reach that argument because Garcia had not raised 
it in his motion to vacate.  So the holding of the court on the statutory 
basis was, in effect, if the advisement is given correctly in English to a 
defendant, the statute has been satisfied, even if the translation might not 
have been accurate.  Any complaint about the accuracy of translation is a 
due process, and not a statutory, argument. 
 
c. History of Duty of Counsel to Advise. 
 
(1) Strickland v. Washington. 
 
In Strickland v. Washington,65 the U.S. Supreme Court delineated 
standards and factors courts must apply to determine whether or 
not a criminal defendant has received the level of effective 
assistance of counsel required by the Sixth Amendment.  The 
Court imposed a two-pronged test:  first, courts must consider 
whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient; second, courts 
must decide, in the event the performance was deficient, whether 
such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant and therefore 
deprived him or her of a fair trial.  If a defendant can prove up on 
both elements, they state an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) 
claim that opens up post conviction remedies. 
 
(2) Padilla v. Kentucky. 
 
On March 31, 2010, much of the previous jurisprudence in this 
area was drastically altered by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Padilla, supra.   
 
Mr. Padilla, the petitioner, a nearly 40-year lawful permanent 
resident of the United States and Vietnam veteran, was charged 
with transporting around 1000 pounds of marijuana in a 
commercial truck.  After some skirmishing about whether or not 
Padilla had validly consented to a search of the truck, he pled 
guilty to three state crimes, the most serious of which was a drug 
trafficking offense, a felony under Kentucky law.  Padilla was 
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment followed by five years’ 
probation.  Nearly two years after sentencing, Padilla filed a pro 
se collateral attack on his conviction, alleging that his trial counsel 
was ineffective because counsel had failed to investigate and 
advise him of the potential immigration consequences of his guilty 
pleas.  Padilla alleged that trial counsel had told him that he did 
 
65  466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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not need to worry about any immigration consequences of the 
guilty pleas, because of the length of time he had been in the U.S.  
He also alleged that, had he known of the potential immigration 
consequences of the guilty pleas, he would not have pled guilty. 
 
The advice given to Padilla by his criminal defense counsel was 
clearly wrong.  Not only does a drug trafficking conviction have 
an effect on a non-citizen’s legal status, it has one of the most 
detrimental effects possible.  In fact, a drug trafficking offense 
such as the one to which Padilla pled guilty is an aggravated 
felony.66  That not only made Padilla deportable, it barred him 
from qualifying for nearly every type of relief from removal that 
might otherwise be available to him.  So the affirmative advice 
offered by criminal defense counsel was about as incorrect as it 
could be.  Nevertheless, a majority of the Kentucky Supreme 
Court held that, because immigration consequences are “collateral” 
to criminal proceedings, Padilla could not prevail on his Strickland 
challenge.  In so ruling, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that 
there was no constitutional defect in trial counsel’s advice on a 
collateral matter even when that advice was legally incorrect. 
 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions: 
 
1. Whether defense counsel, in order to provide the 
effective assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,  
has a duty to investigate and advise a non-citizen defendant  
whether the offense to which the defendant is pleading  
guilty will result in removal. 
 
2. Whether petitioner’s counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel by affirmatively misadvising 
petitioner concerning the likelihood of removal upon the 
entry of his guilty plea. 
 
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion for the Court, in which 
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined.  
Justices Alito and Roberts concurred in the judgment, while 
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. 
 
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal 
defense counsel to inform his or her non-U.S. citizen client 
whether or not a contemplated guilty plea carries a risk of 
deportation.  The Court also held that constitutionally competent 
counsel would have advised Padilla that his drug conviction made 
 
66  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
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him subject to automatic deportation.  Finally, the Court remanded 
the case to the Kentucky Supreme Court so it could determine 
whether or not Padilla could demonstrate prejudice under 
Stickland’s second prong. 
 
In reaching its holding, the Court made several noteworthy 
observations.  First, the Court held that it need not determine 
whether deportation consequences are “collateral” to criminal 
proceedings, since it found that deportation is an integral part of 
the penalty imposed on non-citizen defendants.67  This is so, the 
Court held, because of various amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act since the early 1990's that have restricted nearly 
every form of relief from deportation that was once available to 
non-citizens facing removal from the U.S.  So it is now beyond 
dispute that at least immigration consequences are not 
“collateral”consequences for criminal proceedings for Sixth 
Amendment purposes. 
 
Second, the Court rejected a rule, which the concurrence would 
have adopted, that would hold only affirmative mis-advice can 
serve as the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
The Court reasoned that such a rule would “give counsel an 
incentive to remain silent on matters of great importance, even 
when answers are readily available,” and “would deny a class of 
clients least able to represent themselves the most rudimentary 
advice on deportation even when it is readily available.”68 
 
Third, the Court dismissed any concerns that its new rule would 
open the floodgates to collateral attacks of convictions in which 
defendants were not advised of potential immigration 
consequences of guilty pleas.   
 
The Court wrote that it had confronted a similar argument in 
Stickland itself but “[a] flood did not follow in that decision’s 
wake.”69  In addition, the Court pointed out, in order to prevail on 
Strickland’s prejudice prong, a defendant must convince a court 
that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational 




67  559 U.S. at 364. 
68  Id. at 370. 
69  Id. at 371-372. 
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Finally, the Court wrote, “It seems unlikely that our decision today 
will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained 
as the result of plea bargains.  For at least the past 15 years, 
professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on 
counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a 
client’s plea.  We should, therefore, presume that counsel satisfied 
their obligation to render competent advice at the time their clients 
considered pleading guilty.”70 
 
This last point is significant.  As the Court later expands upon in 
the opinion, the “professional norms” it refers to are likely to be 
the template for counsel in deciding what type of immigration-
related advice they will need to give to their non-citizen clients 
contemplating guilty pleas. 
 
As to how detailed counsel’s immigration advice must be, the 
Court adopted a sliding scale test.  At a minimum, counsel must 
advise his or her client that a pending criminal charge may carry a 
risk of adverse immigration consequences.71  However, in 
“obvious” cases such as Padilla’s, counsel must advise the client 
that a guilty plea would make him deportable.72  This, of course, 
begs the question of how detailed immigration advice must be in 
those cases that fall between “difficult” and “easy.”  How is 
counsel to figure this out? 
 
Part of the answer comes from the Court’s discussion and review 
of “prevailing norms of practice.”  The Court states that such 
norms are guides to determining whether counsel’s advice is 
competent in any given case.  And, the Court points out, the 
weight of these norms is to advise the client “regarding the risk of 
deportation,”73 which goes much farther than simply advising a 
client that there may be adverse immigration consequences to a 
guilty plea.  This interpretation is bolstered by the concurrence, 
whose rule would have only required counsel to advise a client that 
there could be adverse immigration consequences to a guilty plea, 
something akin to the advisement required to be given by courts 
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02.  The concurrence laments 
 
70  Id. at 372. 
71  Id. at 369. 
72  Id. at 360. 
73  Id. at 367. 
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that the majority goes too far in what it requires.74  That lament 
signals that what the majority requires is something more than just 
“you might be in trouble with Immigration if you plead guilty.”75 
 
A look at some of the “professional norms” mentioned by the 
Court further supports this interpretation.  For example, the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, § 14-3.2(f), states: 
 
To the extent possible, defense counsel should 
determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in 
advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible 
collateral consequences that might ensue from entry 
of the contemplated plea. 
 
The commentary to this section is even more explicit in its 
exhortation: 
 
For example, depending on the jurisdiction, it may 
well be that many clients’ greatest potential 
difficulty, and greatest priority, will be the 
immigration consequences of a conviction.  To 
reflect this reality, counsel should be familiar with 
the basic immigration consequences that flow from 
different types of guilty pleas, and should keep this  
in mind in investigating law and fact and advising 
the client. 
 
(3) Post-Padilla Cases. 
 
There have been a number of post-Padilla cases decided by both 
the United States Supreme Court and various state courts around 
the country, applying the lessons of Padilla to various legal and 
factual settings.  Those cases will be discussed later in this outline 
in the context of the legal issues they raise and resolve.76  
 
74  Id. at 375-376. 
75  The Iowa Supreme Court has held that, where the crime with which a criminal 
defendant is charged clearly involves immigration consequences, then defense counsel has a 
Sixth Amendment obligation to inform the defendant of all possible immigration consequences 
of such a conviction.  Diaz v. State, 896 N.W.2d 723, 732 (Iowa 2017).  See further discussion 
of this case at section I.D.2.c.(3)(d), infra. 
76  For example, I discuss the Descamps case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2013 
in the context of determining whether a statute is “divisible” for purposes of applying the 
categorical analysis.  See section V.C.3.b.(8), infra. 
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However, at this point, it is worth discussing four major post-
Padilla cases: Chaidez v. United States,77 the disposition of 
Padilla on remand to the Kentucky state courts,78 Lee v. United 
States,79 and Diaz v. State,80 an Iowa supreme court case that 
expounds and expands on defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment 
obligations in light of Padilla. 
 
(a) Chaidez v. United States. 
 
Before this case was decided in 2013, Courts of Appeal 
across the U.S. were split on whether Padilla was effective 
retroactively; that is, whether it applied to cases that took 
place before March 31, 2010.81  In a 7-2 opinion written by 
Justice Kagan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, under the 
Teague v. Lane82 test, Padilla does not operate 
retroactively. 
 
Interestingly, however, that is not necessarily the end of the 
story.  It is the end of the story, of course, if one is talking 
about retroactivity under a federal constitutional analysis.  
However, other state courts have held, as a matter of state 
constitutional principles, that Padilla does have a 
retroactive effect when analyzed under state law.83  The 
analysis of these state courts varies, but the authority for a 
state court to apply its own retroactivity analysis is rooted 
in the case of Danforth v. Minnesota,84 which held that the 
Teague rule does not constrain the authority of state courts 
to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure 
than is required by federal law. 
 
 
77 568 U.S. 342 (2013). 
78  Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). 
79  137 S.Ct. 1958, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017). 
80  896 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 2017). 
81  Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 347, footnote 2. 
82  489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
83  See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, 333 P.3d 240 (NM 2014); Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 
Mass. 422, 995 N.E.2d 760 (2013). 
84  552 U.S. 264 (2008). 
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The New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion in Ramirez is 
particularly interesting, since it relied primarily on the fact 
that, since 1990, a court rule required that New Mexico 
courts and practitioners had to ascertain if defendants 
understood possible immigration consequences of guilty 
pleas.  As the New Mexico Supreme Court pointed out: 
 
Unlike the federal system, since 1990 New 
Mexico has required attorneys in all trial 
courts to advise their clients of the details of 
the plea colloquy. [The Supreme Court 
form] was amended in 1990 to, among other 
things, require the judge to advise the 
defendant that a conviction may have an 
effect on the defendant's immigration status. 
[The form], applicable to all New Mexico 
trial courts, also obligated the attorney to 
certify having explained the plea colloquy to 
the client in detail.85 
 
Because of this fact, the New Mexico Supreme Court had 
no problem in holding that, in New Mexico state courts, 
Padilla did apply retroactively, since a professional 
standard of conduct had been established under state law 
that pre-dated Padilla by 20 years. 
 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court took a different route to 
arrive at its decision that Padilla applies retroactively.86  
The Court began by pointing out that, prior to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chaidez, it had held that 
Padilla was effective retroactively.87  But it revisited that 
decision in the wake of the Chaidez decision.  The Sylvain 
opinion held that the U.S. Supreme Court, post-Teague, has 
adopted a rule about what constitutes a “new rule” that 
expands what Teague originally imagined: 
 
Although we consider the retroactivity 
framework established in Teague to be 
sound in principle, the Supreme Court's 
post-Teague expansion of what qualifies as a 
 
85  Ramirez, 333 P.3d at 244. 
86  Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 995 N.E.2d 760 (2013). 
87  Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 949 N.E.2d 892 (2011). 
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“new” rule has become so broad that 
decisions defining a constitutional safeguard 
rarely merit application on collateral 
review.88 
 
As a result, the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to 
follow Chaidez and concluded that Padilla did not, in fact, 
establish a “new rule.”89 
 
The Nebraska Supreme Court, citing Chaidez, has held that 
Padilla does not apply retroactively.90  But the issue was 
not squarely raised or briefed by the parties in the case, and 
the analysis by the Nebraska Supreme Court was not as 
detailed as that of either the Massachusetts or New Mexico 
Supreme Courts, nor did it appear to address the issue in a  
Danforth context.  As a result, this issue may still be an 
open one, as a matter of state law, in Nebraska. 
 
The rationale used by the New Mexico Supreme Court 
might get some traction in Nebraska.  Using that general 
rationale, the Washington Supreme Court, in In re Yung-
Cheng Tsai,91 held that Padilla is retroactive as a matter of 
state law because, since 1983, Washington has had a statute 
requiring that a non-citizen criminal defendant be warned 
about immigration consequences before pleading guilty.  
That statute took the form of a standard plea form that all 
criminal defendants, their lawyers, and prosecutors must 
sign at the time the court is asked to accept a guilty plea.  
One of the advisements in the form reads a lot like § 29-
1819.02: 
 
If I am not a citizen of the United States, a 
plea of guilty to an offense punishable as a 
crime under state law is grounds for 
deportation, exclusion from admission to the 
 
88  Sylvain, 466 Mass. at 433, 995 N.E.2d at 769. 
89  The Court of Appeals of New York agreed with the holding in Chaidez in People v. 
Baret, 23 N.Y.3d 777, 16 N.E.3d 1216, 992 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2014).  However, the decision was 
3-2, and both the majority and dissent do an excellent job of laying out the arguments both for 
and against retroactive application of Padilla under a Danforth-type analysis. 
90  State v. Osorio, 286 Neb. 384, 837 N.W.2d 66 (2013). 
91  183 Wash.2d 91, 351 P.3d 138 (2015). 
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United States, or denial of naturalization 
pursuant to the laws of the United States. 
 
The Washington Supreme Court held that the existence of 
this form – and the language regarding possible 
immigration consequences contained within it – give non-
citizen defendants the “unequivocal right to advice 
regarding immigration consequences and necessarily 
imposes a correlative duty on defense counsel to ensure 
that advice is provided.”92  And, the failure of a lawyer to 
investigate the potential immigration consequences of a 
plea, without any tactical purpose, is constitutionally 
deficient performance by the lawyer.93  Therefore, given 
the existence of the statute (and court form) since 1983, the 
Washington Supreme Court held that Padilla is a garden 
variety application of the Strickland test that simply refines 
the scope of defense counsel’s constitutional duties to the 
client.94 
 
Wouldn’t the same hold true in Nebraska, at least since     
§ 29-1819.02 came into existence in July, 2002?  Since 
that time, all Nebraska courts and practitioners have been 
aware that it is the intent of the Legislature that a criminal 
defendant entering a guilty plea be advised by the court that 
such a plea may have immigration consequences.  The 
Washington statute reads very similar to the Nebraska 
statute.95 A competent defense lawyer in Nebraska, at least 
since July, 2002, is aware of a non-citizen criminal 
defendant’s right to be advised that a plea may carry 
negative immigration consequences and, therefore, the 
lawyer should have a correlative duty to advise a non-
citizen defendant of possible immigration consequences of 
a guilty plea.  And to that extent, Padilla did not impose a 
 
92  Id. at 101, 351 P.3d at 143. 
93  Id. at 102, 351 P.3d at 144. 
94  Id. at 103, 351 P.3d at 144. 
95  Compare RCWA 10.40.200(2) with § 29-1819.02: 
Prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty to any offense punishable as a crime 
under state law, except offenses designated as infractions under state law, the 
court shall determine that the defendant has been advised of the following 
potential consequences of conviction for a defendant who is not a citizen of 
the United States: Deportation, exclusion from admission to the United 
States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States. 
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“new rule” for purposes of the Teague analysis.  Or so the 
argument goes. 
 
(b) Padilla on Remand.  
 
As discussed earlier, the Strickland test regarding 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims is two-fold: (1) 
whether the assistance of counsel falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and (2) if so, whether the client 
suffered prejudice as a result of deficient performance by 
counsel.  The Padilla decision by the Supreme Court 
decided the first Strickland issue, but remanded the case to 
the Kentucky state courts on the prejudice issue because 
they had not had a chance to engage in the prejudice 
analysis. 
 
On remand, Mr. Padilla argued that he was prejudiced by 
counsel’s deficient performance because, had he been 
advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, 
he would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on 
going to trial.  However, that subjective argument is not, 
by itself, sufficient to prevail on the Strickland prejudice 
prong.  Instead, one must show that the decision to reject a 
plea offer and proceed to trial would have been objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances.96  The Kentucky trial 
court held that Mr. Padilla had not shown prejudice because 
a decision to proceed to trial would not have been 
reasonable under the circumstances.  Padilla appealed to 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial 
court’s holding and determined that Mr. Padilla had, in fact, 
produced evidence sufficient to meet his burden to show 
prejudice. 
 
In so holding, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, citing the 
Third Circuit in United States v. Orocio,97 stressed how the 
calculus in decisions in cases involving immigration 
consequences are different from those in cases that do not 
involve immigration consequences: 
 
For the [non-citizen] defendant most 
concerned with remaining in the United 
States. . . it is not at all unreasonable to go to 
 
96  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
97  645 F.3d 630 (2011). 
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trial and risk a ten-year sentence and 
guaranteed removal, but with the chance of 
acquittal and the right to remain in the 
United States, instead of pleading guilty to 
an offense that, while not an aggravated 
felony, carries “presumptively mandatory” 
removal consequences. . . . 
 
Likewise, we conclude that although not the 
exclusive factor when determining whether 
a particular defendant’s decision to insist on 
a trial would have been rational, the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea 
can be the predominate factor.98 
 
(c) Lee v. United States.  
 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals’ reasoning in the Padilla 
case on remand was vindicated by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Lee v. United States99  In that case, a criminal defendant 
was charged with a drug trafficking offense, which 
amounted to an aggravated felony.  The defendant was a 
long-time legal permanent resident (LPR) who had lived in 
the United States for 35 years and who had never been back 
to his country of nationality since coming to the U.S.  
After being charged with the drug trafficking crime, he 
repeatedly asked his criminal defense counsel if he should 
be worried about possible immigration consequences of the 
charge, as well as the possible immigration consequences 
of the plea deal that the prosecution was offering him.  
And his criminal defense counsel repeatedly (and 
erroneously) told him no, that he had nothing to worry 
about regarding possible immigration consequences. 
 
As a result, Mr. Lee agreed to plead guilty to a charge that 
turned out to be an aggravated felony drug trafficking 
offense.  Once he found out that such a conviction had 
severe negative immigration consequences, he filed a 
motion to vacate his conviction, arguing that his counsel 
had provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Both the trial court and appellate court held that 
Mr. Lee had demonstrated that his counsel was ineffective 
 
98  Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d at 329 (internal citations omitted). 
99  137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017). 
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under the Strickland analysis, but further held that, because 
the evidence against him was very strong, he could not 
show that he had suffered prejudice as a result of his 
counsel’s incorrect advice. 
 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  After reiterating that a 
criminal defendant is entitled to constitutionally competent 
representation even at the plea-bargaining stage, the Court 
held that the usual test on prejudice, which is whether, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
criminal proceeding would have been different, was 
inapplicable in a case where a plea deal was struck.  In 
such a case, the Court said, the focus when analyzing 
Strickland’s prejudice prong is whether the ineffective 
assistance of counsel led to a forfeiture of the proceeding 
itself.100  Therefore, the proper test is whether the 
defendant can demonstrate a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial. 
 
The government contended that Lee could not prevail on 
the prejudice prong unless he could demonstrate that he 
would have been better off going to trial.  Further, the 
government contended that, given the overwhelming 
evidence of Lee’s guilt, there was no possible way for him 
to make this showing in his case. 
 
The Supreme Court held that was not the proper focus.  
Instead, the focus should be on whether it was reasonable 
for Lee, given his overwhelming concern about the possible 
immigration consequences of his plea, to insist on going to 
trial even in the face of the strong evidence against him.  
The calculus, the Court held, must include an objective 
inquiry, under the particular facts and circumstances of this 
case, of whether, given the totality of the circumstances, a 
decision to reject the plea offer was rational. 
 
We cannot agree that it would be irrational 
for a defendant in Lee’s position to reject the 
plea offer in favor of trial. But for his 
attorney’s incompetence, Lee would have 
known that accepting the plea agreement 
would certainly lead to deportation. Going 
to trial? Almost certainly. If deportation 
 
100  Id. at 1965. 
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were the ‘‘determinative issue’’ for an 
individual in plea discussions, as it was for 
Lee; if that individual had strong 
connections to this country and no other, as 
did Lee; and if the consequences of taking a 
chance at trial were not markedly harsher 
than pleading, as in this case, that ‘‘almost’’ 
could make all the difference.  Balanced 
against holding on to some chance of 
avoiding deportation was a year or two more 
of prison time. Not everyone in Lee’s 
position would make the choice to reject the 
plea. But we cannot say it would be 
irrational to do so.101 
 
(d) Diaz v. State.  
 
The Iowa Supreme Court decided a major case in 2017 
regarding defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment obligations 
in light of Padilla.  Although the decision is not binding 
on Nebraska courts, the decision did come from our next-
door neighbor, and is examined for the reason that it might 
have some persuasive value in Nebraska. 
 
Mr. Morales Diaz was an undocumented immigrant who, at 
the time of the events in the case, had been living in the 
United States since 2002.  He had a young daughter who 
was a U.S. citizen.  Until he was taken into custody by 
ICE, he was her primary caregiver.  Mr. Morales Diaz was 
charged with forgery (a class “D” felony under Iowa law) 
as a result of possessing a Texas identification card that he 
bought on the street, which he admitted was not a 
legitimate document. 
 
After consulting with his criminal defense lawyer, Mr. 
Morales Diaz agreed to plead guilty to an aggravated 
misdemeanor forgery under Iowa Code section 
715A.2(2)(b).  Defense counsel told Mr. Morales Diaz that 
he was “probably going to be deported to Mexico no matter 
what happened,” both because he was undocumented in the 
U.S. and because he had previously missed a hearing in 
Immigration Court.  As a result of his criminal conviction, 
Mr. Morales Diaz was removed to Mexico.  However, he 
returned to the U.S. in custody of the Department of 
 
101  Id. at 1968-1969. 
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Homeland Security and filed a post conviction claim in 
which he alleged his criminal defense counsel was 
ineffective under a Strickland analysis for failing to advise 
him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. 
 
In a remarkable opinion, the court granted Morales Diaz’s 
post conviction claim, holding that he met both Strickland 
prongs: deficient performance by trial counsel and resulting 
prejudice.  The court also held: 
 
ꞏ Counsel’s duty to advise a criminal 
defendant of immigration consequences 
exists separate and apart from the colloquy 
engaged in by a trial court under Iowa Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 2.8.102 
 
ꞏ Counsel has a duty, under Padilla, to 
advise noncitizen defendants whether a 
conviction of a crime “is also a crime that 
renders a noncitizen deportable.”103 
 
ꞏ Once it is clear that conviction of a 
particular offense will result in immigration 
consequences, defense counsel must advise 
the defendant not only that immigration 
consequences will follow, but precisely what 
those consequences will be.  Such 
consequences not only relate to the 
likelihood of deportation, but also to 
unavailability of relief from removal (such 
as eligibility for cancellation of removal), 
grounds of inadmissibility, and the 
likelihood of mandatory detention by ICE.104 
 
The Iowa supreme court recognized that 
these duties are burdensome, but, referring 
to the ABA Standards for Criminal 
 
102  The text of that Rule states that a trial court must address the defendant in open court 
and, inter alia, make certain that the defendant is aware “that a criminal conviction, deferred 
judgment, or deferred sentence may affect a defendant’s status under federal immigration laws.”  
Compare this language with the language in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02, supra. 
103  Diaz, 896 N.W.2d at 729. 
104  Id. at 732. 
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Justice,105 said “we do not find them too 
onerous a burden to place on the 
professional advisers employed to represent 
their clients’ best interests.”106 
 
The court said that, in its opinion, Padilla 
did not alter the standard to which defense 
counsel is held.  “Instead, counsel after 
Padilla is held to the same standard counsel 
was before Padilla: to provide objectively 
reasonable assistance as measured by 
prevailing professional norms.”107 
 
(4) Post-Padilla Nebraska Cases. 
 
The Nebraska Supreme Court has decided a number of post 
conviction cases in which defendants argued that their criminal 
defense lawyers were ineffective because they did not advise the 
defendants of immigration consequences of guilty pleas they 
entered.  Those decisions are reviewed below. 
 
(a) State v. Gonzalez.  
 
State v. Gonzalez108 is the seminal case in this area.  The 
defendant in that case was undocumented.  As a result of 
her not having any immigration status, Gonzalez was 
placed into removal proceedings by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement in late 2006.  In 2007, while those 
immigration proceedings were still pending, she was 
charged with fraudulently receiving public assistance 
benefits, a Class IV felony.  She was initially arraigned in 
early 2008, and pled not guilty.  Two months later, she 
withdrew her not guilty plea and entered a plea of no 
contest to the charge, in exchange for the State’s agreement 
to recommend a sentence of probation.  She also agreed to 
pay restitution in the amount of $18,522, the amount of 
benefits unlawfully obtained by her.  The trial court gave 
Gonzalez the statutory advisement in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-
 
105  Particularly 4-5.5 (4th ed. 2015). 
106  Diaz, 896 N.W.2d at 731. 
107  Id. at 730. 
108  283 Neb. 1, 807, N.W.2d 759 (2012). 
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1819.02 both at the time of her arraignment and at the time 
of the entry of her no contest plea.  The court accepted her 
no contest plea and sentenced her to a term of 5 years’ 
probation. 
 
Her conviction made Gonzalez ineligible for a type of relief 
from removal, specifically, cancellation of removal for 
certain non-permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).  
The conviction made her ineligible for cancellation of 
removal both because it was a “crime involving moral 
turpitude” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and because it 
was an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (specifically, the offense was an 
aggravated felony because of 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(I), which states that a crime involving 
fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim exceeds 
$10,000 is an aggravated felony). 
 
As a result, in July 2010, over two years after she was 
convicted, but while she was still in state custody pursuant 
to her conviction, Gonzalez filed a “Motion to Withdraw 
Plea and Vacate Judgment,” alleging she had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because her criminal 
defense lawyer had not told her that conviction of the 
charge to which she pled no contest would bar her from 
qualifying for cancellation of removal.  Gonzalez’s 
testimony at the hearing on her motion to withdraw her plea 
revealed that she had only learned of this immigration 
consequence about five months before filing her motion, 
and only then because she was consulting with a different 
lawyer who advised her of this consequence.  The trial 
court denied her motion, finding that she had failed to 
demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s failure to tell her of 
the immigration consequences of her plea.  Gonzalez 
appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court. 
 
The first argument the court addressed was whether it had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal.  The State 
argued that there was no jurisdiction because there was no 
vehicle for Gonzalez to use to withdraw her guilty plea 
over two years after conviction and judgment.  The 
supreme court held that it did have jurisdiction over the 
appeal.  In a detailed discussion, the supreme court held 
that there are three avenues available for a defendant to use 
to seek to withdraw a guilty plea if she claims she was not 
advised of the immigration consequences of such a plea: 
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(1) a motion for post conviction relief under the Nebraska 
Post Conviction Act; (2) statutory vacatur of a plea under 
§§ 29-1819.02 and 29-1819.03; and (3) a “common law 
motion to withdraw a plea.”109  The supreme court found 
that Gonzalez was not proceeding under the Post 
Conviction Act, nor was she seeking to use the statutory 
procedure in Chapter 29.  So it turned its attention to the 
only remaining possibility: her common law motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea. 
 
To begin with, the supreme court reiterated what it had 
foreshadowed in Rodriguez-Torres:110  that a common law 
motion to withdraw a plea might exist in cases where a 
defendant could not use the provisions of either § 29-
1819.02 or the Post Conviction Act to vacate the 
conviction.  The court’s language is important, and bears 
repeating verbatim (footnotes have been omitted): 
 
Gonzalez has pursued [a common law 
motion] here.  And contrary to the State’s 
suggestion, it is well established that a 
defendant may move to withdraw a plea, 
even after final judgment.  However, the 
grounds for such a withdrawal are quite 
difficult for a defendant to prove –- the bar 
is set high.  If a motion to withdraw a plea 
of guilty or no contest is made before 
sentencing, a court, in its discretion, may 
allow a defendant to withdraw his or her 
plea for any fair and just reason, provided 
the prosecution would not be substantially 
prejudiced by its reliance on the plea.  But 
with respect to withdrawal of a plea of guilty 
or no contest made after sentencing, 
withdrawal is proper only where the 
defendant makes a timely motion and 
establishes, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that withdrawal is necessary to 
correct a manifest injustice.  That standard 
applies even where a motion to withdraw a 
plea has been made after the sentencing 
court’s judgment has become final.  A 
 
109  Id. at 6, 807 N.W.2d at 765. 
110  Section I.D.2.b.(1)(a), supra. 
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motion for withdrawal is timely if made 
with due diligence, considering the nature of 
the allegations therein, and is not necessarily 
barred because it was made subsequent to 
judgment or sentence.111 
 
The common law motion described by the court was not 
given a name – it is simply a “common law motion to 
withdraw a plea.”  However, the court goes on to describe 
exactly how a defendant can show “manifest injustice” 
sufficient to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea after 
judgment or sentence by way of a common law motion: 
 
We have explained that “manifest injustice” 
may be proved if the defendant proves, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) he or 
she was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel guaranteed by constitution, statute, 
or rule; (2) the plea was not entered or 
ratified by the defendant or a person 
authorized to so act on his or her behalf; (3) 
the plea was involuntary, or was entered 
without knowledge of the charge or that the 
sentence actually imposed could be 
imposed; or (4) he or she did not receive the 
charge or sentence concessions 
contemplated by the plea agreement and the 
prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not to 
oppose those concessions as promised in the 
plea agreement.  And the defendant must 
plead and prove that such omissions have 
resulted in prejudice.112 
 
In effect, in order to demonstrate “manifest injustice” 
sufficient to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing where 
the issue is ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
must prove up a Strickland/Hill113 claim by clear and 
convincing evidence.  It is also significant that the court’s 
 
111  Gonzalez, 283 Neb. at 7, 807 N.W.2d at 766. 
112  Id. at 8, 807 N.W.2d at 766. 
113  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), is the case in which the Supreme Court held 
that Sixth Amendment effective assistance of counsel requirements apply to the plea negotiation 
stage of criminal proceedings. 
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description of “manifest injustice” tracks exactly the 
language found in Standard 14-2.1(b) of the ABA 
Standards of Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty.  Although 
the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that these standards 
have not been “adopted” by the Nebraska Supreme Court in 
any formal sense,114 the fact that the test set out by the 
court in Gonzalez for demonstrating “manifest injustice” 
exactly tracks the language in the ABA Standards suggests 
that, at the very least, the provisions of those Standards are 
highly influential in interpreting state common law in this 
area. 
 
The court ultimately affirmed the denial of Gonzalez’s 
motion, holding that she had not shown any prejudice from 
the failure of trial counsel to inform her of the immigration 
consequences of her plea.  The court held that Gonzalez’s 
testimony that she “would have looked for another 
solution” did not carry her burden of proof to show, by 
clear and convincing evidence under the Strickland/Hill 
prejudice prong, that she would have rejected the plea offer 
in favor of going to trial, and that such rejection would 
have been objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 
 
(b) State v. Diaz. 
 
In State v. Diaz115 the defendant sought to withdraw a 
guilty plea he had entered in 2000, due to his lawyer’s 
failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of 
the guilty plea.  The procedural vehicle Diaz sought to use 
to withdraw his plea was a writ of error coram nobis.116  At 
the time he filed his motion, Diaz had completed his 
sentence, and was no longer in state custody.  The crimes 
 
114  State v. Minshall, 227 Neb. 210, 213-214, 416 N.W.2d 585, 588 (1987); State v. 
Irish, 223 Neb. 814, 818-819, 394 N.W.2d 879, 882 (1986). 
115  283 Neb. 414, 808 N.W.2d 891 (2012). 
116  The purpose of the writ of error coram nobis is to bring before the court rendering 
judgment matters of fact which, if known at the time the judgment was rendered, would have 
prevented its rendition. It enables the court to recall some adjudication that was made while some 
fact existed which would have prevented rendition of the judgment but which, through no fault 
of the party, was not presented. The burden of proof in a proceeding to obtain a writ of error 
coram nobis is upon the applicant claiming the error, and the alleged error of fact must be such 
as would have prevented a conviction. It is not enough to show that it might have caused a 
different result.  Id. at 420, 808 N.W.2d at 896. 
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to which Diaz pled guilty were misdemeanor attempted 
possession of cocaine, and driving while intoxicated.  
Diaz, a Honduran national, had been in the United States 
since 1994 pursuant to a grant of Temporary Protected 
Status from the United States Attorney General, which 
allowed him to stay in the United States, and work 
lawfully, until such time as the Attorney General 
determined it was safe for Hondurans to return home.  
Diaz’s convictions made him removable from the United 
States because a TPS recipient who is convicted of two or 
more misdemeanors loses his TPS status.117  Since Diaz 
had no other immigration status and no other relief from 
removal available to him, that meant he had no way to 
remain in the United States. 
 
The trial court found that Diaz’s uncontradicted testimony 
was insufficient to prove that he was not advised of 
immigration consequences by his trial lawyer in 2000, and 
further found that his testimony alone was insufficient to 
prove that he was currently in removal proceedings.  As a 
result, the trial court denied his motion for a writ of error 
coram nobis.  Diaz appealed. 
 
The State argued that Diaz’s motion should be considered 
to be the type of common law motion described by the 
court in Gonazlez, supra, and that a court does not have 
jurisdiction to consider such a motion once the defendant 
has completed his sentence.  The supreme court declined 
to consider Diaz’ motion as anything other than a motion 
for writ of error coram nobis, however, since all parties and 
the trial court had always treated the motion in that way.  It 
then proceeded to analyze the propriety of a writ of error 
coram nobis in Diaz’ situation. 
 
The supreme court held that a writ of error coram nobis 
was not available to allow Diaz to withdraw his guilty plea.  
The essence of the writ, the court held, is to allow vacatur 
of a guilty plea where some unknown fact existed at the 
time of the plea that, had it been known, would have 
prevented the rendition of the judgment.  The court held 
that Diaz’s claim – that Padilla had been decided after his 
plea was entered – was not an unknown fact at the time he 
entered his plea, but rather an unknown issue of law.  
Although the court recognized that several federal courts 
 
117  8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)(B)(i). 
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have allowed withdrawal of pleas under a coram nobis 
theory in cases such as Diaz’s, it found that the state law 
elements of a coram nobis claim in Nebraska do not match 
those in federal court, making coram nobis unavailable in a 
situation such as Diaz’s.  The court also clarified that 
common law motions, such as coram nobis (and the motion 
described by the court in Gonzalez, supra), originate from 
Nebraska’s adoption of English common law, as codified in 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-101. 
 
Given its disposition of the case, the court did not reach the 
issue of whether Padilla applies retroactively. 
 
(c) State v. Yuma. 
 
The defendant in State v. Yuma118 raised two issues on 
appeal: (1) could he use a common law motion to withdraw 
his plea, as recognized in Gonzalez, and (2) did Padilla 
apply to Yuma’s case, since he plead guilty before Padilla 
was decided? 
 
The supreme court held that the common law motion was 
available to Mr. Yuma because he could not use the 
Nebraska Post-Conviction Act to assert his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  He was released immediately 
upon being sentenced to time served and therefore was 
never in state custody as a result of his conviction, which is 
a requirement of the Post-Conviction Act. 
 
As to the second issue, the supreme court held that Padilla 
did apply to Mr. Yuma’s case.  Although he entered his 
guilty plea before Padilla was decided, he was not 
sentenced until after Padilla was decided.  Because his 
conviction was not final until the sentence was imposed, 
and because that date was after Padilla was decided, the 
“new rule” announced by Padilla applied to Mr. Yuma. 
 
(d) State v. Chojolan. 
 
In State v. Chojolan,119 the supreme court held that Padilla 
does not apply retroactively to pleas that were entered 
before its effective date of March 31, 2010.  However, as 
 
118  286 Neb. 244, 835 N.W.2d 679 (2013). 
119  288 Neb. 760, 851 N.W.2d 661 (2014). 
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noted above,120 the Nebraska Supreme Court has never 
engaged in a detailed analysis of whether Padilla might 
apply retroactively under a state law Strickland analysis 
made possible by Danforth.  The sum total of the supreme 
court’s reasoning of this issue was succinct: 
 
In prior cases, we have noted that in Chaidez 
v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
because Padilla, which was decided in 2010, 
announced a new rule, those defendants 
whose convictions became final prior to 
Padilla could not benefit from its holding. . . 
. In the present case, Chojolan was 
convicted and sentenced in 2006, and 
therefore the rule announced in Padilla in 
2010 does not apply retroactively to his 
conviction.  We conclude that the district 
court did not err when it determined that 
Padilla did not apply retroactively to 
Chojolan’s 2006 plea and conviction.121 
 
(e) State v. Mamer. 
 
State v. Mamer122 is a case with difficult facts that led to a 
questionable outcome.  Mr. Mamer was charged with first 
degree sexual assault.  On advice of counsel, he pled guilty 
to attempted first degree sexual assault.  As the result of 
his conviction, Mamer served approximately three weeks 
after sentencing, since much of his sentence was comprised 
of time already served before the date of his sentencing.  
Mamer was discharged from state custody on October 7, 
2011.  On February 9, 2012, Mamer filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his criminal defense 
counsel had not given him any advice regarding the 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea.123  The basis 
 
120  See section I.D.2.c.(3)(a), supra. 
121  288 Neb. at 763, 851 N.W.2d at 663-664.  The supreme court again reiterated, in 
summary fashion, that Padilla is not retroactive in State v. Sandoval, 288 Neb. 754, 851 N.W.2d 
656 (2014). 
122  289 Neb. 92, 853 N.W.2d 517 (2014). 
123  It is beyond dispute that Mamer’s conviction of first degree sexual assault was an 
aggravated felony.  See INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). 
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of his motion was, in essence, the “manifest injustice” 
prong of the common law motion establish by the Nebraska 
Supreme Court in State v. Gonzalez, supra.  The trial court 
denied Mamer’s motion and he appealed. 
 
The main issue in the case was whether or not Mamer 
could have proceeded under the Post-Conviction Act to try 
to vacate his guilty plea.  As Gonzalez held, a common law 
motion to vacate is only appropriate if no other post 
conviction remedy is available to the movant.  The court 
held that, because Mamer was in state custody for three 
weeks following his conviction, he could have proceeded 
under the Post Conviction Act and therefore it was proper 
for the trial court to grant the State’s motion to dismiss his 
common law motion to vacate.  Mamer’s argument that he 
was not aware of the immigration consequences until the 
moment he was released from state custody was unavailing: 
 
Mamer argues in essence that his claim [of 
ineffective assistance of counsel] did not 
arise until after he was released from 
incarceration and knew of the immigration 
consequences of his plea–-and thus knew 
that his trial counsel’s performance was 
ineffective. . . . Mamer views the factual 
predicate as including the actual 
commencement of removal proceedings, 
especially since he lacked representation 
while incarcerated to inform him of the 
presumptively mandatory deportation law   
. . . . Especially when Mamer was advised 
by the district court that his plea could have 
immigration consequences, Mamer with due 
diligence could have discovered his Padilla 
claim while still incarcerated. . . . Mamer 
plainly knew at the time of trial counsel’s 
representation what trial counsel did and did 
not advise him of. . . . We conclude that 
Mamer’s unawareness of the Padilla 
opinion, which was decided before his plea, 
does not concern the factual predicate for his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
Such alleged ignorance of Padilla concerns 
only the legal significance of the relevant 
objective facts. . . . In the exercise of due 
diligence—either with or without new 
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counsel—Mamer could have discovered the 
applicable deportation law while 
incarcerated.124 
 
This case enunciates a difficult and unforgiving rule.  
Here, the defendant alleged that his criminal defense 
counsel gave him no advice whatsoever that his guilty plea 
carried immigration consequences.  He discovered those 
immigration consequences only when ICE arrived to take 
him into custody for removal proceedings – the very point 
in time at which he was no longer in state custody.  Yet, 
because he was in state custody for three weeks after his 
criminal sentence was imposed, the court held that the 
common law motion to vacate was not available to him 
because he could have, without input from or assistance of 
counsel, filed a post conviction claim under the Post- 
Conviction Act during the three weeks he was in state 
custody. 
 
The court pins its analysis on two factors.  First, it notes 
that Mamer was given the general immigration advisement 
required by § 29-1819.02 at the time he entered his guilty 
plea.  Second, it states that the factual predicate for 
Mamer’s claim was his knowledge that his defense counsel 
did not advise him of the immigration consequences of his 
guilty plea.  And, the court holds, the fact that Mamer only 
later understood the legal significance of this omission by 
criminal defense counsel does not mean that he was 
unaware of the fact that he was not advised regarding the 
immigration consequences of his plea.   
 
The first point is highly problematic, because, in essence, it 
holds that a trial court that complies with its statutory duty 
under § 29-1819.02 has inoculated trial counsel against an 
ineffective assistance claim.125  Other courts, citing both 
general principles and formal standards of practice, have 
disagreed with this conclusion, holding that the Sixth 
Amendment obligation mandated by Padilla is not affected 
 
124  289 Neb. at 97-100, 853 N.W.2d at 523-524 (emphasis supplied). 
125  This is not the first time the supreme court has hinted at this interpretation.  See also 
State v. Barrera-Garrido, 296 Neb. 647 (2017) and State v. Armendariz, 289 Neb. 896 (2015), in 
which the supreme court implies that advice by the court may cure the failure of counsel to 
comply with their Strickland obligations.  However, both of those cases were decided before the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided the Lee case, so their conclusions are subject to question. 
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or ameliorated by a general immigration advisement 
delivered by the court at the time it accepts a guilty plea.126 
 
The second point puts unrepresented defendants in an 
untenable position of not only needing to be aware of naked 
facts giving rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, but also of the legal significance of those facts.  
Under the court’s holding, it was enough that Mr. Mamer 
knew that he was not advised of the immigration 
consequences of his guilty plea.  Given his knowledge of 
what his counsel did not advise him, the court held that he 
could have, through the exercise of due diligence, brought 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before he knew 
that ICE wanted to deport him.127  This rationale puts 
defendants who have received no advice regarding 
immigration consequences of their guilty plea in the nearly 
impossible position of having to discover those 
consequences on their own. 
 
(f) State v. Merheb. 
 
In State v. Merheb,128 the court held that a defendant whose 
 
126  See, e.g., U.S. v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 646 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other 
grounds by Chaidez v. U.S., 568 U.S. 342 (2013):  “The gist of the government's argument is 
that these two [court] colloquies, in tandem, put Mr. Orocio on notice that he could be removed. 
With that notice, the government argues, Mr. Orocio should have prepared arguments on appeal 
or filed a § 2255 petition. The question under Strickland and Hill, however, is not whether Mr. 
Orocio had later access to remedies, but whether he would have pled guilty at all.”  See also, 
Commentary, Standard 14.3-2, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF 
GUILTY, 3d ed. (1999): “Although the court must inquire into the defendant’s understanding of 
the possible consequences at the time the plea is received under Standard 14-1.4, this inquiry, is 
not, of course, any substitute for advice by counsel.  The court’s warning comes just before the 
plea is taken, and may not afford time for mature reflection.  The defendant cannot, without risk 
of making damaging admissions, discuss candidly with the court the questions he or she may 
have.  Moreover, there are relevant considerations which will not be covered by the judge in his 
or her admonition.”  See also, United States v. Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2015). 
127  Ironically, the court correctly states that the prejudice element of Mamer’s claim 
relates to the decision of whether or not to plead guilty, not to whether he was subject to being 
deported as a result of the guilty plea.  289 Neb. at 100, 853 N.W.2d at 524.  Yet at the time 
Mamer chose to plead guilty, he was not in possession of the legal knowledge regarding the 
immigration consequences of that plea, because trial counsel never advised him of those 
consequences. 
128  290 Neb. 83, 858 N.W.2d 226 (2015). 
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conviction was final before Padilla was not entitled to 
vacate his guilty plea, since the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Chaidez held that Padilla is not effective retroactively.  
Again, though, there was not explicit analysis by the court 
as to whether the result might be different under a purely 
state analysis done pursuant to a Danforth analysis. 
 
(g) State v. Jerke. 
 
In State v. Jerke,129 the Nebraska Supreme Court was 
invited to revisit its holding in Mamer under facts very 
similar to those in Mamer. 
 
In 2012, Jerke pled guilty to an aggravated felony crime of 
violence, and was sentenced by the trial court to a term of 
imprisonment of four to six years.  At no time did his trial 
counsel advise him of the immigration consequences of his 
guilty plea.  In 2015, while serving his sentence, Jerke 
learned that he was not eligible for work release because he 
had an “immigration hold” on him.  In 2017, after he had 
been released from state custody and after being formally 
notified that ICE was seeking to deport him, Jerke, through 
new counsel, filed a common law motion to vacate his 
conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
The State opposed Jerke’s motion at the hearing, arguing 
that the common law procedure was not available to him 
because he could have brought his claim under the Post 
Conviction Act while in state custody.  Jerke prevailed on 
his post conviction claim at the trial level, arguing that the 
State had waived its objection by failing to file a motion to 
dismiss.  The State appealed, both as to the procedural 
issue and as to the merits of Jerke’s common law post 
conviction claim. 
 
The supreme court held that the unavailability of either a 
statutory vacatur remedy under § 29-1819.02, or under the 
Post Conviction Act, is not an affirmative defense that must 
be raised by the State but, instead, is a material element of a 
defendant’s claim, which must be pled and proved.  As to 
the merits of Jerke’s claim, the court held that he could 
have filed under the Act while still in state custody, and  
 
 
129  302 Neb. 372, 923 N.W.2d 78 (2019). 
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that the common law remedy was therefore not available to 
him: 
 
Jerke argues that the “logical effect” of 
Mamer is “to place an obligation on an 
untrained defendant to generate the 
wherewithal to perform as a more competent 
attorney than his actual attorney, and to do 
so from within the confines of prison at a 
time when he has no reason to suspect a 
problem to begin with.”   
 
Jerke's argument mischaracterizes our 
holding in Mamer. Most notably, Mamer did 
not hold that the factual predicate of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim exists 
at a time when a defendant has “no reason to 
suspect there was a problem.” To the 
contrary, Mamer held that the factual 
predicate could have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence 
once the defendant was advised by the trial 
court, pursuant to § 29-1819.02(1), that a 
conviction may result in immigration 
consequences. Mamer reasoned that from 
and after the time of that advisement, the 
defendant knew of a possible problem with 
his immigration status and, with the exercise 
of due diligence, could have discovered and 
raised the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel argument during the period of 
incarceration. 
 
Id. at 384, 923 N.W.2d at 86.  In other words, the court 
stuck by its guns and refused to revisit its holding – and the 
underpinnings of that holding – announced in Mamer. 
 
As it did in Mamer, the court implied, in the quoted 
language above, that the general advisement by the trial 
court of possible immigration consequences cures any 
failure by trial counsel to inform a client of immigration 
consequences.  That is a troubling implication.  And, in 
the opinion of this author, it is wrong.130  Interestingly, the 
 
130  See footnote 125, supra.  The mischief that this implication has created has found its 
way into holdings by the Nebraska Court of Appeals that have, without analysis, assumed the 
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Eighth Circuit, about a month after Jerke was decided, 
handed down an opinion that seems to contradict, or at least 
temper, the Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding on this 
point. 
 
(h) Dat v. United States. 
 
In Dat,131 in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
client, an LPR since the mid-1990’s, was charged with two 
counts of Hobbs Act robbery.  He pled guilty to one count, 
but before pleading guilty, Mr. Dat specifically asked his 
criminal defense counsel about the possible immigration 
consequences of his guilty plea.  His defense counsel then 
“spoke to an immigration specialist,” after which he 
advised Mr. Dat that his plea would not result in his 
removal from the U.S. because “he was a long-tenured 
lawful permanent resident, not an ‘illegal immigrant.’”  
Thereafter, Mr. Dat rejected two plea agreements with 
“strong deportation language,” and accepted one that 
acknowledged “there are or may be collateral consequences 
to any conviction to include but not limited to 
immigration,” relying on his counsel’s assurance that his 
guilty plea would not affect his immigration status. 
 
Because Mr. Dat was sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
of 78 months, and because the crime to which he pled 
guilty was a crime of violence, the offense was clearly an 
aggravated felony crime of violence under INA             
§ 101(a)(43)(F), subjecting him to mandatory removal from 
the U.S. 
 
Once he learned of this, Mr. Dat moved to vacate his 
conviction under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (federal habeas), 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  The trial court 
denied his petition without holding a hearing on it, finding 
that he was advised of the immigration consequences by his 
plea agreement, his Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty, and 
the colloquy with the court during the hearing at which his 
guilty plea was accepted.  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit 
reversed and remanded. 
 
correctness of this conclusion.  See, e.g., State v. Gonsalez, 2019 WL 7369233 (December 31, 
2019); State v. Diaz, 2019 WL 3936274 (August 20, 2019).  




The Eighth Circuit had no trouble finding deficient 
performance by trial counsel under Strickland’s first prong, 
since, under Padilla, the advice that conviction of an  
aggravated felony would not affect Mr. Dat’s immigration 
status was clearly and obviously incorrect. 
 
The court found that whether Mr. Dat had been prejudiced 
by his counsel’s deficient performance to be “a closer 
question.”  The court held that if Dat could prove that he 
would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on going to 
trial but for counsel’s immigration advice, that would show 
prejudice under Strickland’s second prong.  The court 
noted that the Supreme Court, in the Lee case, held that 
factors such as a client’s history in the U.S., his family 
circumstances, and his gainful employment all signal strong 
connections to, and desire to remain in, the country.  As a 
result, the court held that, “At this stage, sufficient evidence 
support’s [Dat’s] assertions of prejudice.”132 
 
The court then addressed the government’s argument that 
the combination of the plea agreement, the Petition to Enter 
a Plea of Guilty, and the colloquy with the court at the 
hearing at which his guilty plea was accepted made it 
impossible for Dat to show prejudice.  The circuit court 
demurred: 
 
However, his counsel's alleged misadvice 
specifically undermined these equivocal 
warnings. They informed Dat of a general 
possibility of immigration consequences. 
They do not necessarily contradict or correct 
his counsel's alleged misadvice he would not 
suffer those consequences in his case. 
Compare Doe, 915 F.3d at 913 (counsel's 
misadvice—that deportation was not a 
mandatory result of the guilty plea—not 
remedied where judge asked if defendant 
understood he “may be deported” and did 
not inform him of the “mandatory 
consequences” of his plea to an aggravated 
felony), and United States v. Akinsade, 686 
F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2012) (“general and 
equivocal admonishment” that defendant's 
 
132  Id. at 1195. 
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plea “could lead to deportation” was 
“insufficient to correct counsel's affirmative 
misadvice that [defendant's] crime was not 
categorically a deportable offense”), with 
United States v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421, 428 
(3d Cir. 2015) (any error in counsel's failure 
to inform defendant his guilty plea subjected 
him to automatic deportation was cured by 
plea agreement and district court's “in-depth 
colloquy,” both of which “made clear that 
[defendant] was willing to plead guilty even 
if that plea would lead to automatic 
deportation”). The record here is 
inconclusive whether the plea documents or 
district court remedied counsel's 
misadvice.133 
 
On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing 
and once again denied Dat’s habeas claim.  On appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Dat’s 
habeas claim, finding his trial counsel’s testimony that she 
advised Dat he “could” face immigration consequences that 
“could” make him deportable was objectively reasonable 
and therefore did not prejudice him.134 The Eighth Circuit 
justified this interpretation of Padilla in the following way: 
 
In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that 
counsel must advise the defendant that “his 
conviction would make him ‘deportable’ 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I) if he 
pleaded guilty, not that deportation or 
removal was either mandatory or certain.” 
United States v. Ramirez-Jimenez, 907 F.3d 
1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Cf. 
Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 345-46, 133 S.Ct 1103 
(stating that under Padilla, “criminal 
defense attorneys must inform non-citizen 
clients of the risks of deportation arising 
from guilty pleas.”) (emphasis added). An 
alien with a deportable conviction may still 
seek “relief from removal by providing 
evidence that he is eligible for asylum, 
 
133  Id. at 1195-1196. 
134  983 F.3d 1045, 1048 (8th Cir. 2020). 
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withholding of removal, or relief under the 
Convention Against Torture.” Ramirez-
Jimenez, 907 F.3d at 1094. These 
“immigration law complexities” should 
“caution any criminal defense attorney not 
to advise a defendant considering whether to 
plead guilty that the result of a post-
conviction, contested removal proceeding is 
clear and certain.” Id.135  
 
Despite its shortcomings, the December, 2020 opinion in 
Dat does not retreat from the notion that a court’s duty to 
give a general advisement does not relieve criminal defense 
counsel from their obligation to comply with their Sixth 
Amendment obligations under Padilla.  In other words, 
Dat reaffirms the argument that a court’s general 
advisement is no substitute for defense counsel’s obligation 
to discuss, with some particularity, the immigration 
consequences a client may face if convicted of the offense 
with which the client is charged.  
 




What does all of this mean in practice?  Although reasonable 





135  What is remarkable about this re-interpretation of Padilla, aside from the incentive it 
provides to defense counsel to give immigration advice so equivocal as to be functionally 
meaningless and worthless, is the blatantly false notion that a person convicted of an aggravated 
felony and sentenced to 78 months in prison is eligible for either asylum or withholding of 
removal, given the prohibitions in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (providing that a non-citizen 
convicted of an aggravated felony has been convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” thereby 
disqualifying that person from receiving asylum) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (providing that a 
non-citizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony and sentenced to at least 5 years’ 
imprisonment has been convicted of a “particularly serious crime” that precludes the non-citizen 
from qualifying for withholding of removal).  Additionally, equating the phrase “would make 
him deportable” with the phrase “could make him deportable” rewards imprecise legal advice at 
precisely the time when full and accurate advice is needed by the client.  Particularly in the 
context of Dat’s argument (that counsel had a duty to tell him if the plea would result in his 
removal), sanctioning the use of the word “could” in place of the word “would” feels like a 
bridge too far – especially given that Dat was convicted of an aggravated felony.   
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investigate, understand, and advise a client at least with respect to 
the following:136 
 
(1) The immigration status of the client.137  This is information 
that should be obtained at the initial interview.  And it may not be 
enough to know simply “citizen” vs. “non-citizen,” although at 
least that rudimentary piece of information must be obtained.  
Rather, counsel should try to find out precisely what is the 
immigration status of the client.138 
 
(2) The potential inadmissibility consequences of the contemplated 
plea. 
 
(3) The potential deportability consequences of the contemplated 
plea. 
 
(4) Whether the crime with which the client is charged is an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
 
(5) Whether the conviction would imperil any form of relief from  
removal for which the client would otherwise be eligible.139 
 
136  In fact, as discussed earlier, the Iowa Supreme Court, by virtue of its holding in the 
Diaz decision, requires much more than this. 
137  The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 38 N.E.3d 278 
(2015), held that failing to inquire about the immigration status of a client is per se ineffective 
assistance of counsel: 
Just as the ordinary physician must take a history from the patient before rendering a 
diagnosis, so, too, must the ordinary criminal defense attorney make a reasonable inquiry of his 
or her client regarding the client’s history, including whether he or she is a citizen of the United 
States. . . . Unless a criminal defense attorney knows whether a defendant is a United States 
citizen, the attorney cannot properly evaluate the likelihood that the defendant will face 
immigration consequences, investigate potential avenues of relief, minimize such consequences 
through plea negotiations, or understand how highly the defendant values staying in the United 
States.  Id. at 289-290. 
138  As discussed later, different immigration statuses carry different immigration 
consequences. 
139  This line of inquiry is required by the Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding in State v. 
Gonzalez, supra.  Recall that in that case the client was already in removal proceedings when 
she was convicted of the welfare fraud offense because she was in the country without 
documentation.  One reading of the holding is that Gonzalez’s trial counsel was ineffective in 
not advising her of the fact that her plea would imperil her eligibility to apply for cancellation of  
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Some commentators also urge that the following advice may be 
required by Padilla:140 
 
(6) Whether the conviction would result in mandatory detention of 
the client by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).141 
 
(7) Whether the conviction would preclude the client from 
demonstrating “good moral character.” 
 
Not Just for Defense Counsel 
 
Although the basis for the holding in Padilla is clearly the Sixth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court stated that everyone involved in 
the criminal process has an interest in seeing that non-U.S. citizen 
defendants are properly advised regarding the potential 
immigration consequences of guilty pleas: 
 
[I]nformed consideration of possible deportation 
can only benefit both the State and noncitizen 
defendants during the plea-bargaining process.  By 
bringing deportation consequences into this process, 
the defense and prosecution may well be able to 
reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of 
both parties.  As in this case, a criminal episode 
may provide the basis for multiple charges, of 
which only a subset mandate deportation following 
conviction.  Counsel who possess the most 
rudimentary understanding of the deportation 
consequences of a particular criminal offense may 
be able to plea bargain creatively with the 
prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and 
sentence that reduces the likelihood of deportation, 
as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that 
automatically triggers the removal consequence.  
At the same time, the threat of deportation may 
 
removal for non-permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), which is a form of relief from 
removal for certain individuals who are not permanent residents of the United States. 
140  See, e.g., Kathy Brady and Angie Junck, How Much to Advise: What are the 
Requirements of Padilla v. Kentucky (Practice Advisory published by the Defending Immigrants 
Partnership, April 20, 2010 http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/how_much_to_advise.pdf (last visited May 25, 2021). 
141  In my experience, this is often the most important consideration for many non-citizen 
clients. 
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provide the defendant with a powerful incentive to 
plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that 





The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)143 has held that a 
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim that results in the 
vacatur of a conviction means that there is no longer a 
“conviction” for immigration purposes.144  As a result, a client 
who was deportable solely because of such a conviction is no 
longer deportable.  Padilla claims will therefore have large 
consequences in both the criminal and immigration law realms. 
 
Helpful Padilla Resources 
 
Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity, by Mary E. 
Kramer.  Ms. Kramer is an immigration and criminal defense 
attorney practicing in Miami and has worked and written in this 
area for years.  Her book is published by the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), and was last updated in 
2019 (8th edition). 
 
Norton Tooby is a California practitioner who has also practiced 
and written extensively in this area for a number of years.  He has 
several publications, some oriented to California law and some 
oriented to federal law.  You can access those publications on his 
website:  http://nortontooby.com/.  
 
Finally, there are a number of organizations who have developed 
practice advisories on the Padilla decision and who generally have 
resources available to help criminal defense lawyers in this area.  
Some of those organizations are: 
 
Immigrant Defense Project 
https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/  
 
142  559 U.S. at 373. 
143  See section II.C.2., infra, for a discussion of the BIA. 
144  Matter of Adamiak, 23 I&N Dec. 878 (BIA 2006).  Compare with Matter of 
Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), holding that a conviction that is vacated as the result of 
post conviction events such as rehabilitation does not affect the immigration consequences of 
that conviction. 
61 
Immigrant Legal Resource Center 
www.ilrc.org  
 




E. General Immigration Resources. 
 
The following is a non-exhaustive list of general immigration resources on immigration 
and criminal law that practitioners may find useful.  Because this area is becoming 
increasingly important, new materials are appearing all the time, and practitioners are 
encouraged to keep abreast of new publications and electronic resources. 
 
Immigration and Nationality Act  The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is 
codified in Title 8 of the United States Code.  In addition to being available from the 
usual sources, including online services such as Lexis and Westlaw, the Act is published 
by a number of commercial publishers.  Note that the section numbers of the Act and the 
section numbers as codified in Title 8 of the United States Code are not numerically 
identical.145  There is a version of the INA available on the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Service’s (USCIS) web page.146  
 
Federal Regulations  Regulations implementing the INA are scattered about various 
titles of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).  Most relevant implementing 
regulations are located in Title 8 of the C.F.R.  Conveniently, the sections of the 
regulations found in Title 8 of the C.F.R. match the sections of the INA that they 
implement, at least for the most part.147  Thus, for example, the regulations 
implementing § 212 of the INA are located at 8 C.F.R. § 212. 
 
As with the Act itself, the USCIS website contains an accessible version of Title 8 of the 
C.F.R.  The Government Printing Office (GPO) publishes annually a hard copy version 
of the C.F.R.  However, as with the Act, the regulations are also available through 
various commercial vendors.  Some of the commercial versions of the C.F.R. are 
updated more frequently than every year, and contain subject matter indices that are 
helpful in locating pertinent sections. 
 
 
145  For example, § 212 of the Act deals with grounds of inadmissibility.  However, in 
Title 8 of the United States Code, § 212 of the Act is codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
146  https://www.uscis.gov/ (last visited May 28, 2021). 
147  On February 28, 2003, some of the C.F.R. provisions were relocated in connection 
with the merger of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into the Department 
of Homeland Security.  Those provisions remain in Title 8 of the C.F.R., but the section 
numbers may not exactly correspond to the section numbers of the INA that they implement. 
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Precedent Opinions of the Attorney General and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)  
For many immigration cases, the BIA is the highest level of administrative review within 
the Department of Justice.  As a result, precedent decisions of the BIA are controlling 
(absent any contrary opinions of a federal circuit court or the U.S. Supreme Court) on the 
Service148 and on Immigration Judges.  The Attorney General has the option of 
“certifying” BIA decisions to his/her office and issuing opinions that carry more authority 
than BIA decisions on the same topic.149 
 
The BIA issues a number of decisions each year, but only those designated as 
“precedent” opinions are published and binding agency-wide.  Before January 1, 2001, 
new precedent opinions were issued in slip opinion form, and given an interim number.  
These opinions were called “interim decisions” and were initially cited by the number 
given to each opinion.150  When these opinions were later issued in bound volumes, they 
were called “I&N Decisions,” and were given a new citation.151  Since January 1, 2001, 
BIA precedent decisions are given both an interim decision number and an I&N citation 
when they are issued.152  In mid-2021, I&N decisions were being published in volume 
28. 
 
BIA decisions are available from many sources.  Perhaps the most convenient is the 
virtual library on the EOIR’s official website.153  Of course, BIA decisions are also 
available through other online databases, such as Lexis and Westlaw. 
 
Immigration Law and Crimes  This very helpful one-volume treatise is published by the 
Thomson/West Group and written by Dan Kesselbrenner and Lory D. Rosenberg.  It 
provides a thorough and thoughtful discussion of most of the general issues regarding 
immigration consequences of criminal proceedings. 
 
148  The term “Service,” includes all divisions of what was formerly Immigration and 
Naturalization (INS), most of which are now a part of DHS.  Today, those subdivisions include, 
inter alia, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 
149   8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h).  See, e.g., Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 
(A.G.2018). 
150  For example, the decision issued by the BIA on March 13, 1998, was initially cited 
as follows: Matter of M-D-, Int. Dec. #3339 (BIA 1998). 
151  The M-D- decision has been issued in the bound volume of BIA decisions and is now 
correctly cited as follows: Matter of M-D-, 21 I&N Dec. 1180 (BIA 1998). 
152  As an example, the BIA decision in Matter of M-J-K, was issued by the BIA on June 
29, 2016.  The interim decision number of the case is 3866, but the official cite is 26 I&N Dec. 
773 (BIA 2016). 
153  https://www.justice.gov/eoir/ag-bia-decisions (last visited May 25, 2021). 
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Bender’s Immigration Bulletin  This publication by LexisNexis (Matthew Bender) is an 
immigration periodical that is issued twice a month.  It contains topical articles, columns 
written by experienced immigration practitioners, news on recent immigration 
developments, case digests, and Federal Register publications relating to immigration 
law.  Criminal law practitioners may find it helpful because it frequently contains 
articles on issues involving immigration consequences of specific types of crimes. 
 
Immigration Law and Procedure  This is a multi-volume comprehensive treatise on 
immigration law published by Matthew Bender under the auspices of Lexis-Nexis and 
authored by Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr.  Many consider it to be the definitive 
treatise on immigration law and procedure.   
 
Kurzban's Immigration Law Sourcebook  This is essentially an annotated outline of 
immigration law written by Ira Kurzban, a long-time immigration practitioner from 
Miami.  Because it is organized by topic and includes legal citations relating to specific 
issues of immigration law, it is a good resource to help locate a quick answer to a specific 
question.  It is published by the American Immigration Council. 
 
II. IMMIGRATION AGENCY STRUCTURE. 
 
A. Historical Overview. 
 
Before March 1, 2003, all matters relating to immigration of non-U.S. citizens were 
handled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  In the pre-March 1, 2003, 
world, the United States Attorney General was charged with the administration and  
enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and all other laws relating to 
immigration and naturalization of aliens.154 
 
On November 25, 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002155 became effective.  That 
Act effected a massive restructuring of the federal agencies administering the 
immigration system in the United States.  Most importantly, for purposes of this Guide, 
it abolished the INS as of March 1, 2003.156  On that date, most of the responsibilities for 
 
154  An “alien” is defined by the INA as any person who is not a citizen or national of the 
United States.  INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).  A “national” of the U.S. is a person 
who is either a U.S. citizen or who owes permanent allegiance to the U.S.  INA § 101(a)(22), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22). 
155  Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, Nov. 25, 2002. 
156  Although the INS officially ceased to exist as of March 1, 2003, even as of 2016, 
retooling of that agency was still occurring.  Thus, one still finds numerous references to the 
INS in statutes, regulations, directives, etc.  To address this problem, Congress included 
transition and savings provisions in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that provided that any 
reference to the INS in statute, regulation, directive, etc., shall be deemed to refer to the    
appropriate official or component of the new DHS.  See §§ 1512(d) and 1517, Pub. L. No. 107-
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administering immigration services and enforcement in the United States shifted to the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the bureaus that operate under its aegis. 
 
At this time, there are essentially four federal agencies that have responsibilities relating 
to immigration:  the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of State, and the Department of Labor.  Most of the discussions in this 
Guide will relate to the first three agencies. 
 
An organizational chart for the DHS is found on its website.157  A brief description of 
each federal entity involved with various functions of the former INS158 follows. 
 
B. The Department of Homeland Security. 
 
This Department was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Title I, § 101.159  
The Act gives the DHS broad authority to secure the borders and interior of the United 
States against terrorist attacks.  Section 102 of the Act160 provides that the DHS is to be 
headed by a Secretary of Homeland Security, who is appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.161 
 
There are several bureaus under the DHS umbrella that have responsibilities over 
immigration matters.  Three are of particular interest: U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services. 
 
1. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 
 
As described on its website, the CBP’s mission is stated as follows: “To safeguard 
America's borders thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and 
materials while enhancing the Nation's global economic competitiveness by 
 
296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002). 
157  https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0402_dhs-organizational-
chart.pdf (last visited May 28, 2021). 
158  The term of art used by most federal employees to refer to the former INS is “legacy 
INS.” 
159  Codified at 6 U.S.C. § 111.  The DHS website is found at: http://www.dhs.gov/ (last 
visited May 28, 2021). 
160  6 U.S.C. § 112. 
161  To determine who is the current Secretary of DHS, go to 
https://www.dhs.gov/secretary (last visited May 28, 2021). 
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enabling legitimate trade and travel..”162  What this means, among other things, is 
that CBP inspects163 individuals who seek to enter the United States from 
abroad.164  Thus, those seeking to enter the U.S. at any port of entry will be 
questioned and inspected by employees of the CBP.  It is they who will 
determine if a non-citizen ought to be allowed to enter the U.S.165     
  
2. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 
 
ICE describes its mission as follows: “[T]o promote homeland security and public 
safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing 
border control, customs, trade and immigration.”166  For immigration purposes, it 
is in charge of interior enforcement of immigration laws.  Because it is in charge 
of interior enforcement, ICE, and specifically its Office of Enforcement and 
Removal Operations, is the federal entity with which most immigrants in 
Nebraska will find themselves dealing if they face or find themselves 
involved in removal proceedings.167  
 
Of greatest interest to Nebraska practitioners, ICE has its local presence primarily 
in Omaha at the DHS facility.168  The address of that facility, which houses not 
only local ICE personnel but also the Omaha United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) Field Office169 and the Omaha Immigration 
Court,170 is 1717 Avenue H, Omaha, Nebraska 68110.  There are also ICE 
branch offices located in: Sioux City, Iowa; Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Grand Island, 
Nebraska; and North Platte, Nebraska. 
 
162  https://www.cbp.gov/about (last visited May 28, 2021). 
163  “Inspect” is a term of art that means, in essence, that the CBP interviews those who 
seek to enter the U.S. in order to determine if they have legal authority to enter and should be 
admitted to the U.S. 
164  In the pre-Homeland Security world, Customs Inspection was part of the Treasury 
Department. 
165  The CBP’s website is located at:  www.cbp.gov/ (last visited May 28, 2021). 
166  The ICE website is found at: www.ice.gov (last visited May 28, 2021). 
167  See section IV., infra, for a discussion of removal terminology and procedure. 
168  The Field Office to which the Omaha ICE office reports is the Minneapolis-St. Paul 
Field Office located in Bloomington, Minnesota.  See https://www.ice.gov/contact/field-offices 
(last visited May 28, 2021) for a nation-wide listing of ICE Field Offices. 
169  See section II.B.3, infra, for a discussion of USCIS. 
170  See section II.C.1., infra, for a discussion of the Immigration Courts. 
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At last check, there are three Assistant Field Office Directors for ICE in Nebraska 
and Iowa.  There are also 11 Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officers 
who work under the Field Office Directors. 
 
ICE also operates detention facilities across the U.S. in which those involved in 
removal proceedings are held,171 either pending a hearing before an Immigration 
Judge or following a hearing and pending removal from the United States.172  In 
Nebraska, the three primary detention facilities are the Douglas County Jail in  
Omaha, the Cass County Jail in Plattsmouth, and the Hall County Jail in Grand 
Island.173 
 
The local ICE offices also have one other category of employees who play a large 
role in immigration proceedings, particularly removal proceedings.  Those 
individuals are trial attorneys who work for the Office of the Principal Legal 
Advisor (OPLA) in the local Offices of Chief Counsel.174  Attorneys in the 
Office of Chief Counsel represent ICE before the Immigration Judges and, in 
general, prosecute removal proceedings on behalf of the government.175  
Attorneys representing clients involved in removal proceedings interact frequently 
with attorneys in the Office of Chief Counsel. 
 
In the Omaha District ICE Office, Mr. Darrin Hetfield is currently the Deputy 
Chief Counsel for ICE and presides over an office of several attorneys. 
 
3. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 
 
Section 451 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established, within DHS, a 
bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services.176  The responsibility of the 
USCIS is to process applications for immigration benefits filed by U.S. citizens or 
non-citizens.  For example, if a U.S. citizen marries a non-citizen and wishes to 
get immigration benefits for the non-citizen spouse, she or he would file the 
 
171  A listing of the major detention facilities operated by ICE is found at:  
http://www.ice.gov/detention-facilities/ (last visited May 28, 2021). 
172  See section IV., infra, for a discussion of removal proceedings. 
173  Further information on each county jail, as an ICE detention facility, can be found on 
the ICE website dealing with detention facilities cited above. 
174   More information on OPLA can be found at its website:  https://www.ice.gov/about-
ice/opla (last visited May 28, 2021). 
175  See section IV.B., infra., for a more detailed discussion of removal proceedings. 
176  The website for the USCIS is found at: www.uscis.gov/ (last visited October 9, 
2020). 
67 
appropriate petition or application with the USCIS.  Or if an employer wishes to 
bring a non-citizen employee to the United States to work, the appropriate 
petition/application would be filed with the USCIS. 
 
a. Service Centers. 
 
There are five USCIS Service Centers and one National Benefits Center in 
the United States.  The Service Centers are located in: Mesquite, Texas; 
Laguna Niguel, California; Saint Albans, Vermont; Arlington, Virginia; 
and Lincoln, Nebraska.  The National Benefits Center is located in Lee’s 
Summit, Missouri.  The Service Centers and Benefits Center receive the 
vast majority of applications for benefits that are filed with the USCIS.  
The staff at the Service Centers review the applications to make certain 
that they warrant approval.  In the event a follow-up, in-person interview 
is required, Service Center staff forward applications to local USCIS field 
offices. 
 
It is important to note that the Service Centers and Benefits Center are 
strictly “mail order” operations.  They handle only applications that are 
mailed in to them and are not accessible to the public in general.177   
 
The jurisdictions of the Service Centers used to be divided along 
geographic lines, but increasingly each Service Center is handling 
certain types of applications, regardless of where the applicant lives within 
the U.S. 
 
The local field offices of the USCIS and the Service Centers are not in 
close communication with each other, even if they are in close physical 
proximity to one another.  Therefore, clients who have problems with a 
Service Center will need to address their concerns directly to the Service 
Center –- the local field office normally will not be able to assist with such 
problems.  And the reverse is also true. 
 
b. District and Field Offices. 
 
In 2003, USCIS inherited the field office structure of legacy INS, which 
consisted of three regions and 33 districts nation-wide.178  However, in 
November 2006, USCIS re-structured its field offices in an attempt to 
distribute the workload more evenly among its offices nation-wide.179 
 
177  The volume of mail handled by each Service Center is mind-boggling.  Reliable 
reports are that each Center handles tens of thousands of pieces of mail each day. 
178  See background information, 71 FR 67623 (November 22, 2006). 
179  Id. 
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Currently, the USCIS field office serving Nebraska immigrants is located 
in Omaha, Nebraska at 1717 Avenue H.  The Omaha Field Office is 
within the Kansas City District Office’s jurisdiction.180 
 
The Omaha Field Office is where in-person interviews take place in 
connection with applications for benefits.  In such a case, an individual  
goes to this office if she or he has received an appointment letter 
instructing him or her to go to this office. 
 
The Omaha Field Office also contains an Application Support Center 
(ASC).  The ASC is the division of USCIS that takes biometrics 
(fingerprints and photographs) of individuals in connection with 
applications for immigration benefits. 
 
C. Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). 
 
The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is a division of the United States 
Department of Justice which has its headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia.  It is headed 
by a director.  The EOIR is divided into several sub-organizations.181  
 
The EOIR contains two major components that deal with immigration matters: the Office 
of the Chief Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).182 
 
1. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge. 
 
The Chief Immigration Judge is responsible for the general supervision, direction 
and scheduling of the Immigration Judges.183  At the present time, there are 
approximately 465 Immigration Judges who serve in various of the 69 different 
Immigration Courts nation-wide.184  
 
 
180  71 FR 67624 (November 22, 2006).  The Kansas City District also contains the 
USCIS field offices in Des Moines, Iowa; Kansas City, Missouri; St. Louis, Missouri; and St. 
Paul, Minnesota. 
181  A breakdown of the organizational structure of the EOIR is found at 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/organization-chart (last visited October 9, 2020). 
182  There are other divisions of the EOIR that deal with immigration matters, but these 
two divisions are most commonly encountered by those involved in criminal proceedings. 
183  8 C.F.R. § 1003.9. 
184  For a complete listing of all Immigration Courts and the Immigration Judges 
assigned to each court, go to:  https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing (last 
visited May 28, 2020). 
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The Immigration Courts are essentially administrative trial courts in which 
individuals appear who are facing removal from the United States.  Once a 
charging document is filed with an Immigration Judge by ICE, the Immigration 
Judges have jurisdiction to determine whether or not a person is removable from 
the U.S., and also have jurisdiction over most requests for relief from removal that 
are asserted.185 
 
The Immigration Judges also have jurisdiction to hear requests to reduce bonds  
from those who are being held by ICE subject to posting a bond.186 
 
2. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 
 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), inter alia, hears appeals from most 
decisions made by Immigration Judges.187  As such, it is the final administrative 
level of consideration available in most cases in which the government seeks to 
remove a non-citizen from the United States.  The Board is currently comprised 
of 23 permanent members and 8 temporary board members.188  There are also 
Temporary Board members designated from time to time in order to alleviate the 
workload of the regular Board members.189 
 
The BIA can take summary action on appeals (either dismissing or affirming 
them),190 can issue opinions that have no precedential value, or can issue 
“precedent opinions,” which are binding on all Immigration Judges nation-wide 
unless a Judge is deciding a case in a circuit where a U.S. Circuit Court has 
established a contrary point of law.191  The BIA’s website includes a virtual law 




185  8 C.F.R. § 1003.14. 
186  8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 236.1(d), 1236.1(d).  See section IV.C., infra, for a more 
complete discussion of bond issues in the immigration context. 
187  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b). 
188  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals-bios (last visited October 9, 2020). 
189  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4). 
190  Dismissing, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2); affirming, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). 
191  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g). 
192  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Virtual Law Library, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/virtual-law-library (last visited October 9, 2020). 
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In light of Padilla, every criminal law practitioner must now ascertain the immigration 
status of each of his or her clients.  Failure to make this fundamental inquiry would 
certainly be Exhibit #1 in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by a client who was 
not advised of possible immigration consequences of criminal proceedings.193   
 
Attachment 2 is a questionnaire developed to gather information necessary not only to 
determine the immigration status of a client, but also the information necessary to advise 
a client of possible immigration consequences of criminal proceedings.  If you gather the 
information this questionnaire seeks, you should have most of the information necessary 
to advise a client about possible immigration consequences of the charges he or she faces, 
or to which he or she is contemplating pleading guilty. 
 
Obviously, if a client is a U.S. citizen, then none of the issues discussed in this Guide are 
germane, since a criminal conviction carries no immigration consequences for U.S. 
citizens.194  However, it is very important to inquire about a client's immigration status at 
the beginning of representation, since it could alter to a significant extent the strategy 
employed in representing the client.  The following sections discuss various categories 
of immigration status. 
 
Because there are so many different types of immigration statuses, it is impossible to 
address all of them in the following sections of this Guide.  I have attempted to list some 
of the more common types of statuses, or at least those I believe may be most frequently 
encountered by practitioners.  However, practitioners should always ask to see all 




193  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 38 N.E.3d 278, 288-289 (Mass. 2015). 
194  This technically is not true, although certainly a U.S. citizen cannot be removed from 
the country as the result of criminal proceedings.  However, the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 594 (July 27, 2006), provides, inter alia, 
that U.S. citizens who have been convicted of a “specified offense against a minor” cannot 
petition to bring a relative or fiancé to the U.S. unless there is a finding that such U.S. citizen 
will pose no harm to such relative or fiancé.  INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(viii), 8 U.S.C.                     
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii); the list of offenses that will cause problems includes kidnapping (unless 
committed by a parent or guardian); false imprisonment (unless committed by a parent or 
guardian); solicitation to engage in sexual conduct; use of a child in a sexual performance; 
solicitation to practice prostitution; video voyeurism as defined in 18 USC § 1801; possession, 
production or distribution of child pornography; criminal sexual conduct; use of the Internet to 
facilitate or attempt such criminal conduct; and any conduct that, by its nature, is a sex offense 
against a minor.  42 U.S.C. §16911(7). 
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whether a client has some sort of immigration status in the U.S. and, if so, what that 
status is and how it might affect decisions to be made in the criminal case.195 
 
It is possible that clients may have more than one immigration status at a time.196  
Because the immigration consequences will affect some types of non-citizens more than 
others, it is important to try to determine all immigration statuses of your clients.  If you 
have doubts about the implications of your clients’ immigration status(es), you should 
consult with an immigration practitioner. 
 




As mentioned above, with the exception of Adam Walsh Act197 concerns, if your 
client is a U.S. citizen, then you can put this Guide down and concentrate only on 
the criminal aspects of the case.  If the client is a U.S. citizen, then ICE cannot 
remove him or her from the U.S. due to a criminal conviction. 
 
2. How to Determine if Your Client is a U.S. Citizen. 
 
How do you know if your client is a U.S. citizen?  U.S. citizenship can be 
obtained in four main ways: (1) birth in the United States, (2) naturalization, (3) 
derivatively through one’s parents, and (4) birth abroad if at least one parent was 
a U.S. citizen.  Each of these methods is discussed in greater detail below.198 
 
While some of these contingencies may seem like they would happen 
infrequently, you should make certain to ask your client about them –- they may 
be more common than you think. 
 
 
195  If your client is not on ICE’s radar screen, however, you should think long and hard 
about trying to contact USCIS or ICE to request any of their documentation about the client.  If 
there are other ways to obtain immigration documentation about the client, they should be 
explored before contacting the immigration authorities. 
196  For example, a client may have an asylum claim pending but also be a recipient of 
Temporary Protected Status.  See sections III.H. and III.I.1., infra. 
197     See footnote 194, supra. 
198  Brent Wolzen, an immigration lawyer practicing in Lincoln, wrote an excellent 
article on how to determine whether your client is a U.S. citizen.  Brent’s article was published 
in the October 2010 issue of The Nebraska Lawyer, which is available online. Brent Wolzen, 
U.S. Citizens: Do We Know One When We See One?, Nebraska Lawyer (Oct. 2010),   
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nebar.com/resource/resmgr/nebraskalawyer_2010plus/2010/octobe
r/TNL-1010d.pdf  (last visited June 1, 2021). 
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a. Birth in the United States and Documents to Prove Status. 
 
A person who is born in the United States199 who is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States is a U.S. citizen.200  It does not matter 
what the parents’ immigration status is; if the person is born in the U.S. 
and is subject to its jurisdiction, that person is a U.S. citizen.201 
 
Additionally, a person of unknown parentage found in the United States 
while under five years of age (a “foundling”) is also a U.S. citizen, unless, 
before such a person attains the age of 21, he or she is shown not to have 
been born in the U.S.202 
 
The most obvious way to prove birth in the U.S., and thus demonstrate 
U.S. citizenship, is by producing a certified copy of a U.S. birth certificate.  
A U.S. passport is also conclusive evidence of U.S. citizenship.  There 
may also be other documents that can be used to demonstrate birth in the 
U.S., but the nuances of secondary forms of proof are beyond the scope of 
this Guide.  However, if you believe that your client was born in the 
United States, and is therefore a United States citizen, you should gather 
all forms of proof that would tend to demonstrate that fact. 
 
b. Naturalization (and Documents). 
 
Naturalization is the process by which people who were not U.S. citizens 
at birth attain U.S. citizenship.  Generally speaking, in order to obtain 
U.S. citizenship through naturalization, a person must have been a 
permanent resident (i.e., have had a “green card”) for a period of at least 
five years (three years in the case where the person obtained permanent 
residency as the result of marriage to a U.S. citizen) and must file an 
application for citizenship with the USCIS.203 
 
199  “United States,” when used in the Immigration and Nationality Act, includes the 
continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  
INA § 101(a)(38); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38). 
200  INA § 301(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a). 
201  The language “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in § 301(a) of the INA is meant to 
exclude from citizenship those people born in the U.S. whose parent is a foreign diplomatic 
officer accredited to the United States.  Such people are lawful permanent residents but are not 
U.S. citizens.  8 C.F.R. §§ 101.3, 1101.3. 
202  INA § 301(f); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(f). 
203  The statutes dealing with naturalization are found in the INA beginning with § 310 
(8 U.S.C. § 1421). 
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The qualifications for and steps involved in becoming a U.S. citizen 
through naturalization are beyond the scope of this Guide.  However, 
once a person gains citizenship through naturalization, he or she will be 
given a certificate of naturalization.  Although an example of a certificate 
of naturalization could formerly be found on the USCIS website, that is no 
longer the case.  However, if you do a Google search, you can find 
websites that will give you examples of naturalization certificates.204 
 
c. Derivative Citizenship (and Documents). 
 
The Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA) became effective February 27, 
2001.205  That Act, inter alia, amended section 320 of the INA206 by 
allowing certain children born outside of the United States to obtain 
citizenship automatically through their parents.207 
 
In order to benefit from the CCA, a child must meet the following 
conditions: 
 
(1) At least one parent is a U.S. citizen (by birth or naturalization); 
(2) The child is under 18 years of age; 
(3) The child was lawfully admitted to the U.S. as a permanent 
resident (i.e., has a “green card”) and is residing in the U.S. in the 
legal and physical custody of the citizen parent; and 
(4) If the child is adopted, the adoption must be final.208 
 
Most beneficiaries of this provision are foreign-born children who are 
adopted by U.S. citizens and who enter the U.S. as permanent residents.  
Such children automatically become U.S. citizens upon entry into the U.S. 
under the above-referenced provisions. 
 
Any child who met all these requirements as of the effective date of the 
CCA (February 27, 2001) automatically obtained U.S. citizenship.  
 
204   For example, https://www.immihelp.com/sample-certificate-of-naturalization-us-
citizenship/ (last visited October 9, 2020). 
205  Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (Oct. 30, 2000). 
206  8 U.S.C. § 1431. 
207  The USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 12, Part H, Chapter 4, has a chapter that 
discusses the concept of derivative citizenship fully.  The Policy Manual also has a chart that 
helps to determine if a child has acquired citizenship after birth. https://www.uscis.gov/policy-
manual/volume-12-part-h-chapter-4 (last visited October 12, 2020). 
208  INA § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431. 
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However, the Act is not effective retroactively, meaning that children 
who met these requirements before the effective date of the CCA did 
not automatically acquire citizenship as the result of its provisions. 
 
Children who automatically acquire U.S. citizenship through their parents 
may file Form N–600 with the USCIS to get a certificate of citizenship. 
The certificate of citizenship looks very similar to the certificate of 
naturalization.209  Such children may also obtain a U.S. passport 
evidencing their citizenship status. 
 
More information on the CCA can be found on the USCIS website.210 
 
d. Birth Abroad if at Least One Parent was a U.S. Citizen (and 
Documents). 
 
Some people who were not born on U.S. soil are U.S. citizens because one 
or both of their parents were U.S. citizens.  Therefore, even though a 
child was born outside the United States, he or she may, in fact, be a U.S. 
citizen, depending on the immigration status of his or her ancestors. 
 
The current statutory provisions governing the granting of U.S. citizenship 
to children born outside of the U.S. are found at INA § 301(c), (d), (e), (g) 
and (h).211  However, determination of whether a person born outside the 
U.S. obtained U.S. citizenship through one of his or her parents is a 
complex determination, because most often it depends upon the law of 
U.S. citizenship that was in effect at the time of the person’s birth.212 
 
As an example of how complex this area of law is, consider the 
application of INA § 301(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(h), which became effective 
on October 25, 1994, and applied retroactively.213  The purpose of this 
amendment was to convey citizenship retroactively to any person born 
 
209  An example can be found on the USCIS website: 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/guides/N-560.pdf  (last visited October 12, 
2020). 
210 https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-h-chapter-4  
211  8 U.S.C. § 1401(c), (d), (e), (g) and (h). 
212  As in the case of derivative citizenship, the USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 12, Part 
H, Chapter 3, and attendant charts, assist in determining if a person who was born outside of the 
U.S. is a citizen.  https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-h-chapter-3 (last visited 
October 12, 2020). 
213  See § 101, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (Oct. 25, 1994). 
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outside of the United States before noon (EST) on May 24, 1934, to a U.S. 
citizen mother and non-citizen father if, prior to the person’s birth, the 
mother resided in the U.S.214  One effect of this amendment was to make 
Winston Churchill a U.S. citizen retroactively, because his mother was a 
U.S. citizen who resided in the United States before his birth. 
 
To reiterate, it is important when determining whether a client might be a 
U.S. citizen to go back several generations.  If any of the person’s 
ancestors were U.S. citizens, there is a possibility that the client, even 
though born abroad, might be a U.S. citizen. 
 
As with children who automatically acquire citizenship through their 
parents, individuals who are U.S. citizens born abroad may either apply 
for a certificate of citizenship through the USCIS, or for a U.S. passport or 
some other government-issued document evidencing their U.S. 
citizenship. 
 
e. Loss of Citizenship. 
 
There are limited circumstances in which a person can renounce his or her 
citizenship, or it can be revoked.215  Although you may run into such a 
case, the probability of encountering a client whose U.S. citizenship has 
been renounced or revoked is very low.  Generally speaking, it is much 
easier for someone to lose his or her citizenship if it was acquired 
derivatively or as the result of naturalization, rather than through birth in 
the U.S. 
 
Renunciation of citizenship is extremely rare and can only be 
accomplished by committing one of the acts listed by statute.216  The 
issue of renunciation usually would arise in connection with some 
proceeding in which the person’s citizenship becomes an issue, and  
 
 
214  Prior to the amendment, only U.S. citizen fathers could transmit citizenship to 
children born before May 24, 1934, if such children were born outside the U.S. to one citizen 
parent and one non-citizen parent.  If the mother was the U.S. citizen and the father was the non-
citizen parent, no such transmittal of citizenship could occur.  See Wauchope v. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1993) for a discussion of this issue. 
215  However, that’s not to say it can never happen.  See, e.g., United States v. Hamed, 
976 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2020), where a person’s naturalized citizenship was revoked because of 
misrepresentations he made on his application for naturalization. 
216  INA § 349(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a).  One example of an act of renunciation is 
obtaining naturalization in a foreign country after reaching the age of 18.  INA § 349(a)(1), 8 
U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1).  Other acts are listed in the subsequent subsections of the statute. 
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normally would involve either the State Department or the DHS.  Most 
clients know if they have been the subject of renunciation proceedings. 
 
Revocation, by contrast, is normally handled through the courts.  
Generally speaking, a person’s citizenship can be revoked if that person, 
during the course of naturalization proceedings, engaged in some sort of 
fraud to obtain his or her citizenship, or was in some way ineligible for 
citizenship.217  Again, most clients know if they have been the subject of 
proceedings to revoke citizenship acquired through naturalization.  But  
ask, just to be sure. 
 
C. Legal Permanent Residents (and Documents). 
 
A legal permanent resident (LPR) is a non-citizen who, in general, has the right to remain 
in the U.S. for as long as she or he wishes.  LPRs are entitled to work in the U.S. 
incident to their status, meaning they do not need a separate document indicating their 
right to work.  There are many avenues by which a person can become an LPR, but the 
LPRs most often encountered are ones who obtained their status as the result of a 
qualifying relationship to a U.S. citizen or another LPR. 
 
LPRs have many aliases:  "permanent residents," "permanent resident aliens," "resident 
aliens," "green card holders," and so forth.  All of these phrases mean that the person is 
an LPR. 
 
Do not make the mistake of assuming that because the word "permanent" appears in the 
title describing an LPR's status, he or she cannot be deported from the U.S.  Any person 
who is not a citizen can, under certain circumstances, be deported -- even an LPR who 
has lived virtually his or her entire life in this country.  An LPR who has spent 50 years 
in the U.S. but is convicted of a deportable criminal offense is in just as much peril of 
being put into deportation proceedings as one who has lived here only five months.  The 
only way one can prevent deportation consequences is to become a U.S. citizen. 
 
All LPRs will have a document they can show you to verify their status.  That document 
is the Permanent Resident Card.  The current USCIS form number for the Permanent 
Resident Card is I-551.  Some clients may have the older version of the card, which is 
legacy INS form I-151.  However, only the I-551, containing an expiration date, is valid 
proof of LPR status.218  Until 2010, the “green card” was not actually green.  However, 






217  INA § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451. 
218  See commentary at 72 FR 46922-01 (August 22, 2007). 
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perhaps as a concession to the I-551's street name.  Examples of “green cards,” both 
historical and current, can be found on the USCIS website.219 
 
The I-551 card has a metallic strip and is designed to function similarly to a credit card.  
By scanning this card, immigration and law enforcement and service agencies are able to 
learn information about the card holder through their computer database. 
 
The information on the front of the Permanent Resident Card contains the client's date of 
birth, alien registration number (an eight-digit number preceded by the letter "A"), and 
the date on which the Permanent Resident Card expires.  It is important to understand 
that, although a Permanent Resident Card is valid for only ten years at a time, once the 
card expires it does not mean that the person loses her or his status as an LPR.  It simply 
means that the person needs to acquire an updated Permanent Resident Card in order to 
have a current document verifying his or her status.  LPR status can only be revoked as 
the result of administrative proceedings that comply with statutory and regulatory 
requirements and procedural due process – simple expiration of the Permanent Resident 
Card is not sufficient to revoke someone's LPR status. 
 
D. Conditional Permanent Residents (and Documents). 
 
Some non-citizens are granted LPR status on a conditional basis, and are referred to as 
Conditional Permanent Residents (CPRs).  Such individuals have the same status as 
LPRs for purposes of living and working in the U.S.  These individuals are referred to as 
“conditional” because they have been processed for permanent residence status within 24 
months of their marriage to a U.S. citizen.  The Immigration and Nationality Act 
requires that such persons be given a conditional status, which the non-citizen and spouse 
must jointly petition USCIS to remove at the end of the 24-month period.  If the 
condition is successfully removed, the person will become a full-fledged LPR.220 
 
CPRs will also have a Permanent Resident Card, but the card will indicate on its face, at 
least to the trained eye, that the bearer is merely a CPR.  Probably the easiest way to tell 
that someone is a CPR is to look at the expiration date on the Permanent Resident Card.  
If the expiration date is two years from the date of issue, as opposed to 10 years, then the 
person is a CPR. 
 
Unlike non-conditional permanent residents, however, a CPR must timely petition to 
remove the conditions on his or her status.  If she or he does not, then his or her status is 
revoked as of the second anniversary of his or her being granted CPR status.221  What 
 
219  USCIS, Form I-9 Acceptable Documents, https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-central/form-i-
9-acceptable-documents (last visited October 12, 2020).  USCIS began issuing a new version of 
the “green card” on May 1, 2017. 
220  See INA § 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a; 8 C.F.R. Parts 216 and 1216. 
221  INA § 216(c)(2)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(A). 
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this means is that if you have a client whose Permanent Resident Card was only good for 
two years after the date of issuance, and those two years have passed and the client does 
not have a new green card, that client is likely out of status and subject to being removed 
from the U.S.  If the client is in removal proceedings due to his or her CPR status being 
terminated, it is possible for the client to ask for the Immigration Judge to grant 
permanent resident status as part of the relief sought in removal proceedings.222  If you 
encounter a client in this situation, you should explore what the status of the removal 
proceedings are, to determine if there is a possibility that his or her permanent resident 
status may be granted by the Immigration Judge. 
 
E. Non-Immigrants (and Documents). 
 
Non-immigrants are individuals who are in the U.S. on a temporary basis.  Such 
individuals are entitled to remain in the U.S. for as long as their status authorizes them to 
be here.  They are required to leave the U.S. once their status expires.  They are not 
entitled to remain in the U.S. on a permanent basis.  Some non-immigrants are entitled to 
work and some are not -- it depends on what category of non-immigrant a person is. 
 
There are a number of non-immigrant categories under the INA.223  Examples include 
tourists, business visitors, professionals employed as temporary workers, students, 
fiancees of U.S. citizens, performers, foreign government representatives, certain witness 
informants, trafficking victims, victims of certain types of criminal activity, certain 
family members of LPRs who have been waiting more than three years for an entry visa, 
and so forth. 
 
In the old days, non-immigrants were issued a paper Form I-94 by the CBP at the time 
they entered the U.S.  The I-94 is frequently referred to as an "Arrival/Departure 
Record."  The date and place of admission, the status in which the person was admitted, 
and the date until which the person has been given permission to remain in the U.S. all 
appeared in the upper right section of the paper I-94. Today, however, all of the arrival 
and departure information is stored electronically and can be accessed online.224  
 
Non-immigrants from Mexico may also have a Border Crossing Card (BCC), sometimes 
referred to as a “laser visa.”  Border Crossing Cards allow their holders to enter the U.S. 
without obtaining an I-94 if they remain within 25 miles of the U.S./Mexican border upon 
entry (55 miles in New Mexico and 75 miles in Arizona).225  An example of a BCC can 
 
222  INA § 216(c)(2)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(B). 
223  See INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15), for a list of non-immigrant categories. 
224  A more complete description of how the I-94 information is now stored and accessed 
can be found on the CBP website: U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Arrival/Departure Forms: 
I-94 and I-94W, https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/i-94 (last visited June 2, 2021).  
225  8 C.F.R. § 235.1(h)(1)(iii). 
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be found on page 9 of a 2012 CBP publication entitled CBP Rail APIS Document  
Guidance.226  Although on their faces, BCCs state that they are valid for 10 years at a 
time; this does not mean that the holder can remain in the U.S. for 10 years.  In fact, 
BCCs allow the holder to remain in the U.S. only for periods of up to 30 days at a time 
after which they must leave the U.S.227 
 
F. Parolees (and Documents). 
 
At present, there are two main types of parole: (1) so-called humanitarian parole and (2) 
parole in place (PIP). 
 
Humanitarian parole.  One who has been granted humanitarian parole has been allowed 
to enter the U.S. physically, but under the law, the person has not effected an “entry” as 
defined in the INA.228  As the cited statute indicates, the benefit of humanitarian parole 
is extended only in cases involving urgent humanitarian concerns or significant public 
benefit.229  And once the purpose of the parole is served, the non-citizen must leave the 
U.S. 
 
Parole in place (PIP).  This is a much newer form of parole, and is available to spouses, 
minor children and parents of U.S. citizen military personnel.  The benefit of PIP is to 
allow military family members the ability to adjust status from within the U.S. if they 
were not admitted pursuant to law.230  A qualifying family member of a U.S. citizen 
military member can ask for PIP in order to achieve lawful permanent resident status 




226  U.S. Customs & Border Protection, CBP Rail APIS Document Guidance,  
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/apis_doc_3.pdf (last visited June 2, 2021). 
227  8 C.F.R. § 235.1(h)(1)(iii).  As seen from the regulation, under some circumstances 
the period of authorized stay is as short as 72 hours. 
228  INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). 
229  An example of when parole would normally be granted is to allow a non-citizen to 
undergo necessary medical treatment. 
230  Under INA § 245(a) (8 U.S.C. § 155(a)), a person cannot apply to become a 
permanent resident while remaining in the U.S. unless he or she was “inspected and admitted or 
paroled into the United States. . .” 
231  A detailed discussion of PIP can be found in the USCIS policy memo implementing 
it: USCIS, Discretionary Options for Military Members, Enlistees and Their Families, 
https://www.uscis.gov/military/discretionary-options-for-military-members-enlistees-and-their-
families (last visited June 2, 2021). 
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One who has been paroled into the U.S. will have a document issued by the CBP 
indicating she or he was given parole. 
 
G. Refugees (and Documents). 
 
Technically, refugees are a category of non-immigrants.232  However, they are discussed 
separately here because of their unique situation. 
 
Refugees are people who have been identified as victims of persecution in their home 
countries on account of their race, religion, national origin, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.233  This determination is made by the U.S. government 
before entry into the U.S.  Refugees thus enter the U.S. with the status of a "refugee," 
which is a term of art under the INA.  Refugees are entitled to adjust their status to that 
of an LPR once they have resided in the U.S. for at least one year.234 
 
Persons who enter the U.S. as refugees are issued Form I-94 by the admitting CBP officer 
on which is stamped:  “Admitted as a Refugee Pursuant to section 207 of the Act.  If 
you depart the United States you will need prior permission to return.  EMPLOYMENT 
AUTHORIZED.”235 
 
H. Asylees (and Documents). 
 
As with refugees, asylees are technically non-immigrants.  These are people who 
initially enter the U.S., either with or without documentation, and then assert that they 
qualify for asylum as the result of fitting the definition of “refugee” found in INA        
§ 101(a)(42).236  If they can prove this assertion they are granted asylum and have the 
status of “asylee.” 
 
There are two methods by which a person may be granted asylee status, and therefore two 
different types of documents that you should look for to verify this status. 
 
232  In the world of immigration law, there are only two types of non-citizens:  
immigrants and non-immigrants. 
233  INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
234  INA § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159. 
235  See, e.g., Handbook for Employers, Section 6.3  https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-
central/handbook-for-employers-m-274/60-evidence-of-status-for-certain-categories/63-
refugees-and-asylees (last visited June 2, 2021).  The I-94 may also say “Paroled as a Refugee. . 
.” because in the past ICE considered that some refugees were merely paroled into the U.S. and 
not actually “admitted.”  The BIA has held, however, that since 1997 all refugees are “admitted” 
and not paroled into the U.S.  Matter of D-K-, 25 I&N Dec. 761 (BIA 2012). 
236  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
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1. Affirmative Asylum Recipients (and Documents). 
 
A person seeking asylum can file an “affirmative” asylum application with 
USCIS.237  That application is eventually assigned to an asylum officer with the 
USCIS, who conducts an interview with the applicant and renders a decision on 
the application.  If the applicant is granted asylum status, she or he will have one 
and possibly two documents evidencing that fact.  First, the client should have a 
written decision issued by the asylum officer stating that the client was granted 
asylum.238  Second, the client may have an employment authorization document 
(EAD).  Although asylees are authorized to work in the U.S. incident to their 
status as asylees,239 many of them apply for and receive an EAD as evidence of 
their status and right to work.  The document also serves the dual purpose of 
being a government-issued photo i.d., which clients find helpful to have.  An 
example of an EAD can be found on the USCIS website listing types of 
documents acceptable for verifying employment authorization in the U.S.240 
 
2. Defensive Asylum Recipients (and Documents). 
 
Asylum applications can also be pursued before Immigration Judges in the 
context of removal proceedings.  Asylum is one form of relief from removal that  
 
 
237  An asylum application is filed on USCIS Form I-589.  A complete list of USCIS 
forms and instructions for completing them can be found on the USCIS website. 
https://www.uscis.gov/forms/all-forms (last visited June 2, 2021). 
238  An asylum recipient’s immediate family members (spouse and minor [under age 21 
and unmarried] children) may apply for and receive derivative asylum status through the 
recipient.  This can be done either at the same time the principal applicant requests asylum or 
after the principal is granted asylum.  If the family members are in the U.S. and included on the 
principal applicant’s I-589, then they will receive derivative asylum status once the principal’s 
application is approved.  If the family members are abroad, the principal applicant files USCIS 
Form I-730 to bring them to the U.S. as derivative asylees.  In such case, the documents of the 
family members would look slightly different from that of the principal recipient, but they 
nonetheless should clearly indicate that the bearer has the status of an asylee. 
239  8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(5). 
240  USCIS, Form I-9 Acceptable Documents, https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-central/form-i-
9-acceptable-documents (last visited October 12, 2020).  EADs are granted to individuals who 
fall into one of the regulatory “pigeon holes” authorizing them to work.  For example, a person 
who has been granted asylum is authorized to work pursuant to the provisions in 8 C.F.R.             
§ 274a.12(a)(5).  That regulatory reference appears on the EAD issued to such a person.  If a 
client has an EAD, you can therefore get a clue as to the immigration status of the client by 
looking at the regulatory category listed on the EAD. 
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eligible clients may seek.241 
 
If a client is successful in pursuing a defensive asylum application, she or he will 
have a copy of the Immigration Judge’s decision granting asylum, which will take 
the form of a boilerplate court order with the appropriate boxes checked, and 
signed by the Immigration Judge.  As with affirmative asylum recipients, clients 
who have received asylum from an Immigration Judge may also have an EAD 
indicating that they are asylum recipients.  
 
I. Special Categories. 
 
There are several different programs administered by the USCIS that allow non-citizens 
to remain in the U.S. and, in some cases, receive employment authorization, but do not 
grant them any “official” immigration status.  Some of those programs are discussed 
below. 
 
1. Temporary Protected Status (TPS) (and Documents). 
 
The Temporary Protected Status program allows the Secretary of the Department 
of Homeland Security to permit non-citizen nationals from designated countries to 
remain in the U.S. on a temporary basis until it is safe for such persons to return 
to their home countries.242  Generally speaking, countries are designated by the 
Secretary because of ongoing armed conflict, natural disaster, or some other such 
condition.243 
 
Clients who have received a grant of TPS are authorized to remain in the U.S. 
until the Secretary terminates the TPS designation for their country, and are 
authorized to work.244  However, such individuals do not receive any sort of 
permanent permission to remain in the U.S.  At such time as the TPS designation 
is either terminated or allowed to expire by the Secretary, such TPS recipients 
must leave the U.S.245  
 
241  Relief from removal is akin to an affirmative defense to a removal proceeding.  If 
the immigrant is successful in obtaining relief from removal, that will prevent his or her 
deportation.  Relief from removal works procedurally much like an affirmative defense in the 
sense that the immigrant has the burden of pleading and proving eligibility for the particular 
form of relief from removal she or he seeks. 
242  See INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254, for a general description of the TPS program. 
243  In the case of Haitians, for example, TPS status was initially granted in January, 
2010, because of the damage wrought by the earthquakes in that country. 
244  INA § 244(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(f). 
245  A current list of countries that have received TPS designation by the Secretary can 
be found on the USCIS website: USCIS, Temporary Protected Status, 
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Clients who are granted TPS receive written notification of such a grant.  The 
form on which a client requests TPS is USCIS Form I-821, so the written 
approval notice will mention approval of that form.  Additionally, TPS recipients 
will usually have an EAD.  The category on the EAD indicating that the client is 
a TPS recipient is § 274a.12(a)(12). 
 
If you have a client who has received TPS, you must analyze his or her case  
differently in terms of deportation risks from other clients.  TPS recipients  
will lose their TPS status if they are convicted of (1) any felony, (2) two or  
more misdemeanors, or (3) a “particularly serious crime.”246 
 
2. Applicants for Immigration Benefits (and Documents). 
 
As a general proposition, most non-citizens who have applied for immigration 
benefits are permitted to remain in the U.S. until the USCIS adjudicates their 
eligibility for the immigration benefits for which they have applied.  Examples 
are clients who have applied for adjustment of status (inter alia, those who have 
married U.S. citizens and have applied to get their green cards), those who have 
filed applications for asylum, and those who have filed applications for benefits 
under the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA),247 among 
others.  The mere filing of an application for immigration benefits does not 
confer immigration status on a client, but again, as a practical matter, most clients 
are permitted to remain in the U.S. until the benefit application is adjudicated. 
 
If a client has filed an application for immigration benefits, she or he should have 
a receipt from the USCIS (USCIS Form I-797C) indicating that the application 
has been received.  An example of a receipt notice can no longer be found on the 
USCIS website, but can be found with a Google search.248  In some cases, an 
applicant for benefits is authorized to seek employment authorization and will 
have an EAD.249 
 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last visited June 2, 2021). 
246  INA § 244(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 154a(c)(2)(B).  See Section V.E.2., infra, for a 
discussion of what constitutes a “particularly serious crime.” 
247  Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193 (Nov. 19, 1997). 
248  See, for example, Lirian J. Rosenfeld, Getting Your Green Card  - I-797 Approval 
Notice Stage, PassRight, https://www.passright.com/green-card-i797-approval-notice/ (last 
visited June 2, 2021). 
249  For example, applicants for adjustment of status may receive employment 
authorization pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9).  Applicants for NACARA benefits can 
receive employment authorization under § 274a.12(c)(10).  Applicants for asylum can, after 
their applications have been pending for at least 150 days, receive employment authorization 
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3. Deferred Action Recipients (and Documents). 
 
Deferred action is essentially a grant of administrative discretion by which an 
otherwise removable non-citizen will not be removed from the U.S.  Those who 
are granted deferred action do not have any sort of permanent status, but even 
though they are otherwise removable from the U.S., they will not be removed.  In 
addition, they are eligible to apply for work authorization.250 
 
The current state of deferred action is, to put it charitably, in disarray.  The most 
recent memo from DHS addressing the issue of deferred action was a November 
20, 2014, memorandum by the Secretary of DHS, the Secretary briefly reviews 
the history of deferred action.251  Since granting deferred action is a matter of 
discretion, there was historically no official form on which application for it was 
made.  Instead, the request for deferred action was, in most cases, directed to the 
local district director of the USCIS or ICE.252  That is still the case with 
“generic” forms of deferred action, but other types of deferred action have 
become more formalized. 
 
a. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). 
 
Given how much it has been in the news for the past several years, this is 
probably the most well-known type of “formal” deferred action.  It was 
established in 2012, and essentially amounts to a grant of deferred action 
to a group of individuals who have been deemed to be of very low priority 
for removal from the U.S. 
 
under § 274a.12(c)(8).   
250  8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14). 
251    U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals 
Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf (last 
visited June 2, 2021).  The memorandum, along with the companion enforcement priority memo 
issued by Secretary Johnson on the same day, are must-reads, not only because of the 
background they give of deferred action, but also because of the discussion of ICE’s current 
removal priorities.  The enforcement priority memo of the same date can be found at: U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented 
Immigrants, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion_0.
pdf (last visited June 2, 2021). 
252  Legacy INS used to have an Operations Instruction (O.I. 244.1a(22)) setting forth 
guidelines to consider in determining whether to grant deferred action.  Although that O.I. was 
repealed in 1997, deferred action still exists. 
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DACA recipients request deferred action by filing USCIS Form I-821D.  
A grant of DACA deferred action is indicated on USCIS Form I-797, 
which looks much like the receipt notice, Form I797C, discussed in the 
previous section of this Guide.  In addition, DACA recipients are eligible 
to receive an EAD, with category (c)(14) indicated on the face of the 
EAD. 
 
The details of the DACA program, together with the application process, 
are available on the USCIS website.253   
 
As with TPS recipients, if your client is a DACA recipient, the 
immigration consequences of any criminal convictions must be 
analyzed differently.  DACA recipients can lose their status if they 
are convicted at any time of a felony, a “significant misdemeanor,” or 
of three or more misdemeanors of any type.  They can also lose their 
status if they otherwise pose a threat to national security or public 
safety.254 
 
b. VAWA Deferred Action. 
 
If an abused spouse, child or parent of an LPR files a self-petition in order 
to obtain permanent resident status on his or her own, without the 
assistance of the abuser,255 and if the petition is approved but the 
petitioning victim cannot immediately obtain a permanent resident card 
because a visa number is not available due to visa quota limits,256 USCIS 
will normally grant the beneficiaries of such petitions deferred action and 
employment authorization until a visa number becomes available to the 
 
253  USCIS, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA),  
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals-
daca  (last visited June 11, 2021). 
254  As set forth on the website cited in the previous footnote, for purposes of DACA, a 
“significant misdemeanor” is a crime that is a misdemeanor as defined by federal law 
(specifically, one for which the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is one year or less 
but greater than five days) and (1) regardless of the sentence imposed, is an offense of domestic 
violence, sexual abuse or exploitation, burglary, unlawful possession or use of a firearm, drug 
distribution or trafficking, or, driving under the influence; or (2) if not an offense listed in (1) 
above, is one for which the individual was sentenced to time in custody of more than 90 days. 
The sentence must involve time to be served in custody, and therefore does not include a 
suspended sentence. 
255  See INA § 204(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
256  This would only be the case where the abusing spouse or parent is a LPR, since there 
is no visa waiting period for spouses or minor children of U.S. citizens. 
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VAWA recipient.257  A recipient of this type of deferred action will also 
have a Form I-797, indicating that she has been granted deferred action.  
She may also have an EAD under category (c)(14). 
 
c. Prosecutorial Discretion/Administrative Closure. 
 
Another type of case in which it used to be possible to see a grant of 
deferred action were cases in which a client in removal proceedings had 
been granted prosecutorial discretion/administrative closure by ICE.  The 
contours of this type of deferred action were discussed in the priorities 
enforcement memo issued by DHS Secretary Johnson on November 20, 
2014.  However, by virtue of President Trump’s Executive Order 13768, 
issued on January 25, 2017,258 former Secretary Johnson’s memo has been 
rescinded.  On May 27, 2021, ICE’s Office of Principal Legal Advisor 
(OPLA), issued a memorandum regarding ICE’s new enforcement and 
removal priorities.259  As you can see, the status of deferred action, as it 
relates to enforcement priorities of ICE, varies widely depending on who 
is running the show. 
 
One form that prosecutorial discretion has taken with respect to clients 
involved in removal proceedings is “administrative closure.”  Under this 
arrangement, an immigration judge could order a case to be 
administratively closed, meaning that it would remain pending on the 
court’s docket, but would be in a state of perpetual continuance – in other 
words, it would not be put back on the court’s active docket absent an 
affirmative order from the court.  However, the status of administrative 
closure was dealt a severe blow as the result of a decision authored by 
Attorney General Sessions in Matter of Castro-Tum.260  In that opinion, 
the Attorney General found no legal authority for the general program of 
administrative closure, and forbade Immigration Judges from granting 
administrative closure except in cases where it is authorized by a 
 
257  INA § 204(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II).  See also the very brief 
explanation under the “Working in the United States” tab on the USCIS VAWA site: USCIS, 
Battered Spouse, Children and Parents, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/battered-spouse-
children-and-parents (last visited October 12, 2020). 
Although this proposed amendment to the Adjudicator’s Field Manual has not been formally 
adopted, it is still USCIS’ policy to grant deferred action to LPR VAWA applicants. 
258  82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
259  https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigration-
enforcement_interim-guidance.pdf (last visited June 11, 2021). 
 
260  27 I&N Dec. 271 (AG 2018). 
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regulation or a previously judicially-approved settlement agreement.  
Although the legal reasoning in this opinion is shaky, and, as of this 
writing, at least two circuit courts have overruled Castro-Tum,261 it 
remains controlling law at the BIA level as well as in those circuits that 
have not yet addressed its rationale. 
 
In his opinion in Castro-Tum, the Attorney General realized that requiring 
re-calendaring of all administratively-closed cases would overwhelm the 
Immigration Courts.262  Despite the holding of Castro-Tum, there are 
some cases that do remain administratively closed, pursuant to ICE policy 
recognizing grants of deferred action in certain situations.263 
 
As with TPS recipients, it is important to analyze the immigration 
risks of criminal proceedings differently for this group than for other 
types of non-citizens.  Since the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is, 
well, discretionary, it is likely that any type of criminal conviction will 
imperil the ability of someone to continue to receive deferred action as the 
result of prosecutorial discretion or administrative closure. 
 
Recipients of deferred action should have a letter or some sort of 
communication from ICE stating that they have been approved for 
deferred action.  Additionally, most recipients of deferred action will 
have an EAD, with the category (c)(14) noted on the EAD. 
 
Recipients of administrative closure should have a copy of an Immigration 
Judge’s order granting them administrative closure.  In such cases, it is 
important to determine what type of relief from removal, if any, those 
clients had pending when their removal cases were administratively 
closed.  For example, some clients may have been pursuing defensive 
asylum claims when their removal cases were administratively closed.  In 
such cases, you will need to be sensitive to the way in which a criminal 
case will affect their continued ability to pursue their asylum case (along 




261  Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2020); Meza Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656 
(7th Cir. 2020). 
262  27 I&N Dec. at 292. 
263  For example, ICE has indicated that it will not seek re-calendaring of 
administratively-closed removal cases where U visa applicants have been granted deferred action 
by USCIS. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Revision of Stay of Removal Request Reviews 
for U Visa Petitioners,  https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/revision-stay-removal-request-reviews-
u-visa-petitioners#wcm-survey-target-id (last visited October 12, 2020). 
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4. Voluntary Departure Recipients (and Documents). 
 
Non-citizens may be granted voluntary departure, either before removal 
proceedings are commenced against them, during proceedings, or at the 
conclusion of proceedings.264  Those granted voluntary departure have agreed to 
depart the U.S. by a certain date, in lieu of either being placed into removal 
proceedings or in lieu of having a removal order entered against them.   A grant 
of voluntary departure is advantageous to most non-citizens since being placed in 
removal proceedings or being ordered removed by the Immigration Court carries 
certain penalties with regard to future attempts to enter the U.S.265  Leaving as a 
result of voluntary departure carries fewer, if any, such penalties. 
 
Those who have been granted voluntary departure will have some type of 
documentation of that fact, either issued by a USCIS or ICE officer, or perhaps by 
an Immigration Judge.  Most of those granted voluntary departure are not eligible 
to receive an EAD.266 
 
5. Cancellation of Removal Recipients (and Documents). 
 
Certain non-citizens who are in the U.S. without documentation are eligible, in 
the course of removal proceedings,267 to apply for a form of relief from removal 
called “Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain 
Nonpermanent Residents.”268  Available solely as a defense to removal 
proceedings, this relief, if granted, confers permanent resident status on a 
previously undocumented person.269 
 
264  INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c. 
265  For example, a non-citizen in the U.S. who is ordered removed generally is barred 
from re-entering the U.S. for a period of 10 years.  INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.             
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). 
266  Individuals granted “extended” voluntary departure or voluntary departure under the 
Family Unity Program are eligible to receive an employment authorization document.  See 8 
C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(11) and (13). 
267  Removal proceedings used to be called deportation or exclusion proceedings, 
depending on the client’s status at the time such proceedings were begun.  See the discussion at 
section IV.A.1., infra. 
268  INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 
269  There is also a form of cancellation relief available to permanent residents who are in 
removal proceedings.  See INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  That type of cancellation is 
not discussed here since, if a permanent resident receives this type of relief, she or he will simply 
maintain status as a permanent resident and therefore will have an I-551 (“green card”) to 
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A previously undocumented person who has received a grant of cancellation of 
removal will have a written decision from an Immigration Judge granting such 
relief.  As mentioned earlier, the grant of relief makes the person an LPR.  The 
format of the written decision will be similar, if not identical, to that of a written 
decision granting a defensive asylum application.270  Eventually, the person will 
receive a Permanent Resident Card (I-551), but that may take some time to 
process administratively after the hearing before the Immigration Judge. 
 
Because a non-citizen is authorized to work incident to status as an LPR, she or he 
cannot obtain an EAD.  The person may have an EAD in his or her possession 
that was issued while the cancellation application was pending.  If so, the 
regulatory category on the EAD would be § 274a.12(c)(10). 
 
6. Those Released on Orders of Supervision (OSUP) (and Documents). 
 
Some respondents who have been in removal proceedings have had final orders of 
removal entered against them, but nevertheless cannot be removed to their home 
country by ICE, normally because ICE cannot secure travel documents from the 
appropriate foreign governments.  Clients from South Sudan, Laos, and Somalia 
are examples of those who may face this situation, because governments of those 
countries either repatriate very few of their citizens each year from the U.S., or 
repatriate none at all. 
 
Some in this situation are eligible for release from ICE custody under what ICE 
calls an “order of supervision (OSUP).”271  This is similar to an OR bond in the 
criminal context –- such individuals are released into the community but are 
required to report to ICE on a periodic basis so that ICE can keep track of them.  
Individuals who have been released under orders of supervision are authorized to 
apply for an EAD.272  Obviously, such persons have no formal immigration 
status in the U.S., but are here simply until such time as their removal from the 
U.S. can be accomplished. 
 
Individuals released under orders of supervision will have some documentation 
from ICE granting their request to be released.  Also, as indicated above, they 
will likely have an EAD with the regulatory category of § 274a.12(c)(18). 
 
 
document that status. 
270  See section III.H.2., supra. 
271  INA § 241(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).  See also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 
(2001), for a discussion of the constitutional limitations on indefinite detention of individuals 
who cannot be removed to their home countries. 
272  8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(18).  
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The analysis of immigration consequences of criminal convictions for those in 
this category is different than that for other types of non-citizens.  Since 
those who have received an OSUP from ICE must check in with ICE periodically, 
ICE will monitor their criminal history.  Any type of conviction may jeopardize 
their ability to remain out of custody on an OSUP. 
 
7. Individuals Granted Stays of Removal (and Documents). 
 
There are several scenarios in which a non-citizen might have been ordered 
removed from the U.S., but is the beneficiary of a stay of the removal order.  
Some examples follow. 
 
--A respondent in removal proceedings who has received a negative 
decision from an Immigration Judge has the right to file an appeal to the 
BIA, which, in most cases, is the last stop administratively.273  In such 
instances, there is an automatic stay of removal pending decision of the 
case by the BIA.274 
 
--Respondents who are appealing removal orders to federal court or who 
are challenging removal orders in some way other than by direct appeal 
can apply to such courts for stays of execution of the removal order until 
the case is decided. 
 
--Local directors of ICE have authority to grant administrative stays of 
removal, usually where significant humanitarian concerns are present.275 
 
Obviously, since respondents can be the beneficiaries of stays of removal 
in many different ways, they could have different documents.  And just as 
obviously, being the beneficiary of a stay of removal does not grant 
someone any long-term immigration status in the U.S. 
 
J. Undocumented Individuals. 
 
These are individuals who have either entered the U.S. without any documentation at all, 





273  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).  Decisions of the BIA may be referred to the U.S. Attorney 
General for further review, (8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)). 
274  8 C.F.R. § 1003.6. 
275  8 C.F.R. §§ 241.6, 1241.6.  Recipients of prosecutorial discretion, discussed in 
section III.I.3.c., supra, may have been granted stays of removal. 
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documentation but have remained beyond the period they were authorized to stay in the    
U.S.276 
 
A frequently-encountered acronym in the area of undocumented individuals is “EWI.”  
These initials stand for “entry without inspection,” and are used to describe those 
individuals who physically entered the U.S. without documents and without being 
inspected and admitted by a CBP officer at the time of their physical entry. 
 
Obviously, undocumented individuals who entered without inspection will have no 
legitimate documentation of any kind to verify their status.277  If they entered with 
inspection but have remained beyond the time authorized, they will have documents that, 
on their face, indicate their status has expired.  Such individuals are subject to being 
removed from the U.S. at any time. 
 
IV. REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS. 
 
A. History and Terminology. 
 
The purpose of this section of the Guide is not to turn criminal practitioners into 
immigration lawyers.  Rather, it is to provide some general background and information 
on the workings of the U.S. immigration system regarding removal proceedings.  
Hopefully this information will assist criminal law practitioners in advising their non-
U.S. citizen clients. 
 
1. Historical Forerunners of Removal Proceedings. 
 
As discussed earlier,278 Congress made two massive changes to the INA in 1996:  
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).  Those 
 
276  An example of this last category is a visitor who remains in the U.S. after the period 
of authorized stay indicated on his or her I-94.  In terms of non-immigrants, in most cases the 
date by which the person must leave the U.S. is indicated on the I-94, which is the document 
given to the person by a CBP officer at the time of entry into the U.S.  A visa (which appears in 
a non-citizen’s passport and which is issued by a U.S. consular officer abroad) is like a 
permission slip to seek admission to the U.S.  The visa may be good for several years beyond its 
issuance date, but that does not mean the non-immigrant is authorized to stay in the U.S. until the 
visa expires – that date is found on the I-94. 
277  But they may very well have illegitimate documents indicating that they have some 
status, either because the documents belong to someone else who has status, or because the 
documents are fabricated.  Depending on the quality of such documents and the honesty of the 
client, you may not know that they are without documentation.  So you have to ask and hope 
they tell you the truth. 
278  See section I.B.1., supra. 
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two Acts, especially IIRIRA, changed both substantive law and terminology in 
the area of removal proceedings.  Before IIRIRA was enacted, there were 
essentially two types of proceedings in which legacy INS sought either to exclude 
non-citizens from the U.S. or deport those who were already here: exclusion 
proceedings and deportation proceedings. 
 
a. Exclusion Proceedings. 
 
In exclusion proceedings, legacy INS sought to exclude people from the 
U.S. who were seeking entry into the country.  These proceedings were 
used if a person had not yet physically entered the U.S.  In essence, 
exclusion proceedings were used to keep people out who were at ports of 
entry but whom legacy INS believed were excludable because a provision 
of law did not permit them to enter the U.S.279  Exclusion proceedings 
were also used in cases where immigrants had been paroled into the U.S. 
but had not been formally admitted.280  In such cases, parolees were not 
considered to have effected an entry into the U.S. and were therefore 
subject to exclusion proceedings.  Although non-citizens were entitled to 
hearings in exclusion proceedings, the procedural safeguards were not as 
stringent as those in deportation proceedings, since such non-citizens had 
not yet entered the U.S. 
 
b. Deportation Proceedings. 
 
The second type of proceeding was known as a deportation proceeding, in 
which legacy INS sought to deport someone from the U.S. who had 
already physically entered the country.  Thus, people who were 
physically present in the U.S., regardless of whether they had entered 
legally or not, were put into deportation proceedings if they were 
deportable under existing law.281  One who had physically entered the 
U.S. and who was deportable was entitled to a deportation proceeding 





279  The grounds of exclusion were formerly found in § 212(a) of the INA (8 U.S.C.      
§ 1182), and included things such as certain communicable diseases, certain crimes, being Nazi 
persecutors, and so forth. 
280  See section III.F., supra, for a discussion of the concept of “parole.” 
281  The grounds of deportation in the statute, then found at § 241 of the INA (8 U.S.C.   
§ 1251), included those who had entered the U.S. without documents, those who had been 
convicted of certain crimes, those who had overstayed their periods of authorized stay, and so 
forth. 
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Deportation proceedings, although still administrative proceedings, were 
more formal procedurally than exclusion proceedings, and afforded 
respondents more due process rights than did exclusion proceedings. 
 
2. Current Terminology. 
 
Since April 1, 1997, all proceedings either to keep someone out of the U.S. who 
wants to enter or to remove someone who has already entered are called by one 
name: “removal” proceedings.282  Although IIRIRA was signed into law on 
September 30, 1996, most of its provisions did not become effective until April 1, 
1997.  Therefore, generally speaking, pre-IIRIRA law applies to clients whose 
exclusion or deportation cases were filed before April 1, 1997, and post-IIRIRA 
law applies to clients whose removal cases were initiated on or after April 1, 
1997.  The discussion in later sections of this Guide is based on post-IIRIRA law. 
 
Why bother with this discussion?  Because, although proceedings now have only 
one name, there are still substantive differences between grounds that make a 
person “inadmissible” (i.e., a person who either has never entered the U.S. or has 
physically entered, but without being inspected and given permission to enter), 
and those that make a person “deportable” (i.e., someone who entered legally and 
with inspection).  And, depending on your client’s immigration status, she or he 
may have to worry only about grounds of inadmissibility, only about grounds of 
deportability, or, potentially, about both.283  Today, the grounds of 
“deportability” are found in INA § 237 (8 U.S.C. § 1227), while the grounds of 
“inadmissibility” are found in INA   § 212 (8 U.S.C. § 1182). 
 
Here is another important point: IIRIRA changed the definition of “entry.”  To 
be precise, it eliminated this term from the INA and replaced it with the concept 
of “admission.”  With the advent of IIRIRA, a client who has physically entered 
the U.S. “illegally” (i.e., without documents and without being inspected by a 
CBP officer) has not, under post-IIRIRA law, effected a legal entry.284  
Therefore, such a person, even if encountered in the interior of the U.S., will be 
charged with being inadmissible under § 212(a) of the INA285 rather than with 
being “deportable” under § 237 of the INA.286  As a result, if you are 
representing a non-citizen client who has entered the U.S. without inspection, 
 
282  See, e.g., INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 
283  See the discussion in section V.B.2., infra. 
284  See INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).  The statute also sets forth other 
occasions on which a person is deemed to be seeking “admission” to the U.S. 
285  8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
286  8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
94 
your analysis of immigration consequences should focus on § 212 of the INA, 
rather than on § 237.  
 
B. Removal Proceedings. 
 
At present, there are essentially five different types of removal proceedings: “regular” 
removal proceedings, administrative removal proceedings, reinstatement removal 
proceedings, judicial removal proceedings, and expedited removal proceedings.  Each 
type of proceeding is summarized below. 
 
1. Regular Removal Proceedings.287 
 
“Regular” removal proceedings are those removal proceedings that will be heard 
before an Immigration Judge pursuant to § 240 of the INA.288  This is the type of 
removal proceeding that clients in Nebraska most likely will encounter. 
 
The statute provides, inter alia, that Immigration Judges shall conduct 
proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of a non-citizen 
under INA §§ 212(a) and 237(a), respectively.289  Thus, a client who is 
physically present in the country, whether or not the client has been “admitted” to 
the U.S., will most often face an Immigration Judge, who will determine whether 
or not the client should be removed from the U.S. pursuant to any of the listed 
statutory grounds.  Following is a summary outline of the procedures involved in 
a § 240 removal proceeding. 
 
a. Initiation of Proceedings. 
 
Although several officials have authority to place an individual in § 240 
removal proceedings,290 most often it is an ICE officer working for the 
local Field Office who does so.  One is placed in removal proceedings by 
the issuing of a Notice to Appear (NTA).291  Unless the respondent 
 
287  The Immigration Court Practice Manual is an excellent source of information about 
the nuts and bolts of practice before Immigration Courts.  It can be found on the EOIR website:   
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-chief-immigration-judge-0 (last visited October 12, 2020). 
288  8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 
289  INA § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a). 
290  8 C.F.R. §§ 239.1(a), 1239.1(a). 
291  INA § 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1229.  One example of a NTA is found at 
https://immigrantjustice.org/for-attorneys/legal-resources/file/sample-notice-appear (last visited 
October 12, 2020). 
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consents to being removed from the U.S. without benefit of a hearing,292 
the issuance of an NTA begins a string of events that will result in an 
Immigration Judge determining whether or not the person is inadmissible 
to or deportable from the U.S. 
 
b. Detention During Proceedings. 
 
ICE has the authority to detain anyone who is placed in removal 
proceedings, and is required to detain certain individuals who are in 
proceedings.293  Because the issues of pre-hearing and post-hearing 
detention are complicated, they are discussed more fully in a later 
section.294 
 
c. Master Calendar Hearing. 
 
The first hearing at which the allegations in the NTA are addressed is the 
Master Calendar Hearing.295  At this hearing, the non-citizen is expected 
to respond, by admission or denial, to each of the factual allegations in the 
NTA, as well as to the charge(s) of inadmissibility or deportability. 
 
Master Calendar Hearings are akin to docket calls -- several hearings are 
scheduled for each session.  Immigration Judges determine the order in 
which they wish to call the cases, usually beginning with those who are 
represented by counsel. 
 
Unless the hearing is being conducted by an Immigration Judge who is not 





292  INA § 240(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d). 
293  INA § 236(a) and (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c). 
294  See section IV.C., infra. 
295 There can be a long lapse of time between the issuance of a NTA and the time of the 
Master Calendar Hearing, at least for those clients who are not detained by ICE.  Most NTAs, 
when first issued, do not even contain a date or time for the Master Calendar Hearing, instead 
indicating that the date and time are “To Be Set.”  This is because although (normally) an ICE 
officer issues the NTA, the Immigration Court schedules the Master Calendar Hearings, and the 
NTA-issuing officer does not have access to the Immigration Court’s docket calendar.  For non-
detained cases (see section IV.C., infra, for a discussion of detention issues), initial Master 
Calendar Hearings can take place well after the NTA is issued. 
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person in one of the courtrooms.296  If a person is not represented by 
counsel, the judge normally will, at the person's request, continue the 
Master Calendar Hearing to give him or her an opportunity to secure 
counsel.297  Although a non-citizen has a statutory right to be represented 
by counsel, such representation must be at no expense to the 
government.298  If the respondent is represented by counsel, counsel can 
file a motion with the appropriate Immigration Judge requesting that the 
Master Calendar Hearing be held by conference call among the 
Immigration Judge, the District Counsel, and the respondent’s counsel, 
thus obviating the need for the respondent's physical presence in Omaha.  
However, unless the Immigration Judge specifically waives the 
respondent’s appearance at the hearing, he or she must be present in 
counsel’s office. 
 
If, at the Master Calendar Hearing, the respondent neither contests the fact 
that she or he is inadmissible/deportable nor seeks any waiver of 
inadmissibility or relief from deportation, the Immigration Judge will enter 
an order finding the respondent removable (inadmissible or deportable, 
depending on the situation).  In such a case, the respondent would usually 
waive appeal and the order would become final and enforceable 
immediately.  The ICE District Office is charged with enforcing such an 
order.  ICE officials may take the respondent into custody very soon after 
the hearing concludes or allow him or her some time to report for removal, 





296  The Immigration Court entry is on the north side of the USCIS/ICE building in 
Omaha.  More information on the Court can be found on the EOIR website:  
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/omaha-immigration-court (last visited June 11, 2021). 
297  The statute (INA § 239(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)) provides that a Master 
Calendar Hearing shall not be held sooner than 10 days after the service of the NTA, so that a 
respondent has an opportunity to secure counsel.  In the Omaha District, hearings involving 
non-detained respondents rarely happen immediately after the 10-day period.  In the event they 
do, the judges have historically been very reasonable about continuing the hearing to allow the 
person the chance to secure representation. 
298  INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362. 
299  Although discussion of the equities considered by ICE is beyond the scope of this 
Guide, they generally coincide with the types of equities that will result in a favorable bond 
determination in a criminal law context: i.e., ties to the community, background of the client, 
financial circumstances, and so forth.  Obviously, the primary concern of ICE is that the person 
will actually report for removal when the time comes. 
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d. Individual Calendar (Merits) Hearing. 
 
If the respondent either (1) denies any of the essential factual allegations, 
or the charge(s) of inadmissibility/deportability in the NTA, or  
(2) admits that she or he is inadmissible or deportable but seeks either a 
waiver of inadmissibility or some other form of relief from removal, the 
Immigration Judge will schedule an Individual Calendar Hearing, also 
known as a Merits Hearing.  At this hearing, the issues raised by either 
the denial(s) or the request(s) for waiver/relief will be resolved. 
 
Individual Calendar Hearings are scheduled for dates and times certain -- 
the date and time are reserved solely for the individual respondent's case.  
At this stage of the proceedings, there will be another delay.  Depending 
on the nature of the case, the complexity of the issues involved, the time 
required for the presentation of evidence, and the judge involved, it may 
be a year or longer between the final Master Calendar Hearing and the 
Individual Calendar Hearing in cases in which the respondent is not 
detained (i.e., held in custody) by ICE. 
 
Individual Calendar Hearings are essentially short trials at which exhibits 
are offered and testimony taken on the issue(s) under consideration.  
Pursuant to the Immigration Court Practice Manual, counsel must submit 
supporting documents and briefs to the Immigration Judge at least 15 days 
before the Individual Calendar Hearing.300  Because the proceedings are 
administrative, the formal Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at the 
hearing. 
 
Frequently, the Immigration Judge announces his or her decision on the 
same day the Individual Calendar Hearing takes place.  Both the non-
citizen respondent and ICE may have the right to appeal the Immigration 
Judge’s decision administratively and/or judicially, depending on the type 
of case. 
 
2. Administrative Removal Proceedings. 
 
Administrative removal proceedings are those that take place pursuant to § 238(b) 






300  Immigration Court Practice Manual, § 3.1(b)(ii). 
301  8 U.S.C. §1228(b). 
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not LPRs or who have Conditional Permanent Resident status (CPR)302 if such 
individuals have been convicted of an aggravated felony.303 
 
Administrative removal proceedings are begun when the appropriate federal 
officer issues a Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Deportation Order 
(Notice of Intent) and serves it on the non-citizen.304  The facts that must be 
present in order to permit the use of administrative removal are limited, and will 
be cited in the Notice of Intent: (1) the person is, in fact, an non-citizen, (2) the 
person is not an LPR or is a CPR, (3) the person has been convicted of an 
aggravated felony and such conviction is final,305 and (4) the person is deportable 
as a result of the aggravated felony conviction.306  The Notice of Intent is issued 
on Form I-851.307 
 
The respondent has 10 calendar days from the date the Notice of Intent is served 
on him or her (13 calendar days if service is by mail) to respond to the Notice.308  
If there is no timely response, or if the respondent concedes that she or he is 
deportable, then the officer issues a Final Administrative Removal Order on Form 
I-851A.309  The removal order can be executed once 14 days pass, unless the 
respondent waives the 14-day waiting period.310 
 
If the person submits a timely response to the Notice of Intent contesting some of 
the facts, the issuing officer must decide whether, nevertheless, the charges in the 
Notice of Intent are sustained by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence in 
the record.  If the issuing officer makes that determination, she or he issues the 
Final Administrative Removal Order.311  If, on the other hand, the non-citizen’s 
 
302  INA § 238(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(2).  See section III.D., supra, for a discussion 
of Conditional Permanent Resident status. 
303  INA § 238(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1).  See section V.D.6., infra, for a discussion 
of what crimes constitute an aggravated felony. 
304  8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(1). 
305  See section V.D.2., infra, for a discussion of the term “conviction” under the INA. 
306  8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(1). 
307  Id. 
308  8 C.F.R. § 238.1(c)(1). 
309  8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(1). 
310  8 C.F.R. § 238.1(f)(1). 
311  8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(2)(i). 
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response raises a genuine issue of material fact, then the officer may either obtain 
additional evidence or convert the proceedings into “regular” removal 
proceedings under § 240 of the INA.312  If the officer finds that the person is not 
amenable to removal under § 238(b), then she or he must terminate the 
administrative removal proceedings finally and, where appropriate, begin 
“regular” removal proceedings under § 240.313 
 
3. Reinstatement Removal Proceedings. 
 
Section 241(a)(5) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(5)) provides that if an non-
citizen physically re-enters the U.S. without authorization after having been 
previously ordered removed, or after having voluntarily departed under an order 
of removal, she or he is not entitled to a “new” removal proceeding.  Instead, the 
previously-entered removal order is reinstated from its original date.  It cannot be 
reopened or reviewed in any way, nor can a non-citizen apply for any relief from 
the reinstated removal order, with very limited exceptions. 
 
This means, as the regulation details,314 that a person subject to reinstatement 
removal proceedings has no right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge.  The 
issues in a reinstatement proceeding are very limited: (1) was the person subject 
to a prior removal order? (2) is this the same person who was previously ordered 
removed? and (3) did the person re-enter the U.S. without authorization? If these 
three elements are established, then the person will be removed by reinstating the 
previous removal order, unless she or he is eligible for benefits under the Haitian 
Refugee Immigrant Fairness Act of 1998,315 the Nicaraguan and Central 
American Relief Act,316 or has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in the 
country to which he or she will be removed.317 
 
4. Judicial Removal Proceedings. 
 
Section 238(c)318 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)) lays out a procedure by which 
 
312  8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(2)(ii). 
313  8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(2)(iii). 
314  8 C.F.R. § 241.8. 
315  Section 902, Div. A, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (Oct. 21, 1998). 
316  Section 202, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160 (Nov. 19, 1997). 
317  8 C.F.R. § 241.8(d) and (e). 
318  Because of a Congressional drafting mistake, there are actually two sections 238(c) 
in the INA.  This discussion involves the second of those two sections. 
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United States District Courts can enter removal orders against deportable non-
citizens.  Originally enacted in 1994 as part of the Immigration and Nationality 
Technical Amendments Act,319 section 238(c) was again amended by AEDPA 
and IIRIRA in 1996. 
 
As it currently stands, § 238(c) allows a U.S. District Court judge to enter a 
judicial order of removal against one who is deportable under § 237(a)(2)(A) of 
the INA.  The statute lays out the procedure that must be followed, which 
includes the filing, by the U.S. Attorney’s office, of a notice of intent to request 
judicial removal.  Such a notice must be filed before the beginning of a trial or 
entry of a guilty plea.320  An additional filing, containing the factual allegations 
regarding alienage and identifying the crimes that make the person deportable, 
must be made at least 30 days before the date for sentencing.321 
 
A district court can consider requests for relief from removal by the respondent.322  
If the request for a judicial order of removal is denied by the district court, ICE 
can still seek a removal order through administrative proceedings, which can 
include the basis for the removal order sought from the district court.323 
 
5. Expedited Removal Proceedings. 
 
 Expedited removal proceedings are those conducted pursuant to the provisions of 
INA § 235.324  Historically, these proceedings were used only with respect to 
those encountered at or within 100 miles of ports of entry, and therefore most 
non-citizens in Nebraska were not subject to expedited removal proceedings.  
But the Trump Administration sought to change that practice. 325 
 
 
319  Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4322 (Oct. 25, 1994). 
320  INA § 238(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(A). 
321  INA § 238(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(B). 
322  INA § 238(c)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(C). 
323  INA § 238(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(4). 
324  8 U.S.C. § 1225. 
325  On July 23, 2019, the DHS published notice of its intention to expand expedited 
removal to apply to all persons who cannot prove that they have been in the United States for at 
least two years, regardless of where they are encountered in the U.S. by ICE.  This is a 
significant expansion of the use of expedited removal proceedings.  As of this writing, the Biden 
Administration has not provided any further information on how or whether it will implement 
this policy.  
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The main differences between “regular” removal proceedings under § 240 and 
expedited removal proceedings under § 235 are the speed at which the 
proceedings move, the formality of the proceedings, and the right to appeal 
negative decisions. 
 
Expedited removal proceedings can apply to those who are physically present in 
the U.S., but who did not enter with inspection (EWIs).326  Nevertheless, if an 
EWI client can demonstrate to the appropriate federal officer that she or he has 
been physically present in the U.S. for a period of at least two years, then the 
expedited removal procedures will not apply.327  Expedited removal proceedings 
do not apply to those who are natives or citizens of countries in the Western 
Hemisphere with whose government the U.S. does not have full diplomatic 
relations and who arrive by aircraft at a port of entry.328 
 
The essence of expedited removal proceedings is that the federal officer 
examining either (1) an arriving non-citizen, or (2) a person who EWI’d who does 
not convince such officer that she or he has been in the U.S. for at least two years, 
can order that person removed from the U.S. without further hearing or review if 
the officer finds the person to be inadmissible because of document fraud or 
because such person has no valid entry documents.329  If such a person expresses 
a desire to apply for asylum, the examining officer must refer the person to an 
asylum officer for a determination of whether he or she has a “credible fear” of 
persecution that might qualify him or her for a grant of asylum.330 
 
Except with respect to those who claim asylum or who claim to be permanent 
residents of the U.S., there is no right of administrative appeal from an order of 
removal under § 235, and collateral attacks on such orders are also restricted.331  
There are slightly modified procedures that apply to those whom the inspecting 





326  INA § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 
327  INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) and (II), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) and (II).   
328  INA § 235(b)(1)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(F). 
329  INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). 
330  INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
331  INA § 235(b)(1)(C) and (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C) and (D). 
332  INA § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c). 
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C. Detention of Non-Citizens. 
 
The INA and implementing regulations discuss when and under what conditions ICE may 
or must detain non-citizens in its custody.  The provisions regarding detention of non-
citizens vary depending on the category of non-citizen involved and the stage of 
immigration proceedings in which the non-citizen is involved.  For example, those 
arriving at ports of entry, those charged with crimes, those convicted of crimes, and 
suspected terrorists all are subject to being detained by DHS officials under various 
statutory provisions.  And, depending on the situation, such individuals can be detained 
before removal proceedings are begun, during the pendency of proceedings, or after the 
conclusion of proceedings.  Because few Nebraska practitioners will deal with clients 
who are arriving at a port of entry or are suspected terrorists, this discussion focuses on 
detention of those already present in the U.S. who have been either charged with or 
convicted of crimes. 
 
The statutory and regulatory provisions regarding detention of non-citizens are complex, 
and have been the subject of a number of legal challenges in the courts, both on 
constitutional and statutory bases.  The discussion here of detention provisions and 
procedures is necessarily truncated, since it is not the goal to explore all the nuances of 
detention in the immigration system.  Rather, the hope is to provide basic information to 
criminal law practitioners in order to help them understand, in a general way, how the 
DHS detention process works and how that process might impact strategy decisions to be 
made in the context of representing a non-citizen in a criminal case. 
 
1. Detention Before Commencement of Immigration Proceedings. 
 
Generally speaking, only federal officers can arrest and detain non-citizens who 
are suspected of being immigration violators.333  Although the INA has a 
provision allowing the federal government to enter into written agreements with 
state authorities to arrest and detain suspected immigration violators,334 no such 
agreement exists in Nebraska at the present time. 
 
From 2008-2014, ICE instituted its “Secure Communities” program.  In 2014, 
Secure Communities was replaced by the “Priority Enforcement Program.”  That 
program, like its predecessor, was essentially a data sharing initiative.  All 
individuals booked by local law enforcement agencies were fingerprinted, and 
those fingerprints were sent to the FBI’s data base.  Under the Priority 
Enforcement Program, the FBI automatically sent fingerprints in its data base to 
ICE so ICE could check those prints against its data base.  Any person identified 
by ICE through this procedure whom ICE believed was removable from the U.S. 
was put into removal proceedings.  In 2017, the Trump Administration revived 
 
333  INA § 287(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a). 
334  INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). 
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the Secure Communities program,335 but President Biden revoked that Executive 
Order on the day he took office.336  So, as usual, things are up in the air. 
 
If a state or local law enforcement agency suspects that a person in its custody 
may be someone present in the U.S. without proper documentation, that agency 
normally contacts ICE to see if ICE is interested in interviewing the person.  
Depending on the perceived exigency of the circumstances and the availability of 
resources, ICE will either interview the person over the phone or send someone to 
interview the person in order to determine whether ICE wishes to initiate removal 
proceedings. There may be occasions on which ICE will indicate to the law 
enforcement agency that it is not interested in initiating removal proceedings 
against the person, even if it determines that she or he may be present in the U.S. 
without authorization, but this is now far less common than it used to be, 
particularly with the advent of the Trump Administration. 
 
While law enforcement agencies are always free to contact ICE about suspected 
undocumented individuals they encounter, one provision of the INA requires a 
response from ICE to inquiries from law enforcement.  Section 287(d) of the 
INA337 provides that in the case of an individual arrested by a federal, state or 
local law enforcement agency for a drug offense, if that agency has reason to 
believe that the person is not lawfully present in the U.S., ICE must “promptly” 
determine whether or not to issue a detainer to detain such a person, upon the 
request of the law enforcement agency.  However, as mentioned above, the 
regulations authorize ICE to issue detainers to detain non-citizens in the custody 
of law enforcement agencies,338 even if such detainers are not requested by law 
enforcement, and ICE is doing that with increasing frequency.  Current 
information about ICE detainers, and the form ICE uses to request a detainer, can 
be found on the ICE website.339 
 
ICE detainers are issued by ICE to the custodian or a law enforcement agency 





335  Section 10, Executive Order 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).  
336  https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/25/2021-01768/revision-of-civil-
immigration-enforcement-policies-and-priorities (last visited June 11, 2021). 
 
337  8 U.S.C. § 1357(d). 
338  8 C.F.R. § 287.7. 
339  https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/detainers/ice-detainers-frequently-asked-
questions (last visited June 11, 2021). 
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before releasing the person, of the person’s pending release so that ICE can make 
arrangements to take custody of the individual.340 
 
These forms do not, by their explicit terms, impose any restrictions on the rights 
of those in state custody to participate in programs offered by the institution in 
which they are confined.  However, as a practical matter, once ICE serves one of 
these forms on either a state or local law enforcement agency, many institutions 
have their own policies regarding what types of programs and activities are 
available to those subject to ICE detainers.341  The important thing to remember 
is that any restrictions are caused not by the forms themselves, but instead by the 
policy of the institution holding someone with respect to whom a form has been 
issued. 
 
As mentioned above, § 287(d) of the INA342 only requires action on a requested 
detainer if the individual is arrested because of a controlled substance violation.  
Again, however, as a practical matter ICE will now issue request forms to anyone 
it views as a removal priority. The safest assumption to make is that if your client 
is being held by state officials and s/he is not a U.S. citizen, ICE is likely to be 
notified and will proceed to send a detainer form to the state custodian. 
 
If you represent a client in such a situation (i.e., ICE has sent a detainer form to a 
detention facility in which your client is being held), the analysis of whether to 
pursue a bond regarding the state charges gets complicated.  Here’s why.  If the 
client posts a bond on the state criminal case, he will still have to deal with the 
issue of the ICE request.  Once ICE finds out that the client is to be released on a 
state bond, it will ask local law enforcement to hold the client until it can take the 
client into custody.343  “Taking the client into custody” could include ICE asking 
 
340  8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). 
341  Both immigration and criminal defense attorneys with whom we have spoken relate 
that clients subject to these ICE notifications in county and state facilities are often ineligible, 
pursuant to institutional policy, to access such programs as community work release or other 
programs in which they might otherwise participate.  However, a number of Nebraska counties 
now no longer honor ICE requests, fearing legal liability.  At last check, those included 
Douglas, Hall, Lancaster and Sarpy Counties. 
342  8 U.S.C. § 1357(d). 
343  The regulation (8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d)) requires a criminal justice agency to hold a 
client, at ICE request, for a period of not more than 48 hours, excluding holidays and weekends, 
once ICE has determined to take custody of the client.  The Nebraska immigration practitioners 
to whom we talked reported that the 48-hour rule is not always observed, that is, individuals are 
frequently held more than 48 hours.  Of course, the appropriate legal response to this is to file a 
habeas corpus action, seeking release of the client.  As a practical matter, however, once a 
habeas action is filed ICE normally issues a Notice to Appear, which thereby cures the illegality 
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the local law enforcement agency to continue holding the client in the local 
facility, or it could mean ICE physically removing the client to a federal detention 
facility located remotely from the county in which the client faces criminal 
charges.344 
 
In any event, the client, having made state bond, then must, if she or he is to be 
released, post another bond in an amount to be determined by ICE if the client is 
bondable at all.345  The most favorable outcome is that the client is ICE-
bondable, posts the required bond, and is released.  Less favorable outcomes 
include the client’s being unable to post the amount of the ICE bond346 or not 
being bondable at all.  Under these less favorable scenarios, the client will then 
either continue to sit in the original custodial facility or will be transferred to a 
remote ICE facility until the removal process sorts itself out.  If this comes to 
pass, the client has essentially wasted the money involved in putting up the state 
bond. 
 
There is another important factor:  if the client bonds out on the state charge but 
is unable, for whatever reason, to bond out on the immigration charge, the time 
spent in the custodial facility in ICE custody will not count toward “time served” 
with respect to any sentence imposed in the underlying state case.  So again, 
whether to advise a client to pursue a bond on a state charge is something that 
ought to be carefully considered if ICE has placed a detainer on the client. 
 
2. Detention After Commencement of Immigration Proceedings. 
 
Once ICE issues and serves a Notice to Appear on a non-citizen, thereby placing 
him or her in removal proceedings, ICE will more often than not, in the cases of 
one who is charged with or convicted of crimes that render him or her removable 
from the U.S., take the person into custody.  The discussion here is divided into 
two parts: (1) detention of respondents during removal proceedings but before an 
administrative decision on the removal charges and (2) detention of respondents 
against whom a final order of removal has been entered. 
 
a. Detention of Respondents During the Pendency of Removal 
Proceedings. 
 
The enactment of IIRIRA in 1996 drastically changed the rules of the 
 
of continued detention. 
344  A list of ICE detention facilities can be found at  https://www.ice.gov/detention-
facilities (last visited May October 13, 2020). 
345  See the following section for a discussion of bonds in the immigration context. 
346  All ICE bonds are cash bonds only; no percentage bonds exist. 
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game regarding detention of non-citizens charged with or convicted of 
crimes.  Section 236 of the INA347 is the provision of law bearing most 
directly on detention of individuals during removal proceedings. 
 
Subsection (a) of § 236 provides that ICE can detain a person pending a 
decision on whether the person is to be removed from the U.S.  The 
statute gives ICE the discretion to release the person either on bond in an 
amount of at least $1500 or on “conditional parole,” which amounts to 
allowing an individual who is otherwise inadmissible to the U.S. to be 
present in the U.S. under certain conditions.  One released on bond or 
conditional parole cannot get employment authorization unless he or she is 
a permanent resident or has some other means of qualifying for an 
employment authorization document. 
 
Subsection (c) of § 236 is the mandatory detention provision of the INA 
with which those charged with or convicted of crimes will most often have 
to deal.  That subsection provides, inter alia, that those who are either 
inadmissible or deportable as the result of committing some crimes must 
be detained by ICE and cannot be released except in very limited 
circumstances.348 
 
The only non-citizens involved in criminal proceedings who are not 
subject to the mandatory detention provisions of § 236(c) are the 
 
347  8 U.S.C. § 1226. 
348  INA § 236(c)(1) and (2); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) and (2).  The limited circumstances 
under which such individuals can be released essentially include situations in which release is 
necessary to provide protection to witnesses or those otherwise cooperating with investigations 
into major criminal activities.  There have been two major cases decided by the BIA interpreting 
§ 236(c)(1).  The first, Matter of Rojas, 23 I&N Dec. 117 (BIA 2001), construed the language in 
the statute that says DHS must take an individual into custody “when the alien is released” from 
non-DHS custody.  The BIA in Rojas held that the “when released” language does not require 
DHS to take the person into custody immediately upon release from incarceration (in Rojas, the 
person had been released from state custody two days before legacy INS took him into custody).  
The Supreme Court upheld that reading in Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 203 L. Ed. 2d 333 
(2019), holding that DHS is required to hold, without bond, those who fall under the descriptions 
in the statute regardless of how much time has passed from the time they were released from 
state custody until the time they are taken into DHS custody.  The second, Matter of Garcia 
Arreola, 25 I&N Dec. 267 (BIA 2010), made it clear that the only persons subject to mandatory 
detention under § 236(c) are those who were convicted of the types of offenses mentioned in               
§ 236(c)(1)(A)-(D) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D)).  In other words, if a person has 
committed an offense of the type not described in § 236(c)(1)(A)-(D) and has been released from 
non-DHS custody, he or she is not subject to mandatory detention. 
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following: (1) those removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)349 because of a 
conviction of one crime involving moral turpitude committed within five 
years of entry for which a sentence of one year or longer could be 
imposed; (2) those removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iv)350 because of a 
conviction of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 758 relating to high speed flight 
from an immigration checkpoint; and (3) those removable under § 
237(a)(2)(E)351 because of a conviction of a crime of domestic violence, 
stalking, violation of a protection order or child abuse.  Every other 
person charged with or convicted of a criminal offense is swept into the 
mandatory detention provisions of § 236(c). 
 
Two points are especially worth making about § 236(c): (1) anyone who 
has committed a criminal offense described in § 212(a)(2) of the INA352 
and who has not been inspected and admitted to the U.S. must be detained 
under the provisions of § 236(c).  This is because such a person is 
“inadmissible” under § 212(a) of the INA353 rather than “deportable” 
under § 237, and therefore none of the exceptions to mandatory detention 
apply to such an individual.  This would obviously include all EWIs (i.e., 
those who entered without documentation); and (2) even most permanent 
residents who find themselves involved in criminal proceedings will be 
subject to the mandatory detention provisions of § 236(c) of the INA. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the 
mandatory detention provisions of § 236(c).  In Demore v. Kim, the Court 
held that Congress was justifiably concerned with assuring that deportable 
individuals appeared for their removal hearings and that the mandatory 
detention provisions of § 236(c) did not violate the due process provisions 
of the Fifth Amendment.354  One of the factors that the Court found was 
important in sustaining the constitutionality of § 236(c) mandatory 
detention is the availability of an administrative “Joseph” hearing in which 
the detained respondent can present evidence that he or she ought not be  
subject to mandatory detention.355  Even in the wake of the Demore 
 
349  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
350  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv). 
351  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E). 
352  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 
353  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 
354  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
355  The “Joseph” hearing is named after the Board of Immigration Appeals precedent 
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decision, non-citizens may, under certain circumstances, be able to 
distinguish their cases from the facts in Demore, and therefore argue that 
they ought not be subject to mandatory detention.  Such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of this Guide but is discussed in greater detail by 
others.356 
 
For those detained during the pendency of removal proceedings who are 
not mandatory detainees under § 236(c), a local ICE officer will determine 
under what circumstances such individuals may be released.  If the ICE 
officer determines that the person is not a danger to persons or property, 
and is satisfied that the person is not a flight risk, the officer may authorize 
release of the person during the pendency of removal proceedings.357  The 
statute requires that, unless the person is released on conditional parole, a 
bond of at least $1500 must be imposed.358 
 
Respondents have a right to request that any bond determination made by 
a local ICE officer be reviewed by an Immigration Judge.359  There may 
be occasions when an individual has been taken into ICE custody but ICE 
has not yet filed the Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court.  
Although jurisdiction over the removal proceedings only vests in the 
Immigration Court once the Notice to Appear is filed with the Court,360 
Immigration Judges do have the authority to hear bond matters before the 
Notice to Appear has been filed.361 
 
The types of evidence that Immigration Judges find persuasive in bond 
review hearings are generally the types of evidence that judges find 
persuasive in criminal proceedings: employment, length of time in the 
U.S., community ties, financial situation, family members, prior criminal 
and/or immigration violations, the nature of any prior crimes and/or 
immigration violations, and so forth.  Additionally, Immigration Judges  
 
 
opinion establishing the right to such a hearing.  See In re Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). 
356  See, e.g., Dan Kesselbrenner & Lory Rosenberg, Immigration Law and Crimes     
§§ 8:9 to 8:21 (section I.E., supra). 
357  8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8). 
358  INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 
359  8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a). 
360  8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a). 
361  8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a). 
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may be interested in hearing about the possibility that the respondent is 
eligible for any relief from removal.362 
 
As of this writing, the Immigration Judge in Omaha who primarily serves 
the detained docket is Judge Morrissey.  Most immigration practitioners 
submit evidence in support of their position in the bond hearing (usually in 
the form of an affidavit or other documentary evidence).  Although he 
varies the procedure from time to time, Judge Morrissey’s usual practice is 
to ask respondent’s counsel (if the respondent is represented) to make an 
offer of proof regarding what the evidence would be in support of the 
respondent’s request for bond or request for a lower bond.  If he deems it 
appropriate, or if the respondent is not represented, Judge Morrissey will 
question the respondent and will ask the “usual” questions; i.e., when did 
the respondent come to the U.S., where does s/he live and with whom, is 
s/he married, does s/he have children, what is the immigration status of 
any immediate family members present in the U.S., what criminal record 
does the respondent have, etc. 
 
A respondent may also ask for a second bond review hearing before an 
Immigration Judge, but such a request must be in writing and will be 
granted only if the respondent shows that his or her circumstances have 
materially changed since the first bond review hearing.363 
 
Either side has a right to appeal the Immigration Judge’s bond 
determination.  If the bond is reduced by the Immigration Judge and ICE 
decides to appeal, the regulations provide for an automatic stay of the 
bond reduction decision if the original bond was set at $10,000 or more.364 
 
In 2018, the Supreme Court held, in Jennings v. Rodriguez,365 that those 
who are being detained under INA § 236(c)366 are not entitled to bond 
 
362  There is currently an interesting issue percolating through the courts about who 
carries the burden of proof in bond hearings.  Must respondents show that they are good 
candidates for bond, or must the government show that they are not?  The BIA has held that the 
burden of proof is on respondents.  See Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006).  But at 
least one court has held, in a class action suit, that placing the burden of proof on respondents 
violates due process and the Administrative Procedure Act.  Brito v. Barr, 415 F.Supp.3d 258 
(D. Mass. 2019).  As of this writing, the case is on appeal to the First Circuit.  
363  8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). 
364  8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2). 
365   138 S.Ct. 830. 
 
366  8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 
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hearings or to a presumptive limit on the length of their detention.367  The 
Court held that, unlike the statutory language in INA § 241368 it 
considered in its 2001 Zadvydas opinion (discussed in the next section), 
the statutory language in § 236(c) is not ambiguous, and therefore it would 
be inappropriate to use the principle of constitutional avoidance to either 
limit the amount of time a person can be held in detention or to require a 
bond hearing, when the unambiguous statutory language does not address 
either of these things.369 
 
b. Detention After Entry of Removal Order. 
 
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there are limits to how long the 
government can detain non-citizens against whom final orders of removal 
have been entered.370  Specifically, Zadvydas held that those against 
whom final removal orders have been entered can only be detained for six 
months.  After that, such individuals must be released unless it is 
reasonably foreseeable that they can be removed to another country. 
 
This issue arises in cases where individuals are citizens of countries who 
traditionally do not repatriate their citizens at the request of the U.S. 
government.  Although Zadvydas only applied to one who had been 
formally admitted to the U.S., in 2005 the Supreme Court extended its 
ruling in Zadvydas to those who are inadmissible under § 212371 of the 
INA.372 
 
In response to the Zadvydas decision, the Attorney General promulgated 
regulations implementing the decision and laying out the procedures that 
must be followed when respondents against whom final orders of removal 
have been entered request release from custody.373  Those against whom 
 
367  Section 235(b) proceedings.  
368  8 U.S.C. § 1231. 
369  Jennings, supra., 183 S. Ct. at 842.  The Court also held that those being held under 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and (2) (those applicants for admission who either assert asylum claims or 
believe they are entitled to enter for some other reason) likewise can be held without a time 
limitation and are not entitled to bond hearings. 
370  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
371  8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
372  See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
373  8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13 - 241.14. 
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final removal orders have been entered who are released under post-
Zadvydas procedures do not have any immigration status in the U.S., but 
they are eligible to receive employment authorization.374  Of course, if 
such individual’s removal becomes practicable, he or she will be required 
to report for removal.  
 





This part of the Guide sets forth, in some detail, various categories of immigration 
consequences that may attach to criminal proceedings.  It begins with an overview of 
some general considerations and also describes some immigration concepts with which 
state criminal law practitioners need to be familiar.  Following that, it reviews various 
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability that presently exist under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act and ancillary case law as a consequence of criminal proceedings.  It 
ends with a discussion of “critical categories” in a criminal law/immigration context; that 
is, those various points along the spectrum of immigration law at which immigration 
consequences for non-citizens become more severe. 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of the Guide and at the beginning of the statutory 
analysis charts, it would border on malpractice to simply consult the statutory 
analysis charts without reading this Guide first, and in conjunction with using the 
charts.  That is because, while the charts identify some of the immigration 
consequences for non-citizen criminal defendants, there are nuances that turn on 
the exact immigration status of any particular client.  Immigration consequences 
for a DACA recipient are very different than those for permanent residents.  
Recipients of Temporary Protected Status need to worry about different factors 
than those who have been granted asylum.  And so forth.  The bottom line is to be 
careful when using the criminal analysis charts, and to make certain you know the 
precise immigration status of your client before engaging in your own independent 
analysis of the immigration consequences your client is facing. 
 
B. General Considerations. 
 
1. Legal Hierarchy. 
 
When reading cases that interpret provisions of immigration law, it is important to 
understand the legal hierarchy of case law precedent and how it affects an 





374  8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(18). 
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Generally speaking, in the context of removal proceedings taking place in the 
interior of the country, and not at the border or at a port of entry, the hierarchy is 
as follows: 
 
(1) A local immigration officer, usually one working for ICE, writes up a Notice 
to Appear (NTA) placing the client into removal proceedings. 
 
(2) Once the NTA is filed with the Immigration Court and proceedings commence 
before an Immigration Judge, any decision issued by an Immigration Judge in that 
particular client’s case is binding on the local officer. 
 
(3) Either the respondent or DHS may, in most cases, file an appeal of a decision 
by an Immigration Judge to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  A “non-
precedent” decision issued by the BIA is the binding law of the case; in other 
words, the BIA decision binds each entity below it in the hierarchy (i.e., the local 
officer and the Immigration Judge) with respect to the case in question. 
 
(4) If, in connection with an appeal to the BIA from a decision by an Immigration 
Judge, the BIA issues a “precedent” opinion (the BIA decides which opinions to 
designate as precedent opinions), such an opinion is binding on all Immigration 
Judges and Service officers nation-wide, except for those in a circuit in which 
contrary circuit court authority exists.  Such a decision represents controlling 
agency authority on the question(s) addressed in the opinion. 
 
(5) Under certain circumstances, a case may be “certified” to the Attorney 
General in order that an opinion be issued relating to the issues that were litigated 
before the BIA.  Any such opinion issued by the Attorney General is binding in 
the case in question and, in general, establishes agency policy on the issue(s) 
discussed. 
 
(6) Some, but not all, agency decisions can be appealed to the appropriate court of  
appeals.  Circuit court opinions are binding on the BIA and DHS for the circuit  
in which the opinion is issued.  For example, in cases decided by Immigration  
Judges involving clients residing in Nebraska, any Eighth Circuit opinions on 
point control in any contrary BIA authority or decisions by the Attorney General 
in “certified” cases.375 
 
375  The focus is on circuit courts rather than federal district courts because district courts 
are not normally part of the direct appeals process in removal proceedings.  See INA § 
242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), requiring that appeals of final administrative decisions be filed 
with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the Immigration Judge completed the 
proceedings.  Since many Immigration Courts now conduct hearings via televideo conference, 
the Immigration Judge is frequently located in one city and the respondent and counsel are 
located in another city.  For venue purposes, the hearing is deemed by EOIR to be taking place 
at the location where the case is docketed for hearing.  See Operating Policies and Procedures 
Memorandum for the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OPPM) 04-06 
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(7)  Of course, any United States Supreme Court opinions are the final word on 
the issues addressed in the opinion. 
 
2. Inadmissibility vs. Deportability. 
 
The legal concepts of inadmissibility and deportability are important to 
understand when considering possible immigration consequences your clients 
may face as the result of criminal proceedings.  Although there is considerable 
overlap between the grounds for inadmissibility and deportability, the legal tests 
are not identical.  Additionally, many clients should be concerned with both the 
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability, as will be further discussed below.  
Finally, the acts which trigger immigration consequences differ between grounds 
of inadmissibility and deportability, and practitioners and clients should be aware 





Before the enactment of IIRIRA in 1996, the term “inadmissibility” did 
not exist.  Rather, the focus was on whether someone was “excludable” 
from the United States. 
 
The issue of excludability arose at the point in time at which an individual 
was standing at the U.S. border, either literally or figuratively,376 and 
sought to enter the country.  If such an individual was deemed to be 
excludable under one or more of the provisions of former § 212(a) of the 
INA, then the person would be barred from entering the U.S.  However, 
once a person effected an actual physical entry into the U.S. (other than by 
being paroled into the U.S. or being granted some other official 
permission to enter that did not constitute a formal entry), he or she was 
no longer subject to grounds of exclusion, but then became subject to any 
applicable grounds of deportation, which were located in another section 
of the INA. 
 
IIRIRA changed all that.  The concept of “excludability” was replaced 
with the concept of “inadmissibility.”  Now, mere physical presence in 
 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2004/08/25/04-06.pdf (last visited October 
14, 2020).  IIRIRA purported to eliminate review by courts of appeal in many types of removal 
cases.  See INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)). 
376  Under the pre-IIRIRA concept of exclusion, for example, a person who had been 
paroled into the U.S. had not effected a legal entry.  Thus, even though such a person might be 
physically present in the U.S., his or her immigration inspection was deferred until a future date 
at which time she or he was still subject to be “excluded” just as though he or she was physically 
standing at a port of entry. 
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the U.S. does not mean that a person has effected an entry.  Rather, 
anyone who has not been “admitted” or who has not gained “admission” 
into the U.S. is subject to being removed from the U.S. under the grounds 
of inadmissibility set forth in INA § 212(a).377  And an individual has not 
been “admitted” unless she or he has lawfully entered the U.S. after 
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.378  Similarly, 
those who have been paroled into the U.S. or permitted to land temporarily 
as alien crewmen have not been “admitted.”379  Even legal permanent 
residents (LPRs) who go abroad only briefly may be subject to grounds of 
inadmissibility under certain circumstances.380  
 
What this definition of “admission” means, among other things, is that 
those who came into the U.S. without being inspected and authorized to 
enter by an immigration officer are subject to being removed from the 
U.S. on the basis of one or more grounds listed in § 212(a) of the INA, 
rather than on the basis of grounds of deportability in § 237(a) of the INA.  
Thus, any non-citizen involved in criminal proceedings who came into the 
U.S. without inspection and authorization and who is physically present in 
the U.S. without documents will face the possibility of being removed 
from the U.S. because of one or more of the grounds appearing in § 
212(a)(2) of the INA.  In such cases, it is that statute, and not § 237(a) of 




The grounds of deportability are set forth in § 237(a) of the INA.381  As 
the introductory language to § 237(a) makes clear, the grounds of 
deportability apply to those “in and admitted to” the United States.  Thus, 
in order to be subject to one or more of the grounds of deportability in § 
237(a), one must have been “admitted” to the U.S., as that term is defined 





377  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 
378  INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). 
379  INA § 101(a)(13)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(B). 
380  INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). 
381  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). 
382  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). 
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The grounds of deportability dealing with criminal offenses appear at      
§ 237(a)(2) of the INA. 
 
c. Being Concerned About Both Inadmissibility and 
Deportability. 
 
Given the foregoing discussion, the issues seem to be relatively simple: 
those involved in criminal proceedings who are present in the U.S. 
because they have been admitted with inspection and have some valid 
immigration status need to worry about grounds of deportability in § 
237(a)(2), while those who did not enter with inspection and who are 
present without immigration status must worry about the grounds of 
inadmissibility under  § 212(a) – right?  Wrong.  Unfortunately, the 
world of immigration law is not that simple.  Because IIRIRA re-vamped 
the definition of “admission,” even clients who are permanent residents 
may be affected by criminal grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2). 
 
As an illustration of this point, consider the improbable case of Jesus 
Collado-Munoz.383  Mr. Collado-Munoz, a native of the Dominican 
Republic, became a permanent resident of the United States in 1973.  In 
July, 1974, he was convicted of the crime of sexual abuse of a minor, as 
the result of engaging in consensual sexual intercourse with his then-
girlfriend, who was under the age of majority.  As a result, Mr. Collado 
was sentenced to three years’ probation.  Shortly before the effective date 
of IIRIRA (April 1, 1997), Mr. Collado left the U.S. to visit the 
Dominican Republic, his native country, for two weeks.  When he 
attempted to re-enter the U.S., using his Permanent Resident Card, on 
April 7, 1997, he was refused admission due to his 1974 conviction, which 
the legacy INS contended rendered him inadmissible under the post-
IIRIRA version of § 212(a)(2) of the INA.384  Mr. Collado argued that the 
Fleuti doctrine385 held that, because he was a permanent resident, he was 
not seeking “admission” to the U.S., and therefore he was not subject to 





383  In re Collado, 21 I&N Dec. 1061 (BIA 1998). 
384  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 
385  See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).  Briefly, Fleuti held that a short-term 
departure from the U.S. by a non-citizen who is a lawful permanent resident constitutes a “brief, 
innocent and casual” departure and, as a result, such a person is not subject to any statutory 
grounds of exclusion upon return to the U.S. because the person is deemed not to have broken 
his physical presence in the U.S. by a “brief, innocent and casual” departure. 
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that the change made by IIRIRA, which defined “admission” as set forth 
in § 101(a)(13) of the INA,386 repealed the Fleuti doctrine. 
 
The BIA agreed with the legacy INS’ argument and held that the plain 
language of § 101(a)(13) now defines when an individual is seeking 
admission, and that the Fleuti case, which interpreted a prior version of the 
statute, was no longer applicable to a situation like that of Mr. Collado.  
As a result, the BIA held that Mr. Collado was subject to the grounds of 
inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2) despite the fact that the crime of which 
he had been convicted was over 24 years old. 
 
This remained the law until 2012, at which time the United States 
Supreme Court decided Vartelas v. Holder.387  Like Mr. Collado-Munoz, 
Mr. Vartelas was a long-time LPR: he gained his permanent resident status 
in 1989.  In 1994, he pled guilty to conspiring to make a counterfeit 
security (a felony) and served a four-month jail term as the result of his 
conviction.  He traveled to Greece to visit his parents in 2003, and tried to 
return to the U.S. one week later.  However, Customs and Border 
Protection considered him to be a non-citizen seeking admission to the 
U.S., under the Collado-Munoz rationale, and he was placed in removal 
proceedings based on the fact that his 1994 conviction made him 
inadmissible.  The Supreme Court held that the definition of 
“admissibility” in INA § 101(a)(13)388 does not apply retroactively, 
contrary to what the BIA held in Collado-Munoz, and that Mr. Vartelas 
was therefore not someone seeking admission, and could use the Fleuti 
doctrine to come back in to the United States as a returning LPR.  So any 
LPR who leaves the U.S. and seeks to come back, so long as his or her 
departure was “innocent, casual and brief,”389 does not have to worry 
 
386  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). 
387  566 U.S. 257 (2012). 
388  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). 
389  It is important to note that Vartelas did not hold that a non-citizen with a pre-April 1, 
1997, conviction is never deemed to be seeking admission upon returning to the U.S.  It only 
held that those who are LPRs and whose departures satisfy the Fleuti doctrine are not deemed to 
be seeking admission.  Since Collado-Munoz was decided in 1998, most of us have forgotten 
how to determine if a departure is “innocent, casual and brief.”  We will now have to re-learn 
what that phrase means, at least for pre-IIRIRA convictions.  The two cases – Fleuti and 
Vartelas – give us some guidance.  In Fleuti, the non-citizen went to Tijuana, Mexico for a few 
hours, and then returned to the U.S.  In Vartelas, the non-citizen went to visit his parents for 
about a week.  Both of those were “innocent, casual and brief” departures.  Because this legal 
test involves assessing the totality of the circumstances, it is difficult to draw any bright lines, but 
we would be very nervous about LPR clients staying away for more than six months, regardless 
of the ties they retain to the U.S. in their absence, and regardless of the expressed purpose of 
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about a pre-April 1, 1997, conviction subjecting him or her to the grounds 
of inadmissibility.  But LPRs who have convictions of April 1, 1997, or 
later still have to worry about the Collado-Munoz trap.  The holding in 
Vartelas only applies to convictions that pre-date IIRIRA’s effective date. 
 
As the Collado and Vartelas cases show, even clients who are permanent 
residents may need to be concerned with grounds of inadmissibility, and 
not just with grounds of deportability, at least with respect to convictions 
of April 1, 1997, or later.  Even someone who is a permanent resident will 
be subject to the grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2) of the INA 
once he leaves the U.S. and attempts to re-enter the country if he is 
convicted of a crime that falls under § 212(a)(2) of the INA.390  Such a 
person, unless she or he has been granted a waiver of inadmissibility 
pursuant to § 212(h) of the INA391 or § 240A(a) of the INA,392 will not be 
able to return to the U.S. after a trip abroad.393 
 
d. Interaction of Federal and State Law. 
 
Interestingly, the only mention of immigration in the U.S. Constitution 
relates to Congress’ authority to establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization.394  But the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
the authority to either admit individuals to the U.S. or exclude them from 
the U.S. is a fundamental act of sovereignty reserved to the United States 
 
their trips.  Of course, since the test is phrased in the conjunctive, even a short trip may be 
something other than “innocent” or “casual,” and therefore make Fleuti inapplicable.  As the 
Court pointed out in Fleuti, courts are capable of deciding this issue on a case-by-case basis.  
Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462.  At least for pre-April 1, 1997, convictions, we will be back to that case-
by-case world. 
390  See INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). 
391  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
392  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
393  The BIA has held that it is the government’s burden of proof to show that a returning 
LPR is an applicant for admission.  In other words, the government must prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that one of the six exceptions of INA § 101(a)(13)(C) (8 U.S.C.            
§ 1101(a)(13)(C)) applies to a returning LPR.  And the BIA has held that an LPR “engages in 
illegal activity after having departed the United States” by trying to smuggle someone into the 
U.S. at a port of entry as the LPR is attempting to enter the U.S.  Such an LPR is deemed to be 
seeking admission under § 101(a)(13)(C)(iii), and therefore is subject to the grounds of 
inadmissibility.  Matter of Guzman Martinez, 25 I&N Dec. 845 (BIA 2012). 
394  U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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federal government as a sovereign nation.395  Therefore, the statutory and 
regulatory scheme governing immigration is found at the federal level. 
 
When it comes to the issue of whether a person is inadmissible or 
deportable because of state criminal proceedings, however, things become 
a bit more nuanced.  Of course, federal law applies to determine if the 
person is either inadmissible or deportable, but in applying federal law, the 
immigration decision-maker has to look to the state offense to determine if 
its elements meet the federal definition at issue. 
 
For example, suppose that ICE charges a lawful permanent resident with 
being deportable due to his conviction, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-310, of 
assault in the third degree.  ICE alleges that such a conviction is for a 
“crime involving moral turpitude” which the client committed within five 
years of his last entry into the U.S. and that the maximum possible 
sentence was a year, since the assault was not the result of a fight or 
scuffle entered into by mutual consent. 
 
An Immigration Judge considering this case will need to apply a federal 
definition -- “crime involving moral turpitude” –- to determine if the client 
is deportable as ICE has charged.  However, in making his or her 
determination, the Immigration Judge will have to consider the elements 
of the offense described in the Nebraska statute to determine if those 
elements of the state crime meet the federal definition of “crime involving 
moral turpitude.”  Thus, federal definitions of inadmissibility and 
deportability must be applied to the elements of state crimes.  As a result, 
decision-makers in immigration cases involving state criminal convictions 
analyze both federal and state law. 
 




Section 212(a) of the INA396 contains the classes of those who are ineligible to be 
admitted to the United States.  Said another way, § 212(a) contains the grounds 
of inadmissibility.  There are several grounds under which a person may be 
found to be inadmissible.  However, this Guide will focus only on those grounds 
of inadmissibility that result from criminal convictions or criminal conduct.  
Most of the grounds of inadmissibility relating to criminal convictions are found 
in § 212(a)(2) of the INA.  
 
 
395  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); 
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
396  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 
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2. Health-Related Grounds of Inadmissibility: Alcohol and Drug-
Related Offenses. 
 
The INA provides that one who seeks admission to the U.S. and who is 
determined (1) to have a physical or mental disorder and behavior associated with 
the disorder that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the property, safety, or 
welfare of the applicant for admission or others, (2) to have had a physical or 
mental disorder and a history of behavior associated with the disorder, which 
behavior has posed a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the admission 
applicant or others and which behavior is likely to recur or to lead to other 
harmful behavior, or (3) who is determined to be a drug abuser or addict, is 
inadmissible to the U.S.397 
 
Although these grounds of inadmissibility are not, strictly-speaking, criminal 
grounds of inadmissibility, they are often implicated by criminal behavior induced 
or accompanied by alcohol or drug dependance.  Because of that, criminal 
defense counsel needs to be aware that alcohol-related or drug-related offenses 
have the potential to make a client inadmissible not because of the crime itself, 
but because the crime may, in the eyes of immigration decision-makers, represent 
the manifestation of an alcohol or drug abuse problem. 
 
Just to underscore the point that alcohol-related offenses are not criminal grounds 
of inadmissibility, consider that the BIA has held that the offense of driving under 
the influence is not a crime involving moral turpitude.398  This is true even if the 
DUI conviction is at the felony level due to multiple prior DUI convictions.399  
The rationale for this holding is that the existence of a certain level of blood 
alcohol content is not, in and of itself, a morally turpitudinous act: it is more in the 
nature of a regulatory offense.400 
 
Often, clients who are currently in the U.S. without documents, and who wish to 
obtain documents, must leave the U.S. and go through consular processing in their 
home countries in order to re-enter the U.S. with inspection.  Their applications 
for entry visas are adjudicated by consular officers of the Department of State.  
 
397  INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) and (II), § 212(a)(1)(A)(iv); 8 U.S.C.                     
§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) and (II), § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
398  Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 2001). 
399  Id. 
400  However, the BIA has held that if a person drives under the influence knowing that 
his driver’s license has been suspended in violation of Arizona law, he is engaged in culpable 
conduct and has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.  Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 
I&N Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999).  The Lopez-Meza case involved both drunk driving and driving 
under suspension. 
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One of the tools guiding consular officers’ adjudications is the Foreign Affairs 
Manual (FAM).401 
 
The FAM states that, while alcoholism is not specifically referred to in the statute 
as a health-related disorder, alcoholism is a medical disorder.402  Consular 
officers are directed to refer a visa applicant to a “panel physician” (i.e., one 
whom the State Department has authorized to do medical examinations) in three 
circumstances: 
 
(1) they have a single alcohol-related offense or conviction within the last 
five years; 
 
(2) they have two or more alcohol-related arrests or convictions within the 
last 10 years; or 
 
(3) there is any other evidence to suggest an alcohol problem.403 
 
Despite the language of both the FAM and the cable, it is our experience that if a 
visa applicant falls into any of the categories set above, the consular officer will 
simply find that he or she is inadmissible.  The FAM gives DHS the authority to 
grant a waiver of this ground of inadmissibility, but it is highly discretionary.404  
If no waiver is granted, the final determination cannot be appealed.  Under such 
circumstances, the only recourse is to file another visa application and seek a 
different determination, or simply wait until the appropriate time passes and then 
re-apply for a visa.405  Often, the second option is the only realistic one.  
Obviously, this can work a severe hardship on clients, who may have to wait 
outside the U.S. for an extended period of time. 
 
The Department of Homeland Security has a similar requirement for applicants 
with whom it is dealing in the U.S., such as applicants for adjustment of status.406  
 
401  U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), https://fam.state.gov/ (last 
visited June 17, 2021). 
402  9 FAM 302.2-7(B)(3), paragraph a. 
403  Id. at paragraph b. 
404  9 FAM 302.2-7(D). 
405  The appropriate time that must pass for a visa applicant to show remission 
presumptively is one year.  9 FAM 302.2-7(B)(2), paragraph b.  But the FAM makes clear that, 
even after one year, a finding of remission is not guaranteed.  Id. 
406  See Danielle L.C. Beach, ‘Twas the Season to be Jolly: the Immigration 
Consequences of Excessive Libations, 87 No. 17 Interpreter Releases 873, 877 (2010), discussing 
a January 16, 2004, memorandum issued by W. Yates entitled “Requesting Medical Re-
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As a practical matter, it is easier to make certain that formal procedures are 
followed in the adjustment of status context, because applicants are physically 
present in the U.S., where immigration counsel has more of an opportunity to 
advocate effectively for them. 
 
So-called “DUI-drug” cases (driving under the influence of a controlled 
substance) could also implicate this particular ground of inadmissibility.  In fact, 
any offense that has an alcohol or drug overlay to it (domestic assault, driving, 
etc.) has the potential to trigger this health-related ground of inadmissibility. 
 
Certain types of immigration clients are, in fact, subject to losing their status 
based on a single DUI conviction.  For example, a client who has received 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status will lose that status if the 
client is convicted of a single DUI offense.  Such an offense is considered to be 
at least a “significant misdemeanor” which will cause DACA status to be 
revoked.407 
 
Finally, in 2016, the State Department adopted a policy whereby it declared it has 
the authority to “prudentially” revoke the non-immigrant visa of any non-citizen 
who has been arrested for a DUI offense.408  This is obviously a grave concern 
for any client who is a non-immigrant –- a visitor, a student, a temporary worker, 
etc.  Revocation of such a client’s visa makes the client immediately removable 
from the U.S.  If the client has left the U.S. and is seeking to re-enter the country 
(for example, a foreign student who has traveled home during a break), that client 
will be denied admission. 
 
In short, if your client is charged with any type of offense that involves drugs or 
alcohol, both you and your client need to understand the possible inadmissibility 
ramifications, and take any steps realistically possible to ameliorate those 
ramifications. 
 




Any non-citizen who (1) is convicted of a "crime involving moral 
 
Examinations: Alien Involved in Significant Alcohol-Related Driving Incidents and Similar 
Scenarios.” 
407  See the National Security and Public Safety Guidelines section of the DACA page on 
the USCIS website:  https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-
childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited June 17, 2021). 
 
408 9 FAM 403.11-5(B)(U)c. https://fam.state.gov/FAM/09FAM/09FAM040311.html  
(last visited October 14, 2020). 
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turpitude," (2) admits having committed a crime of moral turpitude, or (3) 
admits committing acts that constitute the essential elements of a crime 
involving moral turpitude is inadmissible.409  Convictions for attempts to 
commit such crimes or conspiracies to commit such crimes also render a 
person inadmissible.410  
  
The definition of "moral turpitude" is not found in the INA.  Because 
“moral turpitude” is not defined in the statute, courts have had to supply 
the working definition of this term.  The most common definition one 
encounters defines a “crime involving moral turpitude,” in general, as a 
crime that is "inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the 
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to 
society in general."411  Such a crime has been defined as an act per se 
morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong, or malum in se, as opposed 
to malum prohibitum, so it is the nature of the act itself and not the 
statutory prohibition of it that constitutes an act of moral turpitude.412 
 
 
409  INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). 
410  Id.  Note that categories (2) and (3) do not require a conviction – they simply 
require that the person admits either committing a crime or admits to committing acts which an 
officer concludes constitutes the essential elements of a crime that renders the person 
inadmissible.  Thus, even those who have not been convicted of crimes may be inadmissible, 
depending on what admissions they make and under what circumstances those admissions are 
made.  For a further discussion of the intricacies of this point, see Kesselbrenner & Rosenberg, 
Immigration Law and Crimes, § § 3:2 - 3:6 (2020).  For a further definition of “conviction,” see 
Section V.D.2 of this Guide, infra. 
411  See, e.g., Matter of Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 1994), aff'd, 72 F.3d 571 (8th 
Cir. 1995). 
412  Id.  So, is this phrase constitutionally suspect because it is too vague?  The 
Supreme Court, in 1951, said no.  Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).  However, given 
the Court’s holding in Dimaya that 8 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague (see discussion 
in section V.D.6.e.(6), infra.), there may be some doubt about the continued validity of that 
holding. There is currently litigation around the country challenging the constitutionality of this 
statute, on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally vague.  See, e.g., Romero v. Sessions, 736 F. 
App’x 632 (9th Cir. 2018) (declining to address the issue but finding the vagueness argument 
“compelling”); Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(noting that “ ‘moral turpitude’ is perhaps the quintessential example of an ambiguous phrase”);  
Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring) (noting that the 
phrase is “stale, antiquated, ... meaningless[,]” “vague[ ], rife with contradiction, a fossil, [and] 
an embarrassment to a modern legal system”).  But see Guevara–Solorzano v. Sessions, 891 
F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the vagueness argument); Verdugo-Morales v. Sessions, 719 
F. App’x 507 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the vagueness argument). 
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b. The Categorical Approach and “Divisible” Statutes.. 
 
Although this discussion is offered in the context of analyzing whether 
a crime is a crime involving moral turpitude, the categorical approach 
applies any time one analyzes a crime to determine whether it 
constitutes an inadmissible or deportable offense.  Thus, whether a 
crime is an aggravated felony, or a domestic violence offense, or a 
firearms offense, or any other type of crime that carries immigration 
consequences – in all of these inquiries courts use the categorical 
approach outlined here to determine what type of crime is involved 
and what immigration consequences it carries.  
 
Determining whether a client has been convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude is more complicated than it might first appear.  The focus, 
courts have repeatedly held, must be on, and only on, determining what 
crime the client was convicted of, and then deciding whether, based only 
on the elements of that crime, the crime is one involving moral turpitude.  
In order to help them make this limited and focused determination, courts 
have developed what has come to be known as the “categorical approach” 
with respect to “indivisible” criminal statutes – in other words, those 
criminal statutes that contain the elements of only one criminal offense.  
Courts have also developed an approach to help them determine of which 
crime a client was convicted in cases involving “divisible” criminal 
statutes – in other words, those statutes that contain elements of more than 
one criminal offense.  Each of these key concepts is discussed briefly 
below.  Following that brief discussion, there is a survey of case law 
applying these concepts in specific factual and legal settings. 
 
Categorical Approach.  When deciding whether a state criminal offense 
describes a “crime involving moral turpitude,” (CIMT)413, both 
administrative and Article III courts have followed what has come to be 
known as the “categorical” and “modified categorical” approaches.  And, 
as stated above, these approaches are also followed in determining 
whether other types of crimes have immigration consequences. 
 
The categorical approach is used in a number of contexts.414  As you will 
see, it has particular significance in the immigration context, and will 
often be involved when determining whether or not a crime carries 
immigration consequences.  The focus of the categorical approach, as 
explained below in the case law survey, is on what crime a client has been 
convicted of, and not what the client actually did in order to be convicted 
 
413  Or any other type of crime that carries immigration consequences. 
 
414  For example, this approach is used by courts in cases involving the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (ACCA), 8 U.S.C. § 924. 
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of the crime in question.  That is important in determining the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, because immigration 
decision-makers must assume, absent evidence in the record of conviction 
to the contrary, that a client engaged in the least culpable conduct 
necessary to be convicted of any given crime.  How this plays out in 
practice is illustrated by the cases reviewed in the following subsections. 
 
Divisible Statutes.  Another concept explored in the cases discussed 
below is that of divisibility of statutes.  Many criminal statutes have 
various subparts to them, whether those subparts take the form of separate 
paragraphs, or disjunctive examples, or other grammatical forms.  
Sometimes such statutes actually define multiple crimes; in immigration 
parlance, those are called divisible statutes.  Other times, they define a 
single crime, but state alternative means by which that crime can be 
committed; in immigration parlance, those are indivisible statutes. 
 
Because the focus of the categorical approach is to determine which crime 
a client was convicted of, the courts have fashioned an approach to help 
them determine (1) whether a statute is divisible (defines multiple criminal 
offenses) or indivisible (unitary) and, if the statute is divisible, (2) which 
portion of a divisible statute, and therefore what particular crime, the 
client was convicted of.  As you read the cases discussed below, you will 
see how this plays out in practice and why it is an important concept in 
immigration law. 
 
(1) Taylor v. United States.415 
 
The categorical approach has its roots in the case of Taylor v. 
United States, which is actually a criminal case, not an 
immigration case.  The issue in Taylor was whether a defendant’s 
sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act.416  That Act allows sentence enhancements in federal 
criminal cases where the defendant has previously been convicted 
of a “violent felony,” whether such convictions were of state or 
federal law.  “Violent felony,” in turn, is statutorily defined as, 
inter alia, “burglary.”  The task the Taylor Court faced was to 
determine if the defendant’s two prior convictions in Missouri state 
court for second degree burglary matched the federal definition of 
“burglary” found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).417  The Court held that, in 
determining whether any of the defendant’s prior convictions were 
“violent felonies,” it was required to look only to the elements of 
 
415  495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
416  18 U.S.C. § 924. 
417  Isn’t federalism fun? 
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the state statutes under which the defendant had been convicted, 
and should not look to the particular facts that led to the 
convictions.418  In other words, the analysis focuses on the nature 
of the crime/conviction itself, and not on the nature of the acts in 
which the defendant engaged in committing the crimes.  That is 
what makes the analysis “categorical” – courts are tasked with 
determining if a particular conviction falls within a certain 
category of criminal offenses.  In this case, the Court had to 
determine whether the defendant’s conviction fell in the category 
of a “burglary,” as that term is categorically defined under federal 
law. 
 
But that presented the Court with another problem – defining what 
“burglary” is for purposes of federal law.  The reason that was a 
dilemma is because Congress did not include a statutory definition 
in the ACCA.  As the Court pointed out, there is no uniform 
definition of “burglary” – various state statutes define it in 
different ways.  But the Court held that its task was to determine, 
for purposes of federal law, what definition of burglary was 
appropriate to use.  It held that, for federal purposes, the term 
cannot be defined by reference to a particular state statutory 
definition, since that would result in inconsistent results, depending 
on which state statute was involved: 
 
[W]e are led to reject the view of the Court of 
Appeals in this case. It seems to us to be 
implausible that Congress intended the meaning of 
“burglary” for purposes of § 924(e) to depend on 
the definition adopted by the State of conviction. 
That would mean that a person convicted of 
unlawful possession of a firearm would, or would 
not, receive a sentence enhancement based on 
exactly the same conduct, depending on whether the 
State of his prior conviction happened to call that 
conduct “burglary.”419 
 
After doing an extensive legislative history review, and an 
historical case survey for guidance in how to undo this Gordian 
knot, the Court ultimately held that the best approach would be to 
adopt the federal “generic” definition of burglary, meaning the 
definition of that term that roughly corresponds to the way the term 
was defined by the majority of states’ criminal codes at the time 
 
418  Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600. 
419  Id. at 590-591. 
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the federal legislation was enacted.420  Using that method, the 
Court determined that the federal generic definition of “burglary” 
contains these elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or 
remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a 
crime.421 
 
All of the cases that follow Taylor use this same approach: (1) 
determine what offense is in play for federal purposes; (2) 
determine the elements of the generic federal offense; (3) look to 
the elements of the state offense to determine if there is a match 
between the state elements and the federal generic elements.  The 
following cases explore how this scheme plays out in various 
contexts. 
 
(2) Shepard v. United States.422 
 
The test for determining the category of previous state criminal 
convictions worked well in Taylor, for various reasons.  But how 
does a federal court decide what category of offense of which a 
defendant has been convicted, and what elements are involved in 
such an offense, where the state statute penalizes conduct that is 
more inclusive and sweeps broader than the applicable federal 
generic offense? 
 
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Shepard.  This case 
again dealt with the Armed Career Criminal Act.  But the issue in 
this case was what documents a court should consult when 
determining whether a defendant has been convicted of a specified 
category of crime under an overbroad state statute; i.e., one that 
sweeps more broadly than the federal generic equivalent statute.  
Recall that, under Taylor, the Court held that the only task in 
ACCA cases is to determine the type, or category, of offense of 
which a defendant had previously been convicted.  Generally, that 
is done by looking at only the elements of the statute in question.  
But if the elements of the state statute under which a defendant is 
convicted are broader than the equivalent federal generic offense, it 
cannot serve as the basis for a sentence enhancement in federal 
court because it does not fall within the category of offense 
Congress intended federal courts to use to enhance sentences. 
 
 
420  Id. at 589. 
421  Id. at 598. 
422  544 U.S. 13 (2005). 
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The defendant in Shepard pled guilty to burglary under 
Massachusetts state statutes.  In his federal prosecution for being a 
felon in possession of a firearm,423 the government argued that his 
sentence should be enhanced under the ACCA because of his prior 
state burglary convictions.  Shepard argued that the state burglary 
statutes under which he was convicted as a result of his guilty pleas 
did not fit the federal generic definition of “burglary” for purposes 
of the ACCA, because they criminalized burglary of places other 
than dwellings, whereas the federal generic crime of burglary, as 
the Court defined it in Taylor, only involved burglary of dwellings.  
Thus, the defendant argued, the state statutes were “overbroad” in 
the sense that they involved crimes Congress did not intend to use 
to enhance the federal crime the defendant had committed. 
 
The government argued that police reports showed that Shepard 
had, in fact, burglarized dwellings, which fits the federal generic 
definition of burglary.  Shepard argued that police reports should 
not be considered in determining what crime of which he had been 
convicted under state law.  Because the Court’s prior decision in 
Taylor dealt with a jury verdict, the specific rule it created – that a 
sentencing court should look only to the statutory elements of the 
state crime, the charging documents, and the jury instructions, did 
not work, since there was no trial in Shepard’s case. 
 
The Supreme Court held that the categorical approach it 
established in Taylor had not resulted in any action by Congress in 
the 15 years since that decision, and thus showed that Congress 
acquiesced in its reasoning.  That only left the Court to determine 
what types of documents should be considered to determine the 
category of an offense in cases where no jury trial takes place.  
The Court held that only the following types of documents could 
be considered to determine what category of crime the defendant 
had been convicted of:  the charging document, the terms of a plea 
agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant 
in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the 
defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this 
information.424 
 
But, as later cases make clear, it is inappropriate to look at any 
documents to determine what a defendant did – it is only 
appropriate to look at documents when the task is to determine 
which portion of a divisible statute the defendant was convicted 
 
423  18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1). 
424  544 U.S. at 26. 
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under.  To stress the point again, the purpose of the categorical 
approach is to determine what crime a defendant was convicted of 
– not what he actually did.  And that is the issue the Board of 
Immigration Appeals address in Matter of Ajami. 
 
(3) Matter of Ajami.425 
 
In Ajami, the respondent was convicted of the crime of aggravated 
stalking under a Michigan statute with several paragraphs, some of 
which required acts of moral turpitude for conviction and some of 
which did not.  As a result, the BIA looked at the record of 
conviction to determine under which paragraph of the statute the 
respondent was convicted.  After doing so, the BIA decided that 
the respondent was convicted under a paragraph of the statute that 
required him to act willfully and, therefore, concluded that moral 
turpitude was involved. 
 
This is an example of how the “modified categorical approach” is 
used – to determine the exact offense involved where the state 
criminal statute is divisible; that is, where it contains more than 
one freestanding crime. 
 
(4) Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez.426 
 
In this case, the Supreme Court added an element to the modified 
categorical approach adopted by the BIA in Ajami.  The issue in 
Duenas-Alvarez was whether California’s theft statute was written 
broadly enough to include not only traditional “thefts,” but also 
crimes that would not meet the federal generic definition of 
“theft.”  More specifically, the state statute in Duenas-Alvarez 
defined “theft” as including being an accessory or accomplice after 
the fact. 
 
The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant had not been convicted 
of a “theft” offense because the least culpable conduct required for 
a conviction theoretically would not have to involve “theft.”  In 
Duenas-Alvarez, the Supreme Court added an element to the 
modified categorical analysis –the “realistic probability” test.  
Under that test, Mr. Duenas-Alvarez was required to show that 
there was a realistic probability that one could be convicted under 
the California statute for engaging in non-theft conduct.  And how 
was Mr. Duenas-Alvarez to meet this new burden of proof 
 
425  22 I&N Dec. 949 (BIA 1999). 
426   549 U.S. 183 (2007). 
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imposed on him?  By providing the decision-maker with an actual 
case (which could include his own case) in which the defendant 
was prosecuted under the statute for engaging in “non-theft” 
conduct.  In other words, unless Mr. Duenas-Alvarez could come 
forward with an actual case in which a defendant was prosecuted 
for non-theft conduct, the immigration decision-maker should not 
assume that such conduct is realistically prosecuted, and therefore 
should not assume it is the least culpable conduct required for 
conviction under the statute.427 
 
(5) Matter of Silva-Trevino.428 
 
Former Attorney General Mukasey threw a bit of a wrench into the 
categorical/modified categorical analysis when he issued the Silva-
Trevino decision in 2008.  This decision articulated circumstances 
under which the Attorney General believed it would be appropriate 
to take a fact-specific approach to determining whether a defendant 
has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.  
However, former Attorney General Eric Holder vacated this 
opinion in 2015, so it is no longer binding authority.429 
 
(6) Nijhawan v. Holder.430 
 
In Nijhawan, a unanimous Supreme Court held that some statutes 
call for a “circumstance-specific” approach, rather than a 
categorical approach.  In this case, the defendant was convicted, 
after a jury trial, of mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and money 
laundering.  Although the jury made no specific finding as to the 
dollar amount of loss the victim had suffered, at the sentencing 
phase of the case, the defendant stipulated that there had been a  
 
 
427  Several courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have held that the “realistic probability” 
requirement does not apply where the statute in question specifically criminalizes particular 
conduct.  In Gonzalez v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 2021), the Eighth Circuit held that a 
non-citizen was not required to show that there was a realistic probability that Florida actually 
prosecuted people for the conduct that made the offense of possession of cannabis broader than 
the generic federal offense, because the Florida statute expressly criminalized such conduct.  In 
such cases, there is no need for the client to show that such conduct would actually be 
prosecuted. 
 
428  24 I&N Dec. 687 (AG 2008). 
429  Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I&N Dec. 550 (AG 2015). 
430  557 U.S. 29 (2009). 
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monetary loss in excess of $100 million, and the court ordered 
restitution in the amount of $683 million. 
 
The government sought to deport the non-citizen defendant, 
arguing that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony; 
specifically, that he had been convicted of an offense that involves 
fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 
$10,000.431  The defendant argued that the Immigration Court 
should use the categorical approach articulated in Taylor in 
determining whether he was convicted of an aggravated felony, 
and that since the $10,000 limit was not an element of the criminal 
offense of which he was convicted, it did not fit the definition of an 
aggravated felony.  Alternatively, the defendant argued that the 
Immigration Court should use the modified categorical approach 
and only consult the documents specified in Shepard. 
 
The Supreme Court held that the portion of the aggravated felony 
statute specifying the dollar amount of the loss was a non-
elemental fact; that is, a fact that it is not necessary for the 
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict 
a defendant of the crime in question.  As a result, it was 
appropriate to look at the specific circumstances under which the 
crime was committed: 
 
Subparagraph (M)(i) [of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)] 
refers to “an offense that ... involves fraud or deceit 
in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 
$10,000” (emphasis added). The language of the 
provision is consistent with a circumstance-specific 
approach.  The words “in which” (which modify 
“offense”) can refer to the conduct involved “in” the 
commission of the offense of conviction, rather than 
to the elements of the offense.  Moreover, 
subparagraph (M)(i) appears just prior to 
subparagraph (M)(ii), the internal revenue provision 
we have just discussed, and it is identical in 
structure to that provision.  Where, as here, 
Congress uses similar statutory language and 
similar statutory structure in two adjoining 




431  INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). 
432  Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38-39. 
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The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that decision-
makers must limit the universe of documents they consider to 
determine if the specific circumstances were met (i.e., the 
monetary amount of the loss) to those articulated in Shepard.  The 
Court found nothing either unworkable or unfair in allowing 
decision-makers to consider, in cases like this, the stipulation as to 
the dollar amount of the loss offered by the defendant at the 
sentencing hearing.433 
 
(7) Moncrieffe v. Holder.434 
 
The 2012-2013 Supreme Court term produced two major decisions 
regarding the categorical approach to interpreting statutes carrying 
immigration consequences as the result of criminal proceedings.  
The first of those cases is Moncrieffe. 
 
The defendant in Moncrieffe was involved in a traffic stop where 
the police found him in possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana.  He 
pled guilty to a Georgia state offense of possession with intent to 
distribute.  Under a Georgia statutory provision, adjudication of 
guilt was withheld and Moncrieffe was sentenced to five years of 
probation, after which time the charge was to be expunged.435 
 
DHS sought to deport Moncrieffe, who was not a citizen, on the 
basis that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony – 
specifically, a drug trafficking offense as defined in INA           
§ 101(a)(43)(B).436  The Immigration Court, the BIA, and the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals all held that Moncrieffe had been 
convicted of an aggravated felony, even though the Georgia statute 
under which he was convicted punished the offense as a 
 
433  Id. at 42-43.  The BIA has adopted the circumstance-specific approach in cases 
involving the ground of deportability related to a conviction for a crime of domestic violence.  
Matter of H. Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 749 (BIA 2016).  In that case, the BIA held that the 
circumstance-specific approach is appropriate to determine whether a respondent convicted of 
assault committed the crime against his domestic partner.  The BIA found the statute, 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), to be more like the statute in Nijhawan than like statutes that call for a strict 
categorical approach.  Additionally, the BIA held that any reliable evidence, including police 
reports, could be consulted to determine the status of the victim against whom a “crime of 
domestic violence” has been committed. 
434  569 U.S. 184, (2013). 
435  Id. at 188-189. 
436  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
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misdemeanor, because possession with intent to distribute 
constitutes “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,” as 
prohibited by the aggravated felony statute. 
 
Using the categorical approach, the Supreme Court held that 
Moncrieffe’s Georgia conviction did not meet the two conditions it 
must meet in order to qualify as an aggravated felony: (1) the 
conduct involved (here, marijuana trafficking) must be prohibited 
by the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) and (2) the CSA must 
prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.437  The second 
requirement comes from the reference in the aggravated felony 
statute that a “drug trafficking crime” is one that is defined in 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c).  But that statute includes a provision that 
punishes one type of action at the misdemeanor level, not the 
felony level:  a case involving distribution of a small amount of 
marijuana for no remuneration.438 
 
The Supreme Court held that it was required to use the categorical 
approach as set forth by Taylor and its progeny to determine of 
what crime Moncrieffe was convicted.  And using that approach, 
it was foreclosed from asking what Mr. Moncrieffe actually did, 
which in this case meant it could not tell what amount of marijuana 
was involved, nor whether Moncrieffe received remuneration for 
distributing the marijuana.  So it had to assume that he was 
convicted for the least culpable conduct that would sustain a 
conviction under the state statute. 
 
Tipping its hat to the Duenas-Alvarez requirement that there must 
be a realistic probability that Moncrieffe could have been 
prosecuted for such least culpable conduct (i.e., possession with 
intent to distribute when only a small amount of marijuana), the 
Court held that he could have been so prosecuted, since Georgia 
appellate court opinions reflected such convictions when as little as 
6.6 grams of marijuana were involved.439  Taking all of these facts 
and precedents into consideration, the Supreme Court held that 
Moncrieffe was not deportable as an aggravated felon: 
 
Ambiguity on this point [whether remuneration was 
involved] means that the conviction did not 
“necessarily” involve facts that correspond to an 
 
437  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 192. 
438  21 U.S.C. § 821(b)(4). 
439  Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 194. 
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offense punishable as a felony under the CSA.  
Under the categorical approach, then, Moncrieffe 
was not convicted of an aggravated felony.440 
 
The Court rejected the government’s argument that this case called 
for a circumstance-specific approach like the one it adopted in 
Nijhawan: 
 
The monetary threshold [in 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(I)] is a limitation, written in to 
the INA itself, on the scope of the aggravated felony 
for fraud.  And the monetary threshold is set off by 
the words “in which,” which calls for a 
circumstance-specific examination of “the conduct 
involved ‘in’ the commission of the offense of 
conviction.  Locating this exception in the INA 
proper suggests an intent to have the relevant facts 
found in immigration proceedings.  But where, as 
here, the INA incorporates other criminal statutes 
wholesale, we have held it “must refer to generic 
crimes,” to which the categorical approach 
applies.441 
 
Thus, Moncrieffe reinforced the Supreme Court’s command that a 
categorical approach is to be used when determining of what crime 
a person has been convicted. 
 
(8) Descamps v. United States.442 
 
Descamps can be thought of as the poster child case for defining 
how the categorical approach is to be applied.  It is worth a careful 
read. 
 
This is another Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) case, 
although it certainly has applicability in the immigration 
context.443  Mr. Descamps was convicted of being a felon in 
 
440  Id. at 194-195. 
441  Id. at 201-202. 
442  570 U.S. 254 (2013). 
443  There was always some question about whether Supreme Court decisions under the 
ACCA applied in an immigration setting, at least in ICE’s view.  But that issue has been put to 
rest, since the BIA has definitively held that the ACCA analysis regarding the categorical 
approach applies in an immigration context.  See Matter of Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I&N Dec. 349 
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possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g).  The 
government, under the ACCA, sought to enhance the penalty 
imposed on him due to his prior state convictions for burglary, 
robbery and felony harassment.  The main focus of the Court’s 
scrutiny was Descamps’ California state burglary conviction.  
Descamps argued that his California state conviction did not fit the 
definition of a federal generic burglary offense because the state 
statute did not require that he enter the premises unlawfully.  But 
the lower courts pointed out that the record of conviction 
established that Descamps’ crime involved unlawful entry into a 
building.444  As a result, the lower courts enhanced Descamps’ 
sentence under the ACCA. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the categorical 
analysis definitely established that California’s burglary statute 
swept more broadly than the federal generic definition of burglary, 
the lower courts should not have engaged in a modified categorical 
approach that involved looking at the record of conviction.  The 
modified categorical approach, the Court reiterated, is only 
resorted to when a divisible statute is involved.  And the purpose 
of the modified categorical approach is simply to help a court 
determine which of various crimes in a divisible statute a 
defendant was convicted of – it is NOT used to determine in what 
conduct the defendant engaged.445  Referring to its long history (at 
least since Taylor was decided in 1990) of using the categorical 
approach as a means of determining what crimes a defendant is 
convicted of, not what acts he committed, the Court again stressed 
that, absent a statute like the one in Nijhawan, what the defendant 
actually did is irrelevant where the relevant inquiry is of what 
crime he was convicted. 
 
Having come this far, the Court then was left with the task of 
defining what is a “divisible” statute.  This is a significant 
question, especially in the context of immigration law, since the 
 
(BIA 2014), order vacated in part, Matter of Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I&N Dec. 478 (BIA 2015), 
adopting the categorical approach articulated in Descamps to the immigration context. 
444  Specifically, at the sentencing hearing in state court, the prosecutor proffered that 
Descamps broke into and entered a grocery store.  Descamps did not object to this proffer. 
445  To underscore its point, the Court puts the term “modified categorical approach” in 
quotation marks, characterizing it not as a genuinely alternative approach, but as “a tool for 
implementing the categorical approach, to examine a limited class of documents to determine 
which of a statute’s alternative elements formed the basis of a conviction.” Descamps, 570 at 
263-264. 
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BIA had held that a criminal statute is “divisible” if one or more 
elements of a criminal statute could be satisfied by conduct that 
either was deportable conduct or non-deportable conduct.446   But 
the Supreme Court adopted a definition of “divisible” at odds with 
the one accepted by the BIA in Lanferman.  The Court held that to 
determine whether a statute is truly divisible, a court looks at the 
elements in a statute that a fact-finder must unanimously, and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, agree exist in order to convict a 
defendant of violating the statute.  The focus is on the elements of 
the criminal offense, not on the facts of the case: 
 
For example, an indivisible statute “requir[ing] use 
of a ‘weapon’ is not meaningfully different”—or so 
says the Ninth Circuit—“from a statute that simply 
lists every kind of weapon in existence ... (‘gun, 
axe, sword, baton, slingshot, knife, machete, bat,’ 
and so on).” In a similar way, every indivisible 
statute can be imaginatively reconstructed as a 
divisible one. And if that is true, the Ninth Circuit 
asks, why limit the modified categorical approach 
only to explicitly divisible statutes? 
 
The simple answer is: Because only divisible 
statutes enable a sentencing court to conclude that a 
jury (or judge at a plea hearing) has convicted the 
defendant of every element of the generic crime. A 
prosecutor charging a violation of a divisible statute 
must generally select the relevant element from its 
list of alternatives. . . . And the jury, as instructions 
in the case will make clear, must then find that 
element, unanimously and beyond a reasonable 
doubt.447 
 
Using this framework, the Court held that the lower courts should 
never have looked at any of the documents in the “record of 
 
446  Matter of Lanferman, 25 I&N Dec. 721 (BIA 2012), overruled by Matter of Chairez-
Castrejon, 26 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 2014).  As an example, suppose a criminal statute proscribes 
“assault,” defined elsewhere in the criminal code or in case law, to mean anything from an 
offensive touching to infliction of severe physical injury.  While it is clear that simple assault 
(i.e., offensive touching) would not be a crime involving moral turpitude, intentionally inflicting 
severe physical harm would be a CIMT.  Under the Lanferman view of the world, such a statute 
would be divisible, because at least one form of conduct (intentional infliction of severe physical 
injury) constitutes deportable conduct. 
447  Id. at 271-272. 
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conviction,” since it was not necessary that they do that in order to 
determine of what offense Descamps was convicted.  In other 
words, the statute under which he was convicted was not divisible.  
With this roadmap, the end result of the case was that Descamps’ 
conviction should not have been enhanced under the ACCA.  The 
Court summarizes its holding at the end of the opinion: 
 
Descamps may (or may not) have broken and 
entered, and so committed generic burglary. But    
§ 459 – the crime of which he was convicted – does 
not require the factfinder (whether jury or judge) to 
make that determination. Because generic unlawful 
entry is not an element, or an alternative element, of 
§ 459, a conviction under that statute is never for 
generic burglary. And that decides this case in 
Descamps' favor; the District Court should not have 
enhanced his sentence under ACCA.448 
 
This is all confusing – even at second and third blush.  But there is 
a resource that will help you understand Descamps’ rationale better 
than we ever could.  It is a video put together by Maureen 
Sweeney at the University of Maryland.  After watching it, we are 
confident you will have a much better handle on the categorical 
approach as set forth in Descamps.449 
 
The history of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court since 
Taylor reaffirms the Supreme Court’s insistence on using the 
categorical approach to determine what crime an immigrant has 
been convicted of.450  Again, the focus is on determining what the 
 
448  Id. at 277. 
449  Maureen Sweeney, Categorical Analysis of Immigration Consequences 7 28 14, 
YouTube (July 28, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDA-wVIedT0 (last visited 
October 13, 2020). 
450  See, e.g., Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (holding that in order to qualify as a 
“drug trafficking offense” under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), an offense must be punishable at the 
felony level in federal court); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (holding that, 
in order for a defendant to have been convicted as a recidivist for purposes of the Controlled 
Substances Act, the focus must be on whether the defendant was actually charged and prosecuted 
as a recidivist in state court, not whether he might have been so charged and prosecuted); 
Johnson v. U.S., 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (holding that where the state statute punishes conduct as 
slight as a tap on the shoulder without consent, such an offense cannot qualify as a “violent 
felony” for purposes of the ACCA); Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015) (holding that a state 
statute that criminalizes possession of a drug that does not appear on the federal drug schedules 
incorporated by the Controlled Substances Act does not make a non-citizen defendant deportable 
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elements of the offense are, and not on determining what a 
criminal defendant actually did.451 
 
c. Examples of Crimes That Involve Moral Turpitude and 
Crimes That do not Involve Moral Turpitude. 
 
For purposes of illustration only, we have provided below partial lists of 
crimes that the BIA and various courts have held either do or do not 
constitute crimes involving moral turpitude.452  These lists are provided 
for general guidance only.  You should make certain to determine 
that the BIA has not changed its position on any of these issues and, in 
Nebraska, you should also determine what the Eighth Circuit’s 
position is for any given crime. 
 
(1) Partial List of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude. 
 
A partial list of crimes that the Board of Immigration Appeals and 
various courts have found to constitute crimes involving moral 
turpitude include:  murder, rape, robbery, kidnapping, voluntary 
manslaughter, some involuntary manslaughter offenses,453 
aggravated assaults, mayhem, theft offenses, child abuse, spousal 
abuse, and incest.  Other crimes that have been held to constitute 
crimes involving moral turpitude are: failure to register as a sex 
 
under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(I)); Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) 
(holding that the ACCA does not permit enhancement of a federal sentence when the state court 
conviction sought to be used is broader than the federal generic crime, and also definitively 
stating that a statute that merely lists alternative facts, as opposed to different elements, is not 
divisible). 
451  Shortly after the Mathis decision was released by the Supreme Court in 2016, the 
Immigrant Defense Project released a practice advisory on how to analyze cases using the 
categorical approach, current through the Mathis decision.  It can be found at 
https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/MATHIS-PRACTICE-
ALERT-FINAL.pdf (last visited October 15, 2020). 
452  This list is taken largely from Ira J. Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook, Chapter 
3, § III. C. 1, and Kesselbrenner & Rosenberg, Immigration Law and Crimes, § 6.2(a).  These 
publications are very helpful in locating authority on the issue of whether or not a particular 
crime is a crime involving moral turpitude. 
453  The Eighth Circuit has held that conviction of involuntary manslaughter under a 
Missouri statute constitutes a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.  Franklin v. 
I.N.S., 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995). 
138 
offender,454 fraud,455 terroristic threats,456 accessory after the fact 
to murder,457 “assault plus” crimes (that is, those that involve 
assault coupled with some further aggravating element such as 
assault with attempt to murder,458 assault with a deadly weapon,459 
aggravated assault,460 assault on a domestic partner,461 child 
abuse,462 child endangerment,463 sexual conduct with a minor,464 
assault on a police officer465), forgery,466 robbery and burglary,467 
 
454  Matter of Tobar-Lobo, 24 I&N Dec. 143 (BIA 2007).  But see Totimeh v. Attorney 
General, 666 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (declining to follow Tobar-Lobo and collecting cases 
criticizing Tobar-Lobo).  Also, we are aware of a decision by Judge Fujimoto of the Omaha 
Immigration Court holding that failure to register as a sex offender under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-
4004(3) is not a CIMT.  Matter of ______, A#_________ (January 27, 2011), (redacted copy of 
opinion on file with the author).  Judge Fujimoto distinguished the Nebraska statute from the 
California statute in Tobar-Lobo, noting that the decision in Tobar-Lobo involved a statute that 
required willful conduct on the part of the defendant, and also required a showing that he had 
previously been advised of the requirement to register.  Judge Fujimoto noted that the Nebraska 
statute requires neither finding for a conviction.  That decision is likely no longer good law in 
the Eighth Circuit.  See Bakor v. Barr, 958 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2020). 
455  Izedonmwen v. I.N.S., 37 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 1994). 
456  Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2004). 
457  Cabral v. I.N.S., 15 F.3d 193 (1st Cir. 1994). 
458  Clark v. Orabona, 59 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1932). 
459  Matter of Logan, 17 I&N Dec. 367 (BIA 1980). 
460  Pichardo v. I.N.S., 104 F.3d 756 (5th Cir. 1997). 
461  Matter of Tran, 21 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 1996).  But see Matter of Sanudo, 23 I&N 
Dec. 968 (BIA 2006). 
462  Guerrero de Nodahl v. I.N.S., 407 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1969). 
463  Hernandez-Perez v. Holder, 569 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 2009). 
464  Matter of Guevara Alfaro, 25 I&N Dec. 417 (BIA 2011). 
465  Matter of Danesh, 19 I&N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988). 
466  Matter of A-, 5 I&N Dec. 52 (BIA 1953). 
467  Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982). 
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extortion,468 receipt of stolen property with the knowledge the 
property is stolen,469 driving a vehicle in a willful and wanton 
manner while trying to evade a police officer,470 falsely obtaining 
a Social Security card,471 use of a false driver’s license,472 
counterfeiting,473 perjury (usually),474 willful tax evasion,475 drug 
offenses where knowledge or intent is an element of the crime (i.e., 
possession with intent to distribute),476 embezzlement,477 and 
passing of bad checks if fraud is an element of the offense.478  
Additionally, use of a weapon during the course of committing 
other crimes may indicate the existence of moral turpitude, thus 
making the conviction one of a crime involving moral turpitude.479  
And the BIA has held generally that accessory after the fact is a 
crime involving moral turpitude if the underlying offense is a 
crime involving moral turpitude.480  Also, conviction of an attempt 
to commit a CIMT is a conviction of a CIMT even if the 
underlying statute does not mention attempt offenses.481 
 
468  Matter of F-, 3 I&N Dec. 361 (BIA 1949). 
469  Matter of Gordon, 20 I&N Dec. 52 (BIA 1989); Okoroha v. I.N.S., 715 F.2d 380 (8th 
Cir. 1983). 
470  Matter of Ruiz-Lopez, 25 I&N Dec. 551 (BIA 2011). 
471  Lateef v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 592 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2010). 
472  Montero-Ubrii v. I.N.S., 229 F.3d 319 (1st Cir. 2000). 
473  Matter of Castro, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (BIA 1988). 
474  The BIA has held that a perjury conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude if 
materiality is an element, since the common law definition of perjury is the controlling one.  
Matter of L-, 1 I&N Dec. 324 (BIA 1942). 
475  Wittgenstein v. I.N.S., 124 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 1997). 
476  Matter of Khourn, 21 I&N Dec. 1041 (BIA 1997). 
477  Matter of Batten, 11 I&N Dec. 271 (BIA 1965). 
478  Matter of Khalik, 17 I&N Dec. 518 (BIA 1980). 
479  Matter of Logan, 17 I&N Dec. 367 (BIA 1980). 
480  Matter of Rivens, 25 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2011). 
481  Matter of Vo, 25 I&N Dec. 426 (BIA 2011). 
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(2) Partial List of Crimes Not Involving Moral Turpitude. 
 
A partial list of crimes that various tribunals have found not to 
constitute crimes involving moral turpitude includes:  simple 
assault,482 some involuntary manslaughter offenses,483 malicious 
mischief (conviction under Washington statute),484 indecent 
exposure,485 most "possession" drug offenses,486 contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor,487 passing bad checks where intent is 
not an element of the offense,488 inventing a Social Security 
number,489 breaking and entering or unlawful entry where intent to 
commit a crime involving moral turpitude is not an element of the 
offense,490 possession of burglar’s tools,491 joyriding,492 and 





482  Matter of S-, 9 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 1962). 
483  Matter of Lopez, 13 I&N Dec. 725 (BIA 1971); but see Franklin v. I.N.S., 72 F.3d 
571 (8th Cir. 1995). 
484  Rodriguez-Herrera v. I.N.S., 52 F.3d 238 (9th Cir. 1995). 
485  Matter of H-, 7 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 1956).  The same case also held that a 
conviction of gross indecency under Michigan law would be a crime involving moral turpitude. 
486  Matter of Abreu-Semino, 12 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA 1968). 
487  Matter of P-, 2 I&N Dec. 117 (BIA 1944), but see Matter of Garcia, 11 I&N Dec. 
521 (BIA 1966), holding that taking indecent liberties with a minor is a crime involving moral 
turpitude. 
488  Matter of Zangwill, 18 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1981), overruled on other grounds, Matter 
of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988). 
489  Matter of ______, A#_______ (BIA February 7, 2011), (redacted copy of opinion on 
file with author). 
490  Matter of G-, 1 I&N Dec. 403 (BIA 1943). 
491  Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579, (BIA 1992) (citing United States ex rel. Guarino 
v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1939) and Matter of S-, 6 I&N Dec. 769 (BIA 1955)). 
492  Matter of M—, 2 I&N Dec. 686 (BIA 1946). 
493  Matter of Granados, 17 I&N Dec. 726 (BIA 1979). 
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d. Statutory Exceptions. 
 
There are two statutory exceptions to the "crimes involving moral 
turpitude" ground of inadmissibility: (1) juvenile offenses and (2) the 
“petty offense” exception. 
 
(1) Juvenile Offenses. 
 
The INA provides that a person who commits what would 
otherwise be a crime involving moral turpitude is not inadmissible 
if (1) the crime was committed when the person was less than 18 
years of age, (2) if confined for the crime, the person has been 
released from confinement and (3) such commission and/or release 
from confinement took place more than five years before the date 
the person applies for a visa or for admission to the U.S.494 
 
The juvenile offense exception of the statute applies if the juvenile 
was charged and prosecuted as an adult under state law.  It does 
not apply if the case simply involved a juvenile adjudication in 
Juvenile Court, because such an offense is not “conviction” of a 
“crime.”495  There is also some authority for the proposition that 
the provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act496 preclude 
a finding that any crime committed by a juvenile under age 16 is a 
crime involving moral turpitude, even if the juvenile was tried as 
an adult.497 
 
(2) “Petty Offenses.” 
 
If a non-citizen commits only one crime involving moral turpitude 
that involves a maximum possible penalty of one year or less and 
 
494  INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
495  Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000).  The BIA has held that a 
“youthful trainee” designation under Michigan law is a “conviction” because it did not have the 
hallmarks of a juvenile adjudication, which means it must be civil in nature and must be such 
that it can neither be deemed a “conviction” ab initio nor ripen into a conviction upon the 
occurrence or nonoccurrence of subsequent events.  Matter of V-X-, 26 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 
2013). 
496  18 U.S.C. § 5031, et seq. 
497  See Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I&N Dec. 135 (BIA 1981).  This case involved a 
juvenile who was convicted as an adult in a Cuban court.  The result might be different if the 
juvenile was tried as an adult in a U.S. state court.  See, e.g., Vieira-Garcia v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d 
409 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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if the person was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in 
excess of six months as a result of being convicted of such a crime, 
then the person is not inadmissible solely due to committing such a 
crime involving moral turpitude.498 
 
Note that if there is an admission of the commission of a crime 
involving moral turpitude, but no conviction, the petty offense 
exception applies so long as the maximum possible sentence that 
could be imposed, in the event of a conviction, was one year or 
less.  In such a situation, the second part of the statutory equation 
(length of actual sentence) is simply disregarded. 
 
Note also that the petty offense exception is available only once.  
It applies only to the first CIMT offense.  If a client has been 
convicted of a previous CIMT, she or he is not eligible for the 




It is not necessarily the end of the world for a client who has committed a 
crime involving moral turpitude to which a statutory exception does not 
apply.  A waiver of this particular ground of inadmissibility is available to 
certain non-citizens, namely, those who committed a prostitution offense 
more than 15 years before applying for admission to the U.S. or other 
non-citizens inadmissible under certain grounds listed in the waiver statute 
who can establish that refusing them admission would result in extreme 
hardship to their U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent, son or 
daughter.499 
 
A discussion of the procedures involved in applying for a waiver, and the 
evidence necessary to obtain one, is beyond the scope of this Guide.  We 
suggest further exploration of this topic in one of the resources we list in 
section I.E., supra. 
 
4. Multiple Criminal Convictions. 
 
A non-citizen convicted of two or more crimes of any type, if the aggregate 
sentences to confinement were five years or more, is inadmissible.500  For 
purposes of this ground of inadmissibility, it does not matter if the convictions 
were the result of a single trial or if they arose from a single scheme of criminal 
 
498  INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). 
499  INA §212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
500  INA § 212(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B). 
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conduct.  So long as the person was convicted of two or more criminal offenses 
of any kind, he or she is inadmissible under this provision. 
 
Note the following with respect to this ground of inadmissibility: 
 
(1) Unlike the ground of inadmissibility regarding crimes involving moral 
turpitude, here there must actually be a conviction –- a simple admission 
will not suffice.501 
 
(2) The two or more crimes can be of any type, even crimes not involving 
moral turpitude.  
 
(3) When counting time to determine if the five-year limit has been reached, 
one looks to all sentences initially imposed by the court, regardless of any 
periods of suspension or deferment.502 
 
(4) When dealing with sentences of indeterminate length, one looks to the 
maximum term imposed to determine the length of the sentence 
imposed.503 
 
(5) As in the case of certain individuals who have committed crimes involving 
moral turpitude, a waiver of this ground of inadmissibility is available.504 
 
5. Drug Offenses. 
 
There are two major categories of drug offenses that will cause non-citizens to be 
inadmissible:  "general" drug offenses and drug trafficking offenses. 
 
a. General Drug Offenses. 
 
A non-citizen convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who 
admits committing acts that constitute the essential elements of any law or 




501  See section V.D.2., infra, for a discussion of what constitutes a “conviction” for 
purposes of the INA. 
502  INA § 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48). 
503  Matter of D-, 20 I&N Dec. 827 (BIA 1994). 
504  INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
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controlled substance is inadmissible.505  Attempts and conspiracies, as 
well as actual violations, also make one inadmissible.506 
 
The definition of "controlled substance" is borrowed from 21 U.S.C.       
§ 802(6).  This includes all drugs listed in the schedules found in 21 
U.S.C. § 812.  These schedules are updated annually.  In addition, a 
"controlled substance" also includes those substances listed by the U.S. 
Attorney General pursuant to his authority under 21 U.S.C. § 811.  The 
Attorney General's list is located at 21 C.F.R. Part 1308. 
 
b. Mellouli v. Lynch.507 
 
In 2015, the United States Supreme Court decided a case that stresses how 
important it is for practitioners to determine if there is a complete match 
between the drug schedules of a state and those used by the Controlled 
Substances Act.  In Mellouli v. Lynch, Mr. Mellouli, a non-citizen, pled 
guilty to a misdemeanor drug paraphernalia offense in Kansas state court.  
In one of the most bizarre sets of facts one might imagine, the “drug 
paraphernalia” Mellouli pled guilty to possessing was his sock, in which 
he had hidden “four orange tablets,” which he conceded were a 
“controlled substance” as defined under Kansas law, although the exact 
type of controlled substance was not specified.508  Because of the 
definition of “drug paraphernalia” under Kansas law (“ all equipment and 
materials of any kind which are used. . . for. . . storing. . . a controlled 
substance. . . .509), Mellouli’s sock, into which he had placed the controlled 
substance, fit the definition of “drug paraphernalia.” 
 
However, there were nine controlled substances on the Kansas schedules 
that did not appear on the schedules related to the federal Controlled 
Substances Act.  As such, Mellouli’s offense would not have qualified as 
a “controlled substances offense” under federal law, even though it did so 
qualify under state law.  As a result of his conviction, ICE sought to 
deport Mellouli under the INA provision that makes it a deportable 
 
505  INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
506  Id. 
507  575 U.S. 798 (2015).  Although the issue in Mellouli was deportability and not 
inadmissibility, the analysis works in both contexts. 
508  Mellouli admitted, prior to being charged, that the pills were Adderall, but that fact 
does not appear in any of the criminal records in the case (perhaps due to a savvy criminal 
defense lawyer?). 
509  K.S.A. § 21-5701(f). 
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offense to be convicted of a crime related to a controlled substance.510  
Mellouli argued that, using the categorical approach, he had not been 
convicted of a crime related to a “controlled substance” as that term is 
defined in the Controlled Substances Act.  The Immigration Court, Board 
of Immigration Appeals, and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals all rejected 
Mellouli’s argument. 
 
But the Supreme Court thought Mellouli’s argument had merit.  The 
Court held that reference in the deportation statute to the Controlled 
Substances Act means that the controlled substance that forms the basis 
for removal of a non-citizen must be one listed in the federal schedules.  
Because Kansas’ schedules included at least nine drugs not included on 
the federal schedules, and because, using the categorical approach, the 
Court had to assume that Mellouli was convicted of possessing one of the 
drugs not on the federal schedules, he could not be held to have been 
convicted of a crime related to a controlled substance “as defined in 
section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802).”  As a 
result, Mellouli was not removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) due to his 
conviction. 
 
This approach does not work in Nebraska, however.  The Kansas 
controlled substance statute was indivisible; that is, it was not an element 
of the prosecution’s case to prove which controlled substance Mr. 
Mellouli possessed – only that he possessed a controlled substance.  In 
contrast, in Nebraska, the BIA has held that the prosecution must, as part 
of its burden of proof, prove what controlled substance a defendant 
possessed in order to obtain a conviction:511 
 
We conclude that § 28-416(3) is divisible vis-à-vis the 
controlled substance involved in the offense.  Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 28-416(3) provides, in pertinent part that a “person 
knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled 
substance . . . shall be guilty of a Class IV felony.” Section 
[id] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-405 provides the schedules of 
controlled substances.  Nebraska state court decisions, the 
statute itself, and the conviction records all support the 
conclusion that the identity of the controlled substance is an 
element which must be proven under § 28-416(3).  
Nebraska courts have held that the identity of the controlled 
substance involved in an offense must be established.  See, 
e.g., State v. Watson, 437 N.W.2d 142 (Neb. 1989); State v. 
 
510  INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
511 See, e.g., Matter of Soto, A# [redacted], (BIA, July 13, 2017) (unpublished opinion on 
file with the author). 
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Nash, 444 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Neb. 1989); see also State v. 
Clark, 461 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Neb. 1990) (the State must 
prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally 
possessed the substance).  Further, relevant jury 
instructions indicate that the prosecution must prove the 
type of substance involved, such that the defendant was 
aware that it was a controlled substance he possessed.  
State v. Heujahr, 540 N.W.2d 566, 572-573 (Neb. 1995) 
(finding that the jury was properly instructed that 
“possession” of the specifically identified controlled 
substance means “either knowingly having it on one’s 
person or knowing of the object’s presence and having 




With the exception of the waiver discussed in the next paragraph, there are 
no exceptions to the controlled substance offense ground of 
inadmissibility as far as those seeking admission as permanent residents 
are concerned.  Any non-citizen convicted of, or who admits having 
committed, or who admits committing acts constituting the essential 
elements of a controlled substance offense is permanently inadmissible to 
the United States as an immigrant.  There is a waiver available for this 
ground of inadmissibility in limited circumstances for non-immigrants.513 
 
There is the possibility of waiving this ground of inadmissibility in a very 




512 Id., slip op. at pp. 2-3.  In Iowa, the argument is more favorable, since the Iowa 
controlled substance statutes define a “controlled substance” to include a simulated controlled 
substance.  Iowa Code Ann. § 124.401(1)(c)(2)(b).  That is broader than the federal definition 
of a controlled substance found in the federal Controlled Substances Act at 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(2) 
(punishing possession of a controlled substance and a counterfeit controlled substance, but not a 
simulated substance).  And, in fact, the BIA has held that a Mellouli argument works under the 
Iowa statute.  See, e.g., Matter of Martinez Hernandez, A# [redacted], (BIA March 14, 2018) 
(unpublished opinion on filed with the author), holding that the Iowa controlled substance 
statutes are violated regardless of whether the substance is a controlled substance, a counterfeit 
substance, or a simulated controlled substance.  This, the BIA held, makes the Iowa statute 
indivisible and overbroad.  Unfortunately for Nebraska practitioners, the Nebraska definition 
matches the federal one.  See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(1), prohibiting possession, distribution, 
etc., of a “controlled substance” or a “counterfeit controlled substance,” as those terms are 
defined in § 28-401. 
513  INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). 
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simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana is eligible to apply for 
the waiver to this ground of inadmissibility.514 
 
d. Drug Trafficking Offenses. 
 
If an immigration or consular officer knows or has reason to believe that 
a non-citizen is engaged in drug trafficking or has trafficked in any 
controlled substance, such a person is inadmissible.515  This ground of 
inadmissibility also applies to those who aid, abet, assist, conspire or 
collude with drug traffickers.516 
 
Note that this ground of inadmissibility does not require a conviction -- 
one is inadmissible even if the DHS or State Department "has reason to 
believe" that the person has been engaged in drug trafficking.  Thus, even 
if charges of drug trafficking are ultimately dismissed, the underlying facts 
might be used by the DHS to deny admission to the person.517  “Reason to 
believe” equates to the adjudicating officer having probable cause to 
believe the person engaged in drug trafficking.518 
 
This particular ground of inadmissibility applies only to drug trafficking 
offenses, which do not include simple possession of a controlled 
substance.519  However, a conviction of a drug trafficking crime, or 
existence of a reasonable belief that a person has possessed a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute will implicate this ground of 
inadmissibility.  And the sweep is broad.  Even a single sale of a small 
amount of a controlled substance is sufficient to sustain a finding that 
someone is a drug “trafficker.”520  On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit, in 
an unpublished opinion, has held that simply offering to sell a controlled 
substance is not a drug trafficking offense because the federal Controlled  
 
 
514  See the introductory language to INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
515  INA § 212(a)(2)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i). 
516  Id. 
517  Matter of Rico, 16 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 1977). 
518  Matter of U-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 355, 356 (BIA 2002). 
519  A conviction for simple possession, however, will present a problem for the person 
under the provisions of INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
520  See Matter of Roberts, 20 I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991), in which the respondent was 
convicted of a single sale of what appeared to be a relatively small amount of cocaine. 
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Substances Act prohibits only the knowing and intentional distribution of 
a controlled substance.521 
 
In 1999, the statute was amended to include certain family members 
within its ambit.  Now, anyone who is the spouse, son or daughter of an 
non-citizen who is inadmissible as a drug trafficker is himself inadmissible 
if, within five years of seeking admission, such person (1) obtained any 
benefit, financial or otherwise, from the non-citizen’s drug trafficking and 
(2) knew, or should have known, that such benefit was the result of drug 
trafficking activity.522  The standard that applies to family members is the 
“reason to believe” standard that applies to the principal drug trafficker, so 
defined family members are inadmissible if a DHS or consular official has 
“reason to believe” that such family members are within the statutory 
definition. 
 
6. Prostitution and Commercialized Vice. 
 
This ground of inadmissibility applies both to those who engage in prostitution 
themselves and those who participate in some way in prostitution or 
commercialized vice.523  Anyone who is coming to the U.S. to engage in 
prostitution, or one who has engaged in prostitution within 10 years of the date 
she or he seeks admission, is inadmissible.524  This is true even if prostitution is 
lawful in the non-citizen's home country.525 
 
One who, directly or indirectly, procures or attempts to procure or import anyone 
for purposes of prostitution is inadmissible.526  As with persons engaging in  
 
 
521  Davila v. Holder, 381 F. App’x 413 (5th Cir. 2010).  Other courts have disagreed 
with this holding.  See, e.g., Pascual v. Holder, 707 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2013). 
522  INA § 212(a)(2)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(ii). 
523  The term “prostitution” means engaging in promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire.  
A finding that one has “engaged” in prostitution requires a consideration of the elements of 
continuity and regularity, as opposed to isolated acts.  22 C.F.R. § 40.24(b).  Although this 
definition applies in an inadmissibility context, the BIA has held that, for purposes of analyzing 
whether running a prostitution business is an aggravated felony, the term “prostitution” is not 
limited to sexual intercourse, but is defined as engaging in, or agreeing or offering to engage in, 
sexual conduct for anything of value.  Matter of Ding, 27 I&N Dec. 295 (BIA 2018). 
524  INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(i). 
525  22 C.F.R. § 40.24(c). 
526  INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii). 
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prostitution themselves, this bar to admissibility applies if anyone has engaged in 
any of these acts within 10 years of seeking admission. 
 
Finally, this ground of inadmissibility applies to anyone coming to the U.S. to 
engage in any other commercialized vice, whether or not it involves 
prostitution.527 
 
As with drug trafficking, this ground of inadmissibility applies whether or not the 
person has actually been convicted of any of the acts described in the statute. 
 
Those deemed inadmissible under this statutory provision can seek a waiver of 
inadmissibility.528  
 
7. Serious Criminal Activity Where a Person has Asserted Immunity 
from Prosecution. 
 
If one (1) has committed a "serious criminal offense"529 (2) has been granted 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction, (3) as a result of the offense and exercise of 
immunity, has left the U.S. and (4) has not later fully submitted to the jurisdiction 
of a U.S. court with respect to the offense, then such a person is inadmissible.530 
 
This ground of inadmissibility is usually applied to foreign diplomats who engage 
in a serious criminal offense, although the terms of the statute are not limited to 
diplomats.  Certain non-citizens may qualify to seek a waiver of this ground of 
inadmissibility.531 
 
8. Significant Traffickers in Persons. 
 
This ground of inadmissibility was added by section 111(d) of the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub.L. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, 




527  INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(iii). 
528  INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
529  This term is defined in the INA as including (1) any felony, (2) any crime of violence 
as defined in section 16 of title 18 of the United States Code, and (3) any crime of reckless 
driving or of driving while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or prohibited substances 
if such crime involves personal injury to another.  INA § 101(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h). 
530  INA § 212(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(E). 
531  INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
150 
122 Stat. 5044, Dec. 23, 2008.  Two classes of principal non-citizens are 
inadmissible under the provisions of the INA regarding trafficking in persons.532 
 
The first class consists of any non-citizen who “commits or conspires to commit 
human trafficking offenses” either in the U.S. or outside the U.S.  The second 
class is comprised of non-citizens whom the DHS or a consular officer knows or 
has reason to believe have been knowing aiders, abettors, assisters, conspirators, 
or colluders with those who traffic in “severe forms of trafficking in persons.”533 
 
In addition to these two classes of principal non-citizens who are inadmissible, the 
statute also provides, akin to the statute on drug trafficking,534 that anyone who 
the DHS or consular officer knows or has reason to believe is the spouse, son, or 
daughter of a non-citizen who falls in one of the two principal classes described 
above, is himself or herself inadmissible if, within the past five years, such 
spouse, son, or daughter has obtained any financial or other benefit from human 
trafficking activity engaged in by the principal non-citizen.535  In addition, such 
spouse, son or daughter is also inadmissible if he or she knew or reasonably 
should have known that the financial or other benefit received within the past five 
years was the product of illicit trafficking.536 
 
9. Terrorist Activity. 
 
As one might imagine, this ground of inadmissibility was broadened in the wake 
of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.  The USA PATRIOT 
Act of 2001537 added several provisions to this particular ground of 
inadmissibility. 
 
The statute538 is interesting and is worth reading, mainly because of the wide 
range of activities it now includes.  Because Nebraska criminal practitioners may 
not encounter many of these activities, we have not discussed them all here, but 
we have set forth some of the categories of non-citizens to which this ground of  
 
 
532  INA § 212(a)(2)(H)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(2)(H)(i). 
533  Id. 
534  INA § 212(a)(2)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(ii). 
535  INA § 212(a)(2)(H)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H)(ii). 
536  Id. 
537  Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, October 26, 2001. 
538  INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). 
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inadmissibility applies because they may come into play even in Nebraska state 
criminal proceedings. 
 
First, the statute provides that the following categories of non-citizens are 
inadmissible on terrorist grounds: (1) those who have engaged in a “terrorist 
activity,” (2) those whom the DHS or a consular official knows, or has reason to 
believe, are engaged in or are likely to engage in a “terrorist activity,” (3) those 
who have, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious 
bodily harm, incited “terrorist activity,” (4) those who are “representatives” of 
certain organizations involved with or linked to terrorism, (5) those who are 
members of foreign terrorist organizations, and (6) those who have used their 
position of prominence within any country to endorse or espouse terrorist 
activity.539 
 
In addition, the statute also makes the spouse or child of such principal non-
citizens inadmissible if the activity causing the principal non-citizen to be 
inadmissible took place within the past five years540 unless such spouse or child 
did not know and should not reasonably have known of the terrorist activity of the 
principal non-citizen or whom the DHS or consular officer believes has 
renounced such terrorist activity.541 
 
Second, the statute defines “terrorist activity.”  Again, the sweep of the acts 
included is breathtaking.  “Terrorist activity” includes the following acts, and 
also includes threats, attempts or conspiracies to do any of the following acts: (1) 
the highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance, including an aircraft, vessel or 
vehicle, (2) the seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure or continue to 
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person or governmental entity 
to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the 
release of the person held, (3) a violent attack upon an internationally protected 
person, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1116(b)(4), or upon the liberty of such a person, 
(4) assassination, and (5) the use of any biological agent, chemical agent, nuclear 
weapon or device, explosive, firearm or other weapon or dangerous device (other 
than for purely personal monetary gain), with the intent to endanger, directly or 




539  INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i). 
540  Id. 
541  INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii). 
542  INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
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The statute also defines “engage in terrorist activity,”543 “representative” of a 
terrorist organization,544 and “terrorist organization.”545 
 
Given the very broad definition of “terrorist activity,” it is not hard to imagine 
that some non-citizens who commit certain acts that most would not think of as 
“terrorist acts” might be held to be inadmissible as “terrorists.”  For example, 
suppose that your client is convicted of domestic assault because he assaulted his 
domestic partner using a weapon of some sort.546  Under a literal reading of the 
statute, the client has engaged in a “terrorist activity” because he used a weapon, 
other than for purely personal monetary gain, with intent to endanger the safety of 
another individual.547  Most of us understand that aggravated assault is a bad 
thing, but it is counterintuitive to think of such an act as a “terrorist activity.”  
This is life under the USA PATRIOT Act.  Having said that, however, I am 
unaware of a client found to be inadmissible based on the “terrorist activity” 
ground for engaging in such behavior.  But that does not mean it couldn’t 
happen. 
 




There are two categories of misrepresentation that make a non-citizen 
inadmissible.  The first is misrepresentation of a material fact if the purpose of 
such misrepresentation is to obtain a visa, other documentation, admission into 
the U.S., or any other benefit provided under the INA.548  The second is a false 
claim of U.S. citizenship for any purpose related to an immigration benefit or any 
benefit under federal or state law.549  The second category of inadmissibility 
could certainly come into play if a non-citizen is engaged in an act or is convicted  
 
 
543  INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv). 
544  INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(v). 
545  INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi). 
546  This type of conviction would also make a client who is currently in the U.S. in 
proper immigration status deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E). 
547  INA § 212(a)(2)(B)(iii)(V), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B)(iii)(V). 
548  INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). 
549  INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I).  See Matter of Richmond, 
26 I&N Dec. 779 (BIA 2016) for the BIA’s take on what it takes to trigger this ground of 
inadmissibility. 
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of an offense involving trying to obtain a benefit under state law (perhaps trying 
to get a driver’s license, for example) by falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen. 
 
As with some of the other grounds of inadmissibility, this ground does not require 
an actual conviction of the acts set forth, although certainly a conviction would 
implicate these provisions of the Act.  Certain individuals may be eligible to 
apply for a waiver of the first category of misrepresentation listed above,550 
however, there is no waiver available regarding the second category of 
inadmissibility.  Nevertheless, there is a statutory exception.  If the false claim to 
U.S. citizenship is made by a non-citizen whose parents are or were U.S. citizens, 
if the non-citizen permanently resided in the U.S. since reaching age 16, and if the 
non-citizen reasonably believed at the time he or she made a false claim of U.S. 
citizenship that he or she was a U.S. citizen, then such an individual is not 
inadmissible.551 
 
11. International Child Abductors. 
 
If a U.S. court grants to any person custody of a U.S. citizen who is a “child” and 
a non-citizen takes or withholds such a child outside of the U.S. in violation of 
such custody order, the non-citizen is inadmissible to the U.S. until such time as 
the child is returned to the custodial parent.552  This ground of inadmissibility 
does not apply if the child is located in a country that is a signatory to the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.553  This 
ground of inadmissibility also applies to those who are spouses, children, parents, 
siblings or agents of non-citizens who abduct children in violation of the 
statute.554 
 
12. Aggravated Felons. 
 
“Aggravated felonies” are crimes defined in INA § 101(a)(43)555 and are 
discussed more fully in this Guide in the context of deportation.556  They are  
 
 
550  INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i). 
551  INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II). 
552  INA § 212(a)(10)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(C). 
553  INA § 212(a)(10)(C)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(C)(iii). 
554  INA § 212(a)(10)(C)(ii)(III), 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(10)(C)(ii)(III). 
555  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
556  See section V.D.6., infra. 
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discussed briefly here, however, because of the ramifications they have on the 
issue of applying for admission to the U.S. 
 
Conviction of an aggravated felony is not a ground of inadmissibility as such, but 
it does have admissibility implications.  INA § 212(a)(9)(ii)557 provides that an 
individual convicted of an aggravated felony is permanently barred from applying 
for admission to the U.S. if she or he has been ordered removed under INA § 
240558 unless, prior to his or her attempting to re-enter the U.S., she or he has 
received permission from the U.S. Attorney General to apply for admission. 
 
This provision raises several fine points of immigration law.  First, simple 
conviction of an aggravated felony does not carry with it the § 212(a)(9)(ii) bar -- 
that only arises if, subsequent to being convicted of an aggravated felony, a non-
citizen is ordered removed from the U.S.  Of course, anyone convicted of an 
aggravated felony will almost certainly be removed from the U.S., so this first 
point is almost purely hypothetical.  Second, a conviction of an aggravated 
felony, together with a subsequent order of removal, is what triggers the bar of  
§ 212(a)(9)(ii).  Thus, a person’s simply admitting commission of an aggravated 
felony will not, in and of itself, trigger the bar.559  Third, although conviction of 
an aggravated felony technically does not make a non-citizen inadmissable, such a 
person is not even allowed to apply for admission unless he or she has received 
advance approval to do so from the U.S. Attorney General.  As a practical matter, 
then, one convicted of an aggravated felony who is removed from the U.S. as a 
result is inadmissible unless he or she gets a stamp of approval from the Attorney 
General for permission to try to re-enter the country.  Of course, the Attorney 
General is unlikely to give such approval any time soon after conviction and 
removal.   
 
13. Miscellaneous Grounds of Inadmissibility. 
 
Other grounds of inadmissibility in the INA relate to espionage, sabotage and 
commercial interference,560 foreign policy considerations,561 membership in 
 
557  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(ii). 
558  8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 
559  Remember, however, that admitting to an aggravated felony may render a non-
citizen inadmissible under some other subsection of INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), 
depending on the type of crime the client admits to committing. 
560  INA § 212(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A). 
561  INA § 212(a)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C). 
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totalitarian parties,562 participation in Nazi persecution or general genocide,563 
alien smuggling,564 draft evaders,565 aliens previously removed,566 unlawfully 
present,567 or unlawfully present after previous immigration violations,568 
polygamy,569 and unlawful voting.570  Because Nebraska practitioners are 
unlikely to encounter these grounds with any frequency, they are not discussed in 
any detail here.  However, if you have a non-citizen who is charged with an 
offense that may trigger one of these grounds of inadmissibility, you should 
investigate the inadmissibility provisions relating to such charges. 
 
D. Grounds of Deportability. 
 
Section 237 of the INA571 describes the categories of non-citizens who are subject to 
being deported from the U.S.  As with the categories of non-citizens who are 
inadmissible, there are several grounds of deportability not related to criminal convictions 
or activity.  However, those grounds will not be discussed in this Guide. 
 
As a reminder, “deportation” refers to proceedings to remove non-citizens from the U.S. 
who have already been admitted, as defined in INA § 101(a)(13).572  See the discussion 
of this point at section V.B.2., supra.  
 
1. General Considerations. 
 
You will notice that several of the grounds of inadmissibility, or at least the terms 
used, overlap with grounds of deportability.  The definition of the overlapping 
terms used (i.e., "conviction," "moral turpitude," etc.) are the same for purposes of 
 
562  INA § 212(a)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D). 
563  INA § 212(a)(3)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E). 
564  INA § 212(a)(6)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E). 
565  INA § 212(a)(8)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(8)(B). 
566  INA § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A). 
567  INA § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B). 
568  INA § 212(a)(9)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C). 
569  INA § 212(a)(10)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A). 
570  INA § 212(a)(9)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(D). 
571  8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
572  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). 
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both inadmissibility and deportability.  Although the criminal grounds of 
deportability under § 237(a)(2) of the INA overlap considerably with the criminal 
grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2), they are not identical.  Thus, it is 
important to read the statutes closely.  Some criminal grounds of deportability do 
not have a counterpart in criminal grounds of inadmissibility.573  And even those 
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability that relate to the same category of 
offense may have differences. 
 
As a reminder, your client should be concerned with grounds of deportability if he  
or she is in, and was “admitted” to, the United States.  To beat a dead horse one  
last time, clients who physically entered the U.S. without documents (“EWIs”) are 
not subject to grounds of deportability under § 237 of the INA since they were not 
“admitted” to the U.S.  Rather, if those clients face removal from the U.S., they 
will be dealing with one of the grounds of inadmissibility under § 212 of the 
INA574 discussed previously.   
 
2. Requirement of “Conviction.” 
 
Another point worth noting is that nearly all criminal grounds of deportability 
require that a “conviction” exist before they apply.575  This is not true for all 
criminal grounds of inadmissibility.576  The following sections contain a 
discussion of various issues relating to the requirement of a “conviction.” 
 
a. Definition of “Conviction.” 
 
Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA577 states that a "conviction" exists if a 
formal judgment of guilt has been entered by a court.578  The statute 
 
573  Two examples are the grounds of deportability for firearms offenses, found at INA   
§ 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), and domestic violence offenses, found at INA         
§ 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E), neither of which has an inadmissibility counterpart. 
574  8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
575  The two exceptions are the grounds of deportability relating to “drug abusers or 
addicts” and those who violate civil protection orders.  These grounds of deportability are 
discussed in sections V.D.7. and V.D.9., infra. 
576  Recall, for example, that the “crime of moral turpitude” ground of inadmissibility 
found at INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) applies even if a person admits having committed such an 
offense, or admits committing acts that constitute the essential elements of such an offense. 
577  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). 
578  The finding of guilt must be made beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Matter of 
Eslamizar, 23 I&N Dec. 684 (BIA 2004), holding that a defendant found guilty of a “violation” 
under Oregon law was not “convicted” of a criminal offense for immigration purposes because 
157 
further provides that a conviction exists even if adjudication of guilt has 
been withheld where (1) a factfinder has found the person guilty, the client 
has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or the person has admitted 
facts sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt and (2) the judge has ordered 
some form of punishment, penalty or restraint on the person's liberty to be 
imposed. 
 
It is useful to look at this definition in the context of various types of 
Nebraska criminal dispositions to determine whether or not a client has 
been “convicted” of a criminal offense for purposes of the INA. 
 
(1) Pretrial Diversion. 
 
A client who receives pretrial diversion under the provisions of 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3601 to 29-3609 has not been “convicted” of 
a criminal offense for immigration purposes because the first 
element of the test in INA § 101(a)(48)(A) has not been met –- no 
judge or jury has found the client guilty, the client has not entered 
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, nor has the client admitted 
facts sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt.579  As a result, any 
client who successfully completes pretrial diversion in Nebraska 
has not been “convicted” of a criminal offense for immigration 
purposes. 
 
(2) Deferral of Judgment, Adjudication or Sentencing. 
 
In 2019, the Nebraska Legislature adopted LB 686 which, among 
other things, allows a court to defer entry of a judgment of 
conviction under certain circumstances.580  However, for 
immigration purposes, a client whose judgment has been deferred 
 
under the statute one could be convicted of a violation under a “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard.  See also Rubio v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 344 (8th Cir. 2018), holding that convictions for 
violating Columbia, Missouri city ordinances are “convictions” for immigration purposes 
because the fundamental aspect of a criminal proceeding is whether guilt was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Because that was the burden of proof involved, convictions of municipal 
ordinances are “convictions” even though some tribunals consider ordinance violations to be 
“civil” rather than “criminal” in nature. 
579  See Matter of Grullon, 20 I&N Dec. 12 (BIA 1989), holding that no “conviction” 
occurred where the respondent qualified for a pretrial diversion program in Florida.  The Florida 
program, as described in Grullon, mirrors Nebraska’s in the sense that the client has not been 
found guilty of any offense, nor has he entered a plea of guilty at the time of entry into the 
pretrial diversion program. 
580  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2292. 
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under this statute has still been “convicted” of a crime for 
immigration purposes because (1) the court has made a finding of 
guilt and (2) ordered some form of punishment, penalty or restraint 
on the client’s liberty. 581 
 
Similarly, if a court finds a defendant guilty but then defers 
sentencing, or accepts a guilty plea from a defendant but then 
defers the adjudication of guilt while requiring the defendant to 
engage in some sort of activity such as community service, the 
client has been “convicted.”  This is because the client has been 
found guilty or has entered a plea of guilty and the court has 
ordered some form of punishment, penalty or restraint on the 
client’s liberty.  In fact, even a guilty plea coupled with the mere 
imposition of court costs, and no other penalty, satisfies the 
definition of “conviction.”582  For these reasons, depending on the 
exact contours of the process, a client who is involved in a 
Nebraska drug court program may have been “convicted” under 
the INA test if the client enters a plea of guilty and the court 
imposes a form of punishment, penalty or restraint on the client’s 





For the reasons articulated in the preceding section, a client who is 
sentenced to probation by a court has been “convicted” of 
a criminal offense because he has either been found guilty of a 
crime or has pled guilty and had some sort of punishment, penalty 
 
581  See, e.g., Matter of Punu 22 I&N Dec. 224 (BIA 1998).  In that case, the BIA 
considered a Texas statute that permitted the defendant to enter a guilty plea and allowed the 
court, once it had accepted such a plea, to withhold adjudication of guilt and (in the case at bar) 
place the defendant on probation.  The BIA held that the 1996 amendments to the INA that 
resulted in the current version of § 101(a)(48)(A) clearly showed Congress’ intent to treat such a 
situation as a “conviction” for immigration purposes. 
582  Matter of Cabrera, 24 I&N Dec. 459 (BIA 2008).  But see Guzman Gonzalez v. 
Sessions, 894 F3d 131 (4th Cir. 2018), holding that imposition of costs under North Carolina 
state law is not a “punishment or penalty” as those terms are used in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). 
583  The author has heard from some Nebraska practitioners that clients have been able to 
convince judges in a drug court setting to refrain from making them enter a guilty plea and then, 
once the drug court procedures are complete, dismiss the case.  If that is possible, then the client 
has not been “convicted” for immigration purposes because the first prong of the statutory test 
under the INA has not been satisfied.  But if the court requires entry of a guilty plea, and then 
allows the client to participate in drug court, that is a “conviction” for immigration purposes. 
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or restraint on liberty imposed by virtue of being put on 
probation.584 
 
(4) Juvenile Adjudications. 
 
A juvenile delinquency adjudication in a juvenile case is not a 
“conviction” for purposes of the INA.585 
 
(5) Forum of Convictions. 
 
(a) Federal vs. State Convictions. 
 
Unless otherwise set forth in a specific provision of the 
INA, it does not matter whether a person is convicted of a 
state crime or a federal crime -- so long as the crime fits the 
categorical definition of a crime described in § 212 or     
§ 237 of the INA, the conviction will make the person 
inadmissible or deportable.  In addition, a person may be 
inadmissible or deportable as the result of conviction in a 
tribal or municipal court.586 
 
(b) Foreign Convictions. 
 
In most cases, foreign convictions will also qualify as 
"convictions" under the provisions of the INA.  In order to 
qualify as a “conviction,” the foreign crime must, inter alia, 





584  See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2246(4), defining “probation” as a sentence under which a 
person found guilty of a crime upon verdict or plea is released by a court subject to conditions 
imposed by the court and subject to supervision. 
585  Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000). 
586  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), relating to domestic 
violence convictions. 
587  See, e.g., Matter of De La Nues, 18 I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 1981) (holding that conduct 
underlying a foreign conviction that would be merely a juvenile offense under U.S. standards 
does not qualify as a “conviction” for immigration purposes); and Matter of McNaughton, 16 
I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 1978), aff'd, 612 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that a securities fraud 
conviction under British law is substantially similar to conduct that would be criminal under U.S. 
law, and is therefore a “conviction” for immigration purposes). 
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(6) Finality of Conviction. 
 
Historically, a conviction must also be "final" in order for it to 
qualify as a "conviction" under the INA.588  This means, 
generally, that the client must have exhausted all direct appeals 
available to him or her as a matter of right, or have waived such 
appeals.589  The BIA has ruled on this issue, holding that the 
finality requirement survived the adoption of IIRIRA.590 
 
b. Post Conviction Proceedings and Their Effect on Whether a 
Person has been “Convicted.” 
 
(1) Statutory Set-Aside Under § 29-2264. 
 
Under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2264(2), a person 
convicted of certain criminal offenses may, under specified 
circumstances, request that the sentencing court set aside the 
conviction.  If the court grants such a request, its order 
rehabilitates the defendant in a number of ways, including 
nullifying the conviction, and removing all civil disabilities 
imposed as a result of the conviction.591 
 
Nevertheless, a beneficiary of this statutory scheme has still been 
“convicted” of a criminal offense for immigration purposes, and 
the set-aside granted by a court does not change that fact.592 
 
588  See, e.g., Smith v. Gonzalez, 468 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2006); Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N 
Dec. 546 (BIA 1988); Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955).  But see Abiodun v. Gonzales, 461 
F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2006), Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004) and 
Griffiths v. I.N.S., 171 F.3d 994, 1008-1010 (5th Cir. 1999), (holding that the amendments to the 
statute made by IIRIRA eliminated the requirement that a conviction be “final” in order to render 
one deportable). 
589  Pino, 349 U.S. 901. See also Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971). 
590  Matter of J.M. Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. 420 (BIA 2018). 
591  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2264(5). 
592  See, e.g., Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512 (1999); Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N 
Dec. 621 (BIA 2003).  In Roldan, the BIA held that if a court vacates a defendant’s conviction 
for reasons related to post conviction rehabilitation, such a conviction still exists for purposes of  
§ 101(a)(48)(A).  In Pickering, the government alleged, and the BIA concluded, that the 
criminal court in which the defendant had been convicted set aside the conviction in order to 
avoid negative immigration consequences.  The Sixth Circuit reversed the BIA’s decision 
affirming the Immigration Judge’s order of deportation, however, because it held that the 
government had not proven, by clear and convincing evidence, the reasons why the criminal 
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(2) Statutory Vacatur under § 29-1819.02. 
 
This statute allows a criminal defendant to request a vacatur of a 
conviction in the event that the defendant was not given the 
advisement required by the statute at the time of entering a guilty 
or nolo contendere plea.  The purpose of the advisement is to 
inform the defendant that, if he is not a United States citizen, he 
may face immigration consequences as the result of a guilty plea.  
In the event that the advisement is not given, the court, upon the 
defendant’s request, must vacate the conviction and allow the 
defendant to enter a plea of not guilty.593 
 
In such circumstances, vacatur of the conviction is due to 
deficiencies in the underlying proceedings, and not because of post 
conviction rehabilitation, and therefore such a vacatur eliminates 
the conviction for immigration purposes.594  
 
(3) Padilla Post Conviction Proceedings. 
 
So-called Padilla post conviction proceedings attack the 
 
court had vacated the conviction. Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006).  
However, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the BIA’s general holding that, if the government had 
proven its allegations, a “conviction” would have still existed under the INA test. 
But the Eighth Circuit does not agree with the Sixth Circuit’s burden of proof analysis.  
Andrade-Zamora v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2016).  In that case, the Eighth Circuit held 
that, in the context of a cancellation of removal case, the non-citizen bears the burden of proof to 
show why a state court vacated his conviction, and if he presents no evidence showing that the 
conviction was vacated due to a substantive or procedural defect, he has not carried his burden of 
proof to show that the conviction was not vacated for a Pickering-type purpose.  Curiously, the 
Eighth Circuit does not discuss or cite the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pickering in arriving at its 
holding. 
In 2018, the BIA reaffirmed its approach in Pickering, and indicated it would apply Pickering’s 
reasoning on a nation-wide basis.  Matter of Conde, 27 I&N Dec. 251 (BIA 2018).  The import 
of this decision is that if a conviction is vacated for an underlying procedural or substantive 
defect, it is no longer a “conviction” for purposes of the § 101(a)(48) analysis. 
593  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02(2).  See the earlier detailed discussion of Nebraska 
cases interpreting this provision in section I.D.2.b.(2), supra. 
594  See, e.g., Matter of Adamiak, 23 I&N Dec. 878 (BIA 2006), holding that vacatur of a 
conviction under an Ohio statute that is similar to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1829.02 nullifies the 
conviction for immigration purposes. 
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underlying validity of convictions due to non-compliance by 
counsel with the duty, under the Sixth Amendment, to advise 
defendants of immigration consequences of guilty pleas.  If a 
conviction is vacated pursuant to such a proceeding, it is because 
of an underlying legal defect in the original criminal proceedings, 
and, as a result, no “conviction” would exist under the principles 




Although pardons do not negate “convictions,” they may help 
avoid removal in certain cases, such as deportability for CIMTs, 
aggravated felonies, and high-speed flights.595 
 
(5) Miscellaneous Considerations. 
 
The BIA has held that, under a New York statute authorizing late-
reinstatement of a direct appeal in a criminal case, a “conviction” 
still exists even if the state conviction is re-opened or is under 
collateral attack.596 
 
3. Relief from Removal. 
 
Unlike grounds of inadmissibility, there are no “waivers” available to clients who 
face removal under § 237 of the INA.  Instead, the parallel concept that allows a 
client to avoid deportation is called “relief from removal,” which can be thought 
of as in the nature of an affirmative defense.  Some clients may have available to 
them various forms of relief from removal which, if successfully asserted, will 
prevent the clients from being deported.  Examples of such forms of relief could 
include asylum claims,597 withholding of removal claims,598 cancellation of 
removal claims,599 and so forth.  While a complete consideration of all potential 
forms of relief from removal is beyond the scope of this Guide, the important 
concept to remember is that some clients may have the ability to avoid 
 
595  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v). 
596  Matter of Cardenas-Abreu, 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009). The Second Circuit 
reversed Abreu, however, and so the holding is not good law in that circuit.  Abreu v. Holder, 
378 F. App’x 59 (2d Cir. May 24, 2010). 
597  INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158. 
598  INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
599  INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (for certain permanent residents) and INA      
§ 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (for certain non-permanent residents). 
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deportation despite being convicted of certain crimes.  Such relief from removal 
will have to be sought before an Immigration Court if the clients are placed in 
removal proceedings. 
 
4. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude. 
 
One who is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is deportable if (1) the 
conviction occurred within five years of the date of the person's last admission to 
the U.S. and (2) the crime of which the person is convicted carries a possible 
sentence of one year or longer.600  If the person became a lawful permanent 
resident under § 245(j) of the INA601 because he or she was a qualified informant, 
then she or he is deportable if convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude 
within 10 years of his or her last entry into the U.S.  Substantively, the definition 
of “moral turpitude” for purposes of deportability is the same as it is for purposes 
of inadmissibility.602 
 
It is important to note that conviction of an attempt or conspiracy to commit a 
crime involving moral turpitude, although perhaps carrying less severe 
consequences in the criminal law context,603 makes no difference in the 
immigration context.  One who is convicted of an attempted crime involving 
moral turpitude faces exactly the same immigration consequences as he or she 
would had he or she been convicted of the underlying substantive offense.604 
 
a. Conviction Within Five Years of Last Admission. 
 
The BIA has held that, in order for this ground of deportability to apply, 
the crime involving moral turpitude must have been committed within five 
years of the date of the admission by virtue of which a person was then 
 
600  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
601  8 U.S.C. § 1255(j). 
602  See section V.C.3., supra. 
603  See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-201. 
604  See, e.g., Matter of McNaughton, 16 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 1978).  There is some 
disagreement as to whether a person has the required mental state to commit a crime of moral 
turpitude if he or she only needs to act recklessly in order to be convicted.  Some courts have 
held that it is “legally incoherent” for a person to attempt to act recklessly.  Gill v. I.N.S, 420 
F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2005); Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004).  In this type of 
circumstance, being convicted of an attempt, as opposed to the underlying substantive offense, 
would benefit the client in terms of immigration consequences. 
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present in the United States.605  The facts of the case illustrate the rule.  
Mr. Alyazji was admitted to the United States as a non-immigrant in 2001.  
In 2006 he adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident 
(“green card holder”).  In 2008, he was convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude.  The question the BIA had to decide was whether Mr. 
Alyazji’s adjustment of status counted as an “admission,” which re-started 
the five-year clock, and therefore made him deportable, or whether the 
adjustment of status was not such an admission. 
 
The BIA held that the most faithful reading of the statute is that an 
“admission” for purposes of the five-year rule is an admission by which 
the person actually is physically admitted to the United States.  So, 
although adjustment of status is clearly an “admission” in the sense that 
one must demonstrate he or she is admissible (or, to say it another way, 
not inadmissible) at the time of adjustment of status, it is not an 
“admission” for purposes of the five-year rule in the deportation statute.  
As a result, Mr. Alyazji was not deportable, because he committed the 
CIMT in 2008, which was more than five years after his physical 
admission into the U.S. in 2001. 
 
It is important to understand that the five- or ten-year dates referred to in 
the statute begin from the date of the person's last physical admission to 
the U.S., regardless of how long the person has been living here.  
Suppose, for example, your client is a Grecian national lawful permanent 
resident who has been living in the U.S. for 50 years.  She or he decides 
to visit her or his family in Greece in 2021 and returns to the States on 
December 3, 2021, after a three-week visit to Greece.  If she or he is 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude that carries a maximum 
possible penalty of one year or longer at any time before June 3, 2026, he 
or she will be deportable under this provision. 
 
b. Length of Maximum Possible Sentence. 
 
Another important point is that a conviction of certain misdemeanors will 
render a non-citizen deportable under this provision.  Because the statute 
speaks of crimes that carry possible sentences of one year or longer, this 
includes crimes for which the maximum possible sentence is exactly one 
year.  In Nebraska, this would include Class I misdemeanors if the 
underlying crime involves "moral turpitude."  So even a single 






605  Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 2011). 
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5. Multiple Criminal Convictions. 
 
This ground of deportability applies when a client is at any time after admission 
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a 
single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless if the client was confined as a 
result of such convictions and regardless of whether the convictions arose out of a 
single trial.606 
 
As you can see, this ground of deportability differs from its cousin ground of 
inadmissibility607 in several ways: 
 
(1) The crimes under the deportability statute must be crimes involving moral 
turpitude, whereas the inadmissibility offenses need not involve moral 
turpitude. 
 
(2) The crimes under the deportability statute must not arise out of a single 
scheme of criminal conduct, whereas the inadmissibility ground would 
apply even if the multiple convictions arise out of the same scheme of 
criminal misconduct. 
 
(3) There is no minimum length of sentence or confinement required for the 
second or subsequent convictions to trigger the ground of deportability, 
whereas under the inadmissibility statute, the aggregate sentences to 
confinement imposed for the offenses must be at least five years. 
 
6. Aggravated Felonies. 
 
Appropriately named, this is one of the more aggravating provisions in the entire 
INA.  Generally, it provides that one convicted of an "aggravated felony" at any 
time after admission is deportable.608 
 
 
606  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  The BIA has held that a 
defendant who was convicted in two counties of forgery and possession of stolen property based 
on his use of multiple stolen credit or debit cards to obtain items of value from several retail 
outlets on five separate occasions over the course of a day was convicted of crimes not arising 
out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.  Matter of Islam, 25 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 2011). 
607  INA § 212(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B). 
608  INA § 237 (a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  This is often the least of an 
immigration client’s worry, however.  A client who has been convicted of an aggravated felony 
is barred from seeking a whole host of immigration benefits or forms of relief from removal for 
which she or he might be eligible in the absence of an aggravated felony conviction. 
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The definition of "aggravated felony" is found in § 101(a)(43) of the INA.609  
This term first made its appearance as a result of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988610 and has expanded dramatically since then.  A great deal of federal 
legislation enacted since 1988 that has dealt with deportation has added to the list 
of crimes included in the definition of "aggravated felony."  A discussion of all 
of the provisions of the aggravated felony definition is well beyond the scope of 
this Guide, since analyses of what crimes constitute aggravated felonies literally 
fill books.  Following are highlights of some of the more frequently-encountered 
subdivisions of the statute.  Counsel are invited to consult the analyses of 
individual Nebraska criminal statutes charts, and are cautioned to look closely at 
the entire aggravated felony statute when assessing a criminal case. 
 
a. Murder, Rape or Sexual Abuse of a Minor. 
 
The “murder” part of this statute611 is one of the original provisions of the 
aggravated felony statute.  By its terms, “murder” includes all levels of 
crimes classified as “murder,” but would not include such crimes as 
manslaughter.612 
 
The provisions regarding rape and sexual abuse of a minor were added by 
IIRIRA in 1996 and, due to the fact that the terms are not defined in the 
statute, have frequently been the subject of litigation. 
 
Because the statute does not define “rape,” courts have been left to 
determine what Congress meant by that term.  Most current criminal 
statutes do not use the term “rape.”  Instead, they use the term “sexual 
assault.”  Courts are therefore left to struggle with whether “rape” always 
is “sexual assault” under applicable state statutory schemes.  “Statutory 
 
609  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
610  Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, Nov. 18, 1988. 
611  INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). 
612  Probably.  The BIA, in Matter of N-W-, 25 I&N Dec. 748 (BIA 2012) calls this 
statement into question.  The respondent in M-W-, while driving under the influence of alcohol, 
rear-ended a car, killing the occupants on impact.  He was charged with second degree murder 
under a Michigan statute.  The BIA held that one convicted of murder in violation of a statute 
requiring only a showing of extreme recklessness or a “malignant heart” has been convicted of 
“murder” for purposes of the aggravated felony statute even in a case where the defendant was 
voluntarily intoxicated and no intent to kill was established.  If the BIA really means what it 
says in this opinion, it dramatically expanded the definition of “murder” for aggravated felony 
purposes. 
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rape” is likely “rape” for purposes of the aggravated felony statute,613 
although in light of the Supreme Court’s re-emphasis on the categorical 
approach as articulated in Descamps, this may be an open question.  In 
Castro-Baez v. Reno,614 the Ninth Circuit held that sexual assault 
committed by drugging the victim constituted “rape” as defined by the 
aggravated felony statute.615  But, again, given the emphasis of following 
the federal “generic” definition of an offense set forth in Descamps, this 
interpretation may be open to challenge.  Other questions also arise with 
regard to what constitutes “rape.”  In a non-precedent decision, the BIA 
held that sexual contact without penetration is not “rape” for purposes of 
the aggravated felony statute.616  And, more recently, the BIA held that 
“rape” means vaginal, anal or oral intercourse, or digital or mechanical 
penetration, no matter how slight.617 
 
“Sexual abuse of a minor” is defined very broadly by the BIA.618  
Although the BIA has defined “minor” to include any victim of sexual 
 
613  See, e.g., Silva v. Gonzalez, 455 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2006). 
614  217 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000). 
615  The defendant argued that the California statute under which he was convicted was 
not coterminous with the federal sexual assault statutory definitions, and therefore did not 
constitute “rape.”  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that it had to define the term by 
employing the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of that word and then determine 
whether or not the conduct prohibited by the California statute fell within that definition.  Id. at 
1059. 
616  Matter of Gutierrez-Martinez, 2004 WL 880256 (BIA 2004) (unpublished). 
617  Matter of Keeley, 27 I&N Dec. 146 (BIA 2017). 
618  See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I&N Dec. 991 (BIA 1999), holding that 
a respondent convicted of indecent exposure to a minor in the minor’s presence for the purposes 
of sexual gratification had been convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor” for purposes of the 
aggravated felony statute.  However, the Ninth Circuit has held that conviction of indecent 
conduct in the presence of a minor under an Arizona statute was not “sexual abuse of a minor” 
because the statute neither required that the minor be touched or even be aware of the 
defendant’s conduct.  Rebilas v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2007).  The defendant was 
convicted of public indecency to a minor by, “in the presence of a minor, intentionally or 
knowingly engaged in an act of sexual contact and was reckless about whether a minor under the 
age of fifteen years was present.” Id. at 1164.  In Matter of Guevara Alfaro, 25 I&N Dec. 417 
(BIA 2011), the BIA held that any intentional sexual conduct by an adult with a child involves 
moral turpitude, as long as the perpetrator knew or should have known that the victim was under 
the age of 16. 
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abuse under the age of 18,619 in Esquivel-Quintana,620 the Supreme Court 
held that consensual sexual intercourse between an adult and a person age 
16 or over is not “sexual abuse of a minor” under the aggravated felony 
definition.  However, if the crime of which one is convicted fits the 
categorical definition of “sexual abuse of a minor,” even a state 
misdemeanor conviction for sexual abuse of a minor constitutes an 
aggravated felony under § 101(a)(43)(A).621 
 
As can be seen from this very brief discussion, this is a very complex area 
of law.  Practitioners are invited to consult the analyses of individual 
Nebraska criminal statutes at the end of this Guide for a more detailed 
consideration of how various Nebraska statutes would be interpreted.  
 
b. Drug Trafficking. 
 
Section 101(a)(43)(B) of the INA622 states that “illicit trafficking in a 
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled 
Substances Act), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 
24(c) of title 18, United States Code),” is an aggravated felony.  Thus, a 
drug offense can be an aggravated felony in two ways: (1) it constitutes 
“illicit trafficking” or (2) it is statutorily defined in the federal Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) as a “drug trafficking crime.” 
 
The first way in which an offense can be a “drug trafficking” offense is if 
the defendant is convicted of an offense that involves unlawful trading or 
dealing for profit in a drug classified as a “controlled substance” under the 
CSA.623  This would include offenses whose elements involve sale of a 
controlled substance or possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver. 
 
619  Matter of V-F-D, 23 I&N Dec. 859 (BIA 2006). 
620  137 S. Ct. 1562, 198 L. Ed. 2d 22 (2017). 
621  Matter of Small, 23 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2002).  See also Garcia-Urbano v. 
Sessions, 890 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2018), holding that violation of a Minnesota statute 
criminalizing even consensual sexual intercourse between a defendant who was age 18 and his 
victim who was age 15 constituted aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor.) 
622  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
623  21 U.S.C. § 802, et seq.  See, e.g., Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536, 541 (BIA 
1992).  If a drug offense does not include an element of dealing or delivery, but instead requires 
only an offer to sell, it is not a “trafficking” offense.  See, e.g., Matter of Garcia-Torres, A45 
864 724 (BIA October 19, 2006), (unpublished); Davila v. Holder, 381 F. App’x 413 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
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The second way in which a drug offense can be a “trafficking” offense is 
if it is defined as a “drug trafficking crime” in the CSA.  Until 2006, 
many individuals faced deportation as “aggravated felons” if they were 
convicted of simple drug possession offenses that were classified as 
felonies under applicable state law, since the BIA held that an offense 
could be an aggravated felony if it was classified as a felony under either 
state or federal law.624  In 2006, the United States Supreme Court had 
occasion to interpret this portion of the statute in Lopez v. Gonzalez.625  In 
Lopez, the Court held that, in order to be an aggravated felony under       
§ 101(a)(43)(B), a drug trafficking offense must meet the federal 
definition of “felony” –- a state drug offense, even if classified as a felony 
under applicable state law, does not constitute an aggravated felony under 
§ 101(a)(43)(B) unless the state offense would qualify as a “trafficking” 
offense under the federal definition in the CSA.  This decision resolved a 
split in the circuits, some of which had held that drug trafficking offenses 
that were merely misdemeanors under federal law, but felonies under state 
law, qualified as “aggravated felonies” under § 101(a)(43)(B).  In the 
wake of Lopez, a drug trafficking offense must be a felony under the 
federal definition in order to constitute an aggravated felony.626  
Recognize, however, that under the CSA, one type of simple possession 
offense is considered to be a felony “trafficking” offense: simple 
possession of flunitrazepam.627 
 
One of the issues left open by the Lopez decision was whether a second or 
subsequent state drug offense for simple possession could be considered to 
be an aggravated felony.  The issue arose because, under federal law, 
simple possession of a controlled substance after a prior final conviction 
for drug possession is a felony.628  This is sometimes referred to as the 
federal “recidivist possession” felony provision.  In 2010, the Supreme 
Court held that second or subsequent simple possession offenses are not 
 
624  Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (BIA 2002). 
625  549 U.S. 47 (2006). 
626  The defendant in Lopez was convicted of helping someone else possess cocaine in 
South Dakota.  South Dakota state law treated such conduct as the equivalent of possessing 
cocaine, which was a felony offense under state law.  Mere possession of cocaine is not a felony 
under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 844(a)), however. 
627  21 U.S.C. § 844(a).  Prior to 2010, simple possession of crack cocaine was also a 
drug trafficking offense, but the statute was amended by § 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-220, (August 3, 2010), to omit any reference to crack cocaine. 
628  Id. 
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aggravated felony offenses under INA § 101(a)(43)629 unless the state 
conviction is based on the fact of a prior conviction.630  In other words, in 
order for a defendant to be a recidivist “drug trafficker,” he or she must 
either admit his or her status or a judge or jury must determine that the 
defendant is a recidivist.  A simple subsequent conviction of a drug 
possession offense, without more, will not suffice. 
 
The Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, has held that a defendant 
who pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana, but whose sentence 
was enhanced on the basis of a prior conviction for delivery of cocaine, 
was guilty of a drug trafficking offense due to the enhancement provision, 
which made the defendant a drug trafficker under the recidivist provision 
of the Controlled Substances Act.631  This seems like quite a stretch, and 
there do not appear to be any other holdings finding that a simple 
possession offense is a drug trafficking offense based only on the fact of 
the sentence being enhanced for a prior conviction. 
 
As discussed earlier,632 the Supreme Court has ruled that one convicted 
under a Georgia statute of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute 
was not convicted of an aggravated felony trafficking offense where he 
distributed a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration.633 
 
c. Firearms Trafficking. 
 
INA § 101(a)(43)(C)634 states that “illicit trafficking in firearms or 
destructive devices (as defined in section 921 of title 18, United States 
Code) or in explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title)” 
is an aggravated felony.  This is a fairly straightforward provision and, 
unlike drug trafficking crimes, here, “trafficking” is used in the ordinary 






629  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
630  Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010). 
631  Okon v. Holder, No. 10-60347, 2011 WL 1773514 (5th Cir. May 10, 2011). 
632  See section V.C.3.b., supra. 
633  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013). 
634  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C). 
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devices,” or “explosive materials” as those terms are defined in the 
applicable statutes.635 
 
d. Firearms Offenses. 
 
INA § 101(a)(43)(E)(ii)636 provides that conviction of any offense 
“described in” certain sections of the U.S. criminal code relating to 
firearms are aggravated felonies.  It is important, in analyzing any state 
criminal offenses, to make certain that you match the elements of the state 
offense with the crimes described in the federal statutes listed in INA § 
101(a)(43)(E)(ii).  Consult the statutory analysis charts for analysis of 
how individual Nebraska firearms offenses match the federal statutes.  
One important fact to note is that the United States Supreme Court has 
held that a state firearms offense can be an aggravated felony firearms 
offense if it is otherwise described in the applicable federal statutes even 
though the state offense does not contain an interstate commerce 
element.637 
 
e. Crimes of Violence. 
 
INA § 101(a)(43)(F)638 makes a "crime of violence" an aggravated felony 
if the term of imprisonment imposed by a court for such crime is at least 
one year.  "Crime of violence" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 as "(a) an 
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other 
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used 
in the course of committing the offense."  However, in 2018 the 
Supreme Court declared subsection (b) to be unconstitutionally vague 
(see discussion below).  That subsection can no longer be used to describe 
an aggravated felony crime of violence. 
 
Subsection (a) describes an offense that has, as an element, the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another.  A typical example of such an offense is first degree 
sexual assault, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319.  Conviction under this statute 
requires proof of, inter alia, sexual penetration.  That constitutes the use 
 
635  INA § 101(a)(43)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E), also describes offenses that relate 
to firearms and explosive devices and makes them aggravated felonies. 
636  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii). 
637  Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 194 L. Ed. 2d 737 (2016). 
638  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). 
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of physical force against the person of another and, therefore, fits the 
definition of “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).639 
It is worth looking briefly at a few noteworthy decisions interpreting this 
statute. 
 
(1) Leocal v. Ashcroft.640 
 
In Leocal v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that a client 
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and causing 
serious bodily injury was not convicted of an aggravated felony 
because, under the Florida statute at issue in that case, a showing 
of mere negligence was necessary in order to sustain a conviction.  
Because there was no mens rea requirement to convict under the 
Florida statute, the Supreme Court held that the offense was not a 
“crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and therefore not an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).641  The Court 
had no trouble holding that conviction under such a statute did not 
satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), because the Court 
interpreted “use” as requiring “active employment,” something not 
present in a statute where mere negligent conduct will sustain a 
conviction.  
 
(2)  Matter of Sanudo.642    
 
In Matter of Sanudo, the BIA held that conviction for domestic 
battery in violation of §§ 242 and 243(e) of the California Penal 
Code did not constitute a “crime of violence” because the statutes 
criminalize “willful and unlawful use of force or violence” against 
 
639  In other illustrative examples, the Eighth Circuit has held that pointing a gun at 
another person is categorically a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 16(a) because it involves the 
threatened use of physical force against another person (Reyes-Soto v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 369 (8th 
Cir. 2015)), and the BIA has held that a conviction for an aggravated felony under a Puerto Rico 
statute that does not require the use of violent physical force is not categorically a crime of 
violence under this same statutory provision (Matter of Guzman-Polanco, 26 I&N Dec. 713 
(BIA 2016). 
640  543 U.S. 1 (2004). 
641  Until recently, there was some question as to whether Leocal could also be read to 
stand for the proposition that reckless behavior is not sufficient to meet the definition of “crime 
of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16.  That was settled by the Supreme Court in Borden v. United 
States, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2021 WL 2367312 (June 10, 2021), holding that reckless behavior is not 
sufficient to meet the “crime of violence” definition. 
642  23 I&N Dec. 968 (BIA 2006). 
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another.  This language, the BIA held, was so broad that it could 
include conduct that was not “violent” in the sense intended by      
18 U.S.C. § 16, and therefore did not meet the definition of “crime 
of violence” necessary to turn the conviction into an aggravated 
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F). 
 
(3) Johnson v. United States (Johnson I).643 
 
Although not an immigration case, Johnson v. United States agreed 
in general with the BIA’s reasoning in Sanudo.  In Johnson, the 
defendant was convicted of knowingly possessing ammunition 
after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1).  The government sought prosecution enhancement 
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which provides that a person who has 3 
previous convictions for a “violent” felony must be imprisoned for 
a minimum of 15 years.  The term “violent felony” is defined in 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) in a very similar way to “crime of 
violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16. 
 
One of the Florida statutes under which the defendant in Johnson 
was convicted allowed conviction for actually and intentionally 
touching or striking another person against that person’s will or 
intentionally causing bodily harm to another.644  The Supreme 
Court held that, for purposes of a “violent felony,” there must be 
“violent” force involved; i.e., force capable of causing physical 
pain or injury to another.645  And the Court specifically drew a 
comparison between the definition of “violent felony” in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and the definition of “crime of violence” in        
18 U.S.C. § 16(a).646  As a result, it appears that any assaultive 
offense that does not involve physical force sufficient to cause pain 
or injury to another cannot be a “crime of violence” for purposes of 
18 U.S.C. § 16(a). 
 
(4) Johnson v. United States (Johnson II).647 
 
One of the more momentous cases decided in this area was the 
 
643  559 U.S. 133 (2010). 
644  Id. at 136. 
645  Id. at 140-141. 
646  Id. 
647  576 U.S. 591 (2015). 
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2015 Supreme Court opinion in Johnson v. U.S (not to be confused 
with the 2010 Johnson v. United States opinion by the Supreme 
Court).  The 2015 case is important not only because of the 
holding in the case but also because of what it portends for the 
future of the “crime of violence” analysis in an immigration 
context.  Johnson involved a defendant who had a long criminal 
history.  He was prosecuted for the federal offense of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm.  The government sought to 
enhance his sentence under the provisions of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (ACCA) due to, among other things, his previous 
conviction under Minnesota law of possessing a short-barreled 
shotgun.  The government sought to enhance Johnson’s sentence 
under the so-called “residual clause” of the ACCA.648  The 
Supreme Court held that the residual clause violates the Due 
Process Clause because it is void for vagueness.  The Court found 
two major problems with the residual clause: (1) it requires a judge 
to imagine the “ordinary case” offense, regardless of what the 
actual facts are of the case, and (2) it fails to define how much risk 
is necessary to qualify a crime as a violent felony.649  In holding 
the residual clause to be an unconstitutionally vague statute, the 
Supreme Court overruled 4 of its prior decisions that mandated the 
use of the “ordinary case” approach to determining whether the 
residual clause applied.650 
 
(5) Voisine v. United States.651 
 
In 2016, the Supreme Court decided a case that, at first blush, 
seemed to stand for the proposition that a mens rea of recklessness 
is sufficient to constitute a crime of violence under the aggravated 
felony statute.  But that interpretation turned out not to be 
correct.652  In Voisine v. United States, the Court held that a 
 
648  That provision is found at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), and defines a “violent felony” 
as one that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.” 
649  Id. at 597. 
650  The cases overruled by Johnson are James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007); 
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); 
and Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011).  
651  136 S. Ct. 2272, 195 L. Ed. 2d 736 (2016). 
652   See Borden, supra., specifically recognizing that the holding in Voisine was 
statutory-specific, and does not control the more generic analysis of whether reckless behavior is 
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reckless domestic assault qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922 
(g)(9).  The Court reasoned that the language in the statute653 
includes not only knowing or intentional acts,654 but also those 
committed recklessly. 
 
(6) Sessions v. Dimaya.655 
 
In Dimaya, the Supreme Court finished the work it began in 
Johnson II, supra., and held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is also 
unconstitutionally vague.  After the Johnson opinion held that the 
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was 
unconstitutionally vague, Mr. Dimaya mounted a challenge to the 
constitutionality of subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 16, given the 
similarity in language between the two statutes.656  The Supreme 
Court, without much discussion, held that, for the same reasons it 
articulated in Johnson in holding the ACCA residual clause 
unconstitutional, subsection (b) was also unconstitutionally vague. 
 
(7) Stokeling v. United States.657 
 
In a bit of a surprise holding, the Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 
 
a sufficient mens rea to constitute a crime of violence.  Borden, supra., ___ S.Ct. at ___, 2021 
WL 2367312 at 5. 
653  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), which defines a “misdemeanor domestic violence 
offense” as one that “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the 
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian 
of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is 
cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person 
similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.” 
654  The Court has held that knowing and intentional acts violate the statute.  United 
States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014). 
655 138 S. Ct. 1204, 200 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2018). 
656  Compare the language of the two statutes.  The residual clause of the ACCA defines 
a “violent felony” as, inter alia, a federal felony offense that “otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(3)(2)(B)(ii).  
Subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 16 defines a “crime of violence” as “any other offense that is a 
felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or 
property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 
657  139 S. Ct. 544, 202 L. Ed. 2d 512 (2019). 
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decision, that a conviction of violation of the Florida robbery 
statute qualifies as a “violent felony” for purposes of the ACCA, 
because the physical force required under the ACCA, for purposes 
of analyzing state robbery convictions, only requires the force, 
however slight, necessary to overcome the victim’s resistance.  As 
an example, the Court held that, at common law, the force required 
to pull a diamond pin out of a woman’s hair constituted sufficient 
force to qualify as robbery.  And that type of force, the Court held, 
is sufficient to qualify a Florida robbery offense as an ACCA 
predicate “violent felony.” 
 
The Court noted that in Johnson II, supra., it had held that there 
must be greater force to qualify a battery as a “violent felony” for 
ACCA purposes.  But, the Court held, that is because the common 
law definition of battery, from which Congress borrowed in 
writing the ACCA, required force sufficient to cause pain to the 
victim.  Not so with respect to common law robbery. 
 
The dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor, wasn’t buying this 
distinction:658 
 
Starting today, however, the phrase “physical force” 
in § 924(e)(2)(B)(I) will apparently lead a Janus-
faced existence.  When it comes to battery, that 
phrase will look toward ordinary meaning; when it 
comes to robbery, that same piece of statutory text 
will look toward the common law.  To the extent 
that is a tenable construction, the majority has 
announced a brave new world of textual 
interpretation.659 
 
Nevertheless, five votes are more than four, so for purposes of 
analyzing robbery offenses for ACCA purposes, even a slight force 
is enough to qualify as sufficient force to constitute a “violent 
felony.”  As Justice Sotomayor points out, the result will be 






658  The voting split on this case was interesting.  Justice Thomas wrote the majority 
opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined.  Chief Justice Roberts, 
along with Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, joined Justice Sotomayor in the dissent. 
659  Id. at 560. 
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f. Theft Offenses. 
 
INA § 101(a)(43)(G)660 states that a “theft offense,” including receipt of 
stolen property, or a “burglary” offense is an aggravated felony if the 
client is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one year. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the definitions of the terms 
“theft” and “burglary” must be uniform, and must not depend on the 
definitions given those terms by various states.661  In Taylor, the Supreme 
Court adopted a “generic, contemporary” meaning of burglary (i.e., the 
definition that is now used in most states’ criminal codes).662  The Court 
held, “Although the exact formulations vary, the generic, contemporary 
meaning of burglary contains at least the following elements: an unlawful 
or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, 
with intent to commit a crime.”663 
 
In Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez,664 the Supreme Court held that aiding and 
abetting is included in the generic definition of “theft,” which it defined as 
“taking of property or an exercise of control over property without consent 
with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of 
ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.”665 
 
The BIA has held that a respondent who was convicted of unlawful 
driving and taking a vehicle in violation of California law was convicted 
of a “theft offense.”666  The Eighth Circuit has held that one who violates 
Iowa’s identity theft statute has committed a “theft offense.”667 
 
The Supreme Court has held that, in order to be guilty of aggravated 
identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), a defendant must know that  
 
 
660  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). 
661  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
662  Id. at 598. 
663  Id.  In a later decision, the BIA held, applying this definition, that burglary of a 
vehicle under Texas law is not a “burglary offense” under the aggravated felony definition, 
because a structure was not involved.  Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 1325 (BIA 2000). 
664  549 U.S. 183 (2007). 
665  Id. at 189.  
666  Matter of V-Z-S, 22 I&N Dec. 1338 (BIA 2000). 
667  United States v. Mejia-Barba, 327 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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the “means of identification” she or he unlawfully transferred, possessed, 
or used did, in fact, belong to another person.668 
 
In an interesting case out of the Third Circuit, the Court held that where a 
theft offense also involves fraud and deceit, the requirements of both INA  
§ 101(a)(43)(G)669 and INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i)670 must be met in order 
for the offense to be an aggravated felony.671 
 
In United States v. Figueroa-Estrada,672 the Fifth Circuit held that 
conviction under a state statute that can be violated either by depriving the 
owner of his property or by “appropriating” the property is a divisible 
statute as to whether it is a theft offense, because the “appropriating” 
division of the statute does not fit the generic definition of “theft” adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Taylor, supra.  As a result, the Fifth Circuit used 
the modified categorical approach to determine which part of the statute 
the defendant violated.673  Under a strict categorical analysis required by 
Descamps, this approach is no longer viable, since the statute in question 
merely involves different means of committing the same offense, and not 
elements of separate crimes. 
 
In a 2016 opinion, the Fourth Circuit held that, using the categorical 
approach, an embezzlement is not a “theft” for purposes of this analysis 
because the generic definition of a “theft” involves taking another’s 
property without his or her consent, whereas at least the initial taking of  
 
 
668  Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009). 
669  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). 
670  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  This provision includes under the definition of an 
aggravated felony a fraud offense in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000. 
671  Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2004). 
672  416 F. App’x 377 (5th Cir. 2011). 
673  Although decided before Descamps, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis for determining 
whether the state statute was divisible would still be good, since the statute in question appears to 
contain different elements, and not merely list different means of committing the same crime: 
(1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to 
use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently: 
(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property. 
(b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the 
use of the property. 
Fla. Stat. § 812.014 (2004) (416 F. App’x. at 381). 
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property in an embezzlement is done with the consent of the owner, albeit 
the consent is obtained by fraud.674 
 
Again, practitioners are urged to consider carefully the statutes under 
which their clients are charged and to consult case law and other resources  
that will assist them in determining if this part of the aggravated felony 
statute will apply. 
 
g. RICO Offenses. 
 
Any offense listed under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 relating to Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations is an aggravated felony, provided 
that the maximum sentence possible is one year or more.675  As with 
crimes of violence, this includes a number of crimes, and practitioners 
should become familiar with the types of crimes listed in 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1962.  Such offenses could include bankruptcy fraud, bribery, 
counterfeiting, extortion, wire and mail fraud, unlawful debt collection, 
and other crimes of the type described in the federal statute. 
 
h. Failure to Appear. 
 
If a criminal defendant commits the offense of failing to appear for service 
of a sentence, he or she commits an aggravated felony, provided that the 
underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years 
or more.676  Additionally, if a person fails to appear before a court 
pursuant to a court order "to answer to or dispose of" a felony charge for 
which the possible punishment is two years or more, she or he has 
committed an aggravated felony.677 
 
i. Attempts and Conspiracies. 
 
Any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the offenses defined as 





674  Mena v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2016). 
675  INA § 101(a)(43)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(J). 
676  INA § 101(a)(43)(Q), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(Q). 
677  INA § 101(a)(43)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(T). 
678  INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U). 
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7. Controlled Substance Offenses. 
 
INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i)679 states that any non-citizen who has been convicted any 
time after admission of a violation (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any 
law or regulation of a State, of the United States, or of a foreign country relating 
to controlled substances is deportable.  This ground of deportability reads very 
much like the ground of inadmissibility discussed above680 with two exceptions.  
First, in order to make a non-citizen deportable, the controlled substance 
conviction must have occurred after admission into the U.S.  Second, there is an 
exception to this ground of deportability for a single offense of simple possession 
of 30 grams or less of marijuana.681 
 
INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii)682 states that if, at any time after admission, a non-citizen 
is or has been a "drug abuser" or "addict," he or she is deportable.  This ground 
of deportability is very similar to the related ground of inadmissibility683 and will 
likely be interpreted in the same way.684 
 
8. Firearms Offenses. 
 
A non-citizen is deportable if, at any time after being admitted into the U.S., she 
or he is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, 
exchanging, using, owning, possessing or carrying any weapon, part or accessory 
that falls under the definition of a firearm or destructive device, as those 
 
679  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
680  See section V.C.5., supra. 
681  One facing the issue of inadmissibility as the result of a controlled substance offense 
must affirmatively request a waiver if the conviction fits the "30 grams or less" simple 
possession category.  In the deportation context, conviction of such an offense is a straight 
exception to the ground of deportability -- no affirmative request for relief from removal is 
necessary. 
682  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
683  INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iv).  See discussion in section 
V.C.2., supra. 
684  Most of the time, the ground of inadmissibility is interpreted by a consular officer of 
the State Department, who is evaluating the admissibility of a person attempting to enter the U.S. 
from abroad, whereas this ground of deportability will be interpreted by a DHS official here in 
the U.S.  As a practical matter, however, DHS officials often look to State Department 
guidance on issues of inadmissibility when interpreting companion provisions of deportability. 
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definitions appear in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) and (4).685  A conviction for 
attempting or conspiring to commit a firearm offense also renders one 
deportable.686 
 
This ground of deportability should not be confused with the aggravated felony 
firearms offenses687 -- it is much more inclusive.  Although one convicted of a 
firearms offense that makes him deportable under this provision may also have 
been convicted of an aggravated felony trafficking offense, the two tests are not 
identical, and counsel should look closely at the two statutes to determine if both 
are implicated by a particular conviction. 
 
If the person is charged with a crime that does not involve a firearm as an 
essential element of the offense, but receives an enhanced sentence because a 
firearm was involved, most courts hold that this is not a firearms offense for 
immigration purposes.688 
 
In Nebraska, it appears as though any offense involving the definition of a 
“firearm” will not be a firearms offense for purposes of INA § 237(a)(2)(C) 
because the definition of “firearm” under the Nebraska statutes includes antique 
firearms, whereas the federal definition of “firearm” specifically excludes antique 
firearms.689  Although it is incumbent upon a client to demonstrate that there is a 
realistic probability that a person could be prosecuted for possessing an antique 
firearm under the Nebraska statutes, the Nebraska Court of Appeals has affirmed 
the conviction of a person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm 




685  INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). 
686  Id. 
687  INA § 101(a)(43)(C) and (E), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C) and (E). 
688  See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Cortes, 20 I&N Dec. 587 (BIA 1992); but see Vue v. 
I.N.S., 92 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a conviction for aggravated robbery with a 
weapon did constitute a firearms offense where the record of conviction demonstrated that a 
firearm was used in the commission of the crime).  It seems unlikely that this case would be 
decided the same way today, given the reinforced holdings of the categorical approach in cases 
such as Descamps, Moncrieffe and Mathis.  Additionally, the client did not contest the 
government’s use of the indictment during removal proceedings, which is the document from 
which it was determined that a weapon was involved. 
689  Compare the definition of “firearm” in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 1201(1) with the definition 
in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a). 
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powder pistols.690  Such pistols are “antique firearms” under the federal 
definition.691 
 
9. Domestic Violence Offenses. 
 
There are two types of domestic violence offenses that make a non-citizen 
deportable: (1) conviction of certain “domestic violence” offenses and (2) 
violation of protection orders.  Each of these offenses is discussed in turn 
below.692 
 
If a non-citizen, after being admitted to the U.S., is convicted of a crime of 
domestic violence, stalking, child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment, he 
or she is deportable.693  The term "crime of domestic violence" means any crime 
of violence (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16)694 committed against (1) a current or 
former spouse, (2) a person with whom the client shares a child in common, (3) a 
person with whom the client either is living or with whom the client once lived as 
a spouse, (4) a person "similarly situated" to a spouse under the laws of the 
jurisdiction where the crime is committed, or (5) a person who is protected from 
the client under the domestic or family violence laws of the United States, any 
state, any tribal government, or any unit of local government.695 
 
There has been a significant amount of litigation concerning this deportation 
provision.  As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has weighed in with two 
significant decisions in this area: the Castleman and Voisine decisions.696 
 
690  State v. Tharp, 22 Neb. App. 454, 854 N.W.2d 651 (2014), affirming the conviction 
of a person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 28-1206. 
691  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(16). 
692  It is important to note that this ground of deportability does not have a counterpart 
ground of inadmissibility under INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.  However, a domestic violence 
offense may also be considered as a crime involving moral turpitude (see, e.g., Matter of Tran, 
21 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 1996); but see Matter of Sanudo, 23 I&N Dec. 968 (2006), limiting the 
Tran analysis), or may be considered some other type of inadmissible or deportable offense, 
depending on the facts of the case. 
693  INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). 
694  In light of the Dimaya opinion holding subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 16 to be 
unconstitutionally vague, one only need be concerned with whether the offense fits the definition 
of “crime of violence” under subsection (a). 
695  Id. 
696  See section V.D.6.d., supra, for a discussion of Castleman and Voisine. 
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In 2006, the BIA issued an important decision interpreting this ground of 
deportability.  In Matter of Sanudo,697 the BIA held that a non-citizen’s 
conviction for domestic battery in violation of California law was not 
categorically a “crime of violence” and therefore the § 237(a)(2)(E)(i) ground of 
deportability did not apply.698  Other decisions have followed this same 
analysis.699  Given the decision in Johnson v. United States,700 there is a good 
argument that any statute under which a conviction can be obtained without a 
showing of at least bodily injury is not a “crime of violence.”701  
 
There is also a very good argument that, under certain statutes, a crime of 
violence is not involved even if there is bodily injury present.  In a 2018 order 
(on file with the author), Judge Anderson of the Omaha Immigration Court held 
that conviction under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-310(1) (third degree assault – 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to a domestic partner) 
is not a crime of domestic violence because, under the categorical approach, the 
statute is indivisible, and recklessness is not a sufficient level of scienter to 
support a finding that the statute is a crime of violence.702 
 
The Board of Immigration Appeals issued a significant decision in 2016 
interpreting this deportability provision.  In Matter of H. Estrada,703 the BIA 
 
697  23 I&N Dec. 968 (BIA 2006). 
698  Sanudo also held that violation of this California statute did not constitute a “crime 
involving moral turpitude” under § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), because under 
California law, a conviction could be sustained for a very minor and incidental unconsented-to 
touching of the victim, not necessarily involving any violence or tangible harm.  Id. at 972. 
699  See, e.g., Bhan v. Gonzalez, 198 F. App’x 604 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
conviction under a Washington fourth degree assault statute was not a “crime of violence,” and 
therefore not a “domestic violence offense,” because the statute can be violated by mere touching 
or spitting); Matter of Sejas, 24 I&N Dec. 236 (BIA 2007) (holding the same way, and for the 
same reasons, with respect to a Virginia statute). 
700  559 U.S. 133 (2010). 
701  In fact, a local immigration practitioner has reported to us that she was able to 
convince an Immigration Judge that a conviction of her client under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-323 for 
domestic assault was not a “crime of violence” and therefore did not render her client deportable 
under § 237(a)(2)(E)(I). 
702   This decision is obviously bolstered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. 
United States.  See section V.D.6.e.(1), supra. 
 
703  26 I&N Dec. 749 (BIA 2016). 
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held that the circumstance-specific approach as set forth by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the Nijhawan case,704 rather than a strict categorical approach as 
articulated by Descamps,705 was the appropriate method to use to determine 
whether the assault crime of which the respondent was convicted was committed 
against a person who qualifies as a domestic partner.  And, of course, there is the 
Voisine decision706 that reinforces this circumstance-specific approach in such 
cases. 
 
The INA also renders deportable any non-citizen who violates a protection order 
issued against that person.707  A "protection order" includes not only free-
standing proceedings, such as those under Nebraska's Protection From Domestic 
Abuse Act,708 but also temporary orders entered ancillary to other proceedings, 
such as the types of temporary orders that may be entered in conjunction with 
dissolution or legal separation actions.709  Understand that even if the client is not 
convicted of a criminal offense for violating the protection order, she or he could 
still be deportable: even a finding of civil contempt would satisfy the provisions 
of this part of the statute.710 
 
10. Terrorist Activity. 
 
This ground of deportability711 is defined, and interpreted, exactly the same as the 
corresponding ground of inadmissibility.712 
 
11. Miscellaneous Grounds of Deportability. 
 
The foregoing subsections are not an exhaustive list of all grounds of 
deportability.  As with the case of the numerous grounds of inadmissibility, other 
 
704  See the discussion of Nijhawan in section V.C.3.b.(6), supra. 
705  See the discussion of Descamps in section V.C.3.b.(8), supra. 
706  See section V.D.6.d.(5), supra. 
707  INA § 237(a)(3)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). 
708  Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-901 to 42-929. 
709  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-357. 
710  See, e.g., Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 931 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2019). 
711  INA § 237(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B). 
712  INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).  See section V.C.9., supra., for a 
discussion of this ground of inadmissibility. 
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grounds of deportability exist.  They relate to crimes such as espionage,713 
sabotage,714 treason,715 sedition,716 failure to comply with Selective Service 
laws,717 document fraud,718 and unlawful voting.719  All grounds of deportability 
are found in INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227, and practitioners are urged to consult 
that section of the INA when determining whether their non-citizen client is 
charged with a crime that carries deportation consequences. 
 
E. "Inchoate” Immigration Offenses. 
 
There are some offenses that, although they do not have any immediate inadmissibility or 
deportation consequences, can make a non-citizen client's life miserable in the future.  
For example, clients who engage in certain acts are ineligible to receive some types of 
relief from deportation or waivers of inadmissibility.  As such, criminal law practitioners 
should have some familiarity with these “inchoate” immigration offenses in order to try 
to avoid admissions or convictions that will have future collateral effects on a client's 
immigration options. 
 
1. Lack of Good Moral Character. 
 
In order to be eligible to receive certain benefits under the INA, a non-citizen 
must demonstrate that she or he is of "good moral character."720  That term is 
defined in the INA721 by listing acts which, if committed by a non-citizen, will 
preclude him or her from demonstrating "good moral character." 
 
713  INA § 237(a)(2)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(i). 
714  Id. 
715  Id. 
716  Id. 
717  INA § 237(a)(2)(D)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(iii). 
718  INA § 237(a)(3)(B) and (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(B) and (C). 
719  INA § 237(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6). 
720  Some of the instances in which a demonstration of good moral character is required 
include naturalization (an application to become a U.S. citizen), voluntary departure (an 
application that, if granted, allows one to leave the U.S. voluntarily in lieu of being removed 
under an order of removal), and cancellation of removal (a form of an affirmative defense to 
removal available to certain non-citizens).  Other programs, such as eligibility for benefits under 
the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) or the Temporary Protected Status 
(TPS) program (see section III.I.1., supra) also require a showing of good moral character. 
721  INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
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One is precluded from establishing that she or he is of "good moral character” if: 
 
• He or she is or was a “habitual drunkard.”722 
 
•  She or he commits an offense that places him or her in a class of persons 
described by INA §§ 212(a)(2)(A)723 (relating to crimes involving moral 
turpitude or controlled substance violations), (a)(2)(B)724 (relating to multiple 
criminal convictions), (a)(2)(C)725 (relating to controlled substance traffickers), 
(a)(2)(D)726 (relating to engaging in prostitution or commercialized vice), 
(a)(6)(E)727 (relating to alien smuggling), or 212(a)(9)(A)728 (relating to entry 
into the U.S. after previously having been removed).729  A person cannot 
demonstrate good moral character if she or he falls in the above-described class of 
people even if, under those sections, the person would not be inadmissible.730 
 
•  His or her income is derived principally from illegal gambling or he or she has 
been convicted of two or more gambling offenses.731 
 
• He or she has given false testimony for purposes of receiving any immigration 
benefit.732 
 
722  INA § 101(f)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1). 
723  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A). 
724  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B). 
725  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C). 
726  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D). 
727  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E). 
728  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A). 
729  INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3). 
730  Id.  There is one notable exception to this, however.  If an individual is convicted 
of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts constituting the essential elements of a 
crime involving moral turpitude (see section V.C.3., supra.), and if the “petty offense” exception 
applies (see INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) and also see section 
V.C.3.d.(2)), then the person is not precluded from showing good moral character.  Matter of 
Urpi-Sancho, 12 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 1956). 
731  INA § 101(f)(4) and (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(4) and (5). 
732  INA § 101(f)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6).  See Matter of Richmond, 26 I&N Dec. 779 
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• He or she has been confined, as a result of a conviction, to a penal institution for 
an aggregate period of 180 days or more, even if the confinement was the result of 
crimes committed outside the period for which he or she must demonstrate good 
moral character.733 
 
• He or she has been convicted of an aggravated felony.734 
 
Some immigration benefits require one to demonstrate affirmatively that she or he 
is of good moral character.  Other benefits are "discretionary" in nature, meaning 
that an immigration official can refuse to confer the benefit on a non-citizen if, in 
the official's exercise of discretion, that person does not deserve a favorable 
exercise of discretion.735  In deciding whether or not to exercise discretion in 
favor of an individual, immigration officials frequently look at the "good moral 
character" test, even though it is not always a categorical precondition to the 
granting of the benefit. 
 
It is important to understand that just because one has avoided committing the 
acts that would require a finding that she or he is not of “good moral character,” 
this does not mean that the person has "good moral character."736  It simply 
means that the person is not categorically barred from demonstrating that he or 
she is, in fact, of good moral character. 
 
However, if the person either (1) makes a false claim to U.S. citizenship or (2) 
registers to vote or actually votes in an election at any level in violation of a law 
requiring voters to be U.S. citizens, she or he can still be found to be of good 
moral character.  In order for this exception to apply, the person must show the 





(BIA 2016) for a case interpreting this provision. 
733  INA § 101(f)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7). 
734  INA § 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8).  See section V.D.6., supra, for a discussion 
of aggravated felonies.  To qualify as an “aggravated felony,” a conviction for a qualifying 
criminal offense must have occurred after November 29, 1990, unless the crime is murder, in 
which case the date of the conviction is irrelevant.  See §§ 501(b) and 509, Immigration Act of 
1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990).  See also Caastiglia v. I.N.S., 108 F.3d 
1101, 1103-1104 (9th Cir. 1997). 
735  Examples of such benefits are adjustment of status, asylum and cancellation of 
removal. 
736  See the last paragraph of INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
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permanently in the U.S. before reaching age 16, and he or she reasonably believed 
at the time of making the claim that he or she was, in fact, a U.S. citizen.737 
 
In the documents related to a criminal proceeding, it would be helpful to try to 
delete any references to any of the acts listed in the statute since some of those 
acts do not require a conviction to bar one from demonstrating good moral 
character.  Unless the statute specifically requires otherwise, mere commission of 
the listed acts can bar one from establishing good moral character, even if she or 
he was not convicted of a crime relating to the commission of such acts. 
 
2. Particularly Serious Crimes. 
 
One who (1) has been convicted by a final judgment of a "particularly serious 
crime," or (2) who USCIS or ICE has “serious reasons” for believing has 
committed a “particularly serious crime” is ineligible to apply for either asylum738 
or withholding of removal.739  As to (1), the statutes actually read that a non-
citizen is ineligible for these immigration benefits if “the alien, having been 
convicted of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the 
United States.”  Although this sounds like a two-pronged test (conviction of a 
particularly serious crime + being a danger to the United States), the BIA has held 
that it is not, and that one who has been convicted of a “particularly serious 
crime” is per se a danger to the United States.740  Most federal courts have agreed 





737  Id. 
738  INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii).  Former 
Attorney General Ashcroft held that he was “highly disinclined” to exercise his discretion to 
grant asylum where the non-citizen has been convicted of a dangerous or violent crime unless 
extraordinary circumstances exist.  Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373 (AG 2002).  The 
respondent in Jean was convicted of second degree manslaughter under New York law relating 
to the death of an infant. 
739  INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii).  Withholding 
of removal is a benefit that is similar in nature to asylum, except that it is strictly an affirmative 
defense to a removal proceeding.  Additionally, unlike an application for asylum, withholding of 
removal is a non-discretionary form of relief, which means that if the person meets all of the 
elements entitling him or her to withholding of removal, an immigration official must grant the 
relief, whether or not the official deems the individual "worthy" of the relief. 
740  Matter of Carballe, 19 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1986). 
741  See, e.g., Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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held that the “serious reason for believing” test under (2) above equates to a 
finding of probable cause, rather than a lower standard of “some evidence.”742 
 
The term "particularly serious crime" is partially defined in statute.  For purposes 
of an asylum claim, one who has been convicted of an aggravated felony743 has 
been convicted of a “particularly serious crime.”744  For purposes of asserting a 
withholding of removal claim, one has been convicted of a “particularly serious 
crime” if he or she is convicted of an aggravated felony and has, in connection 
with such conviction(s), been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 
at least five years.745  The withholding statute makes clear that aggravated 
felonies are not the only types of crimes that can constitute "particularly serious 
crimes."746 
 
Although “particularly serious crime” is partially defined by the statutes, its 
complete definition has been left to administrative tribunals and the courts.  
Whether a crime that is not an aggravated felony is “particularly serious” is 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  The Board of Immigration Appeals has 
given some guidance on the factors it considers in determining whether a crime is 
"particularly serious."  It looks at the nature of the conviction, the circumstances 
and underlying facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and whether 
the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the person likely will be a 
danger to society.747 
 
The Eighth Circuit has held that evidence of a defendant’s mental health at the 
time the crime was committed should be considered by the Immigration Court and 
the BIA when deciding whether a crime is “particularly serious.”748  Given the 
holding in Shazi, if it is otherwise consistent with the goals of the client in a 
criminal case, criminal defense counsel should consider presenting mental health 
evidence in criminal court (if nothing else, as part of the sentencing process) for 
cases in which a conviction might otherwise be considered to be a particularly 
serious crime.  Such “ready made” evidence in the criminal record would be of 
 
742  Barahona v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2021). 
743  For a detailed discussion of aggravated felonies, see section V.D.6., supra. 
744  INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). 
745  INA § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). 
746  Id. 
747  Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1992).  Matter of N-A-M, 24 I&N Dec. 
336 (BIA 2007). 
748   Shazi v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 2021). 
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assistance to immigration counsel who may seek to argue that such evidence 
should be considered by immigration decision-makers addressing the issue of 
whether a conviction was for a particularly serious crime. 
 
It is difficult to paint with any broad strokes in this area, but, generally speaking, 
crimes against persons are more likely to be considered particularly serious 
crimes than property crimes.749  Robbery with a firearm,750 drug trafficking 
crimes,751 mail fraud crimes involving substantial amounts of money,752 and 
possession of child pornography753 have been held to be particularly serious 
crimes.  Burglary with intent to commit theft754 and simple possession of 
cocaine755 have been held not to be particularly serious crimes.  The Ninth 
Circuit has held that it is at least possible that a serious DWI offense, or multiple 
DWI offenses, might be particularly serious crimes.756 
 
Practitioners should also remember, however, that given the wide number of 
crimes that now are categorized as aggravated felonies, there are many non-
violent crimes that will, by statutory definition, be considered to be particularly 
serious crimes. 
 
3. Significant Misdemeanors. 
 
Non-citizens who have been granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) relief will lose their eligibility for DACA if they are convicted of a 
“significant misdemeanor” or three or more “non-significant” misdemeanors.757 
 
A “significant misdemeanor,” for DACA purposes, is defined as one that is a 
misdemeanor under federal law (i.e., one that carries a possible penalty of 
imprisonment of more than five days up to one year), and either (1) is an offense 
 
749  Id. 
750  Matter of Carballe, 19 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1986). 
751  Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (AG 2002). 
752  Arbid v. Holder, 674 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2012); Tian, 546 F.3d 890. 
753  Matter of R-A-, 25 I&N Dec. 657 (BIA 2012). 
754  Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982). 
755  Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819 (AG 1994). 
756  Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2011). 
757  For a more complete discussion of the DACA program, see section III.I.3.a., supra. 
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of domestic violence, sexual abuse or exploitation, burglary, unlawful possession 
or use of a firearm, drug distribution or trafficking, or driving under the influence 
or (2) is one for which the individual was sentenced to time in custody of more 
than 90 days. The sentence must involve time to be served in custody, and 
therefore does not include a suspended sentence.758 
 
A “non-significant misdemeanor” for DACA purposes is a misdemeanor as 
defined under federal law (i.e., one that carries a possible penalty of imprisonment 
of more than 5 days up to a year), other than an offense of domestic violence, 
sexual abuse or exploitation, burglary, unlawful possession or use of a firearm, 
drug distribution or trafficking, or driving under the influence and is one for 
which the individual was sentenced to time in custody of 90 days or less.759 
 
VI. WAIVERS OF INADMISSIBILITY AND RELIEF FROM REMOVAL. 
 
As discussed earlier,760 the Nebraska Supreme Court has implicitly held that Padilla requires 
criminal defense counsel to advise their clients if a particular conviction will imperil any forms 
of relief from removal to which they might otherwise be entitled.  Rather than add another 
category to each of the statutory analysis charts, I discuss here the most common forms of 
waivers of inadmissibility and relief from removal for which clients may be eligible.  For each 
form of waiver or relief from removal, I have (1) set forth the elements the client must prove to 
qualify and (2) indicated what types of criminal offenses will categorically bar the client from 
qualifying for that particular waiver or relief. 
 
In order to help you advise your clients fully of the possible immigration consequences they face 
as the result of criminal proceedings, I have developed flow charts for each form of waiver of 
inadmissibility and relief from removal discussed here.  Those flow charts appear in 
Attachment 3.  If conviction of the crime in question would imperil a waiver or form of relief 
to which the client might otherwise be entitled, make certain to advise the client accordingly as 




Just as it is important to determine whether your client should be concerned with 
inadmissibility, deportability, or both, it is important to understand the basic terminology 




758  U.S.C.I.S., Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals-
daca (last visited June 17, 2021). 
759  Id. 
760  See the discussion of State v. Gonzalez in section I.D.2.c.(4)(a), supra. 
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Generally speaking, if your client is concerned about whether he or she will be 
inadmissible to the United States as the result of a criminal proceeding, you need to 
analyze whether there are any waivers of the particular ground of inadmissibility with 
which your client is concerned and, if so, whether the criminal proceedings in which your 
client is involved might imperil his or her opportunity to apply for such waivers.  On the 
other hand, if deportability is the main concern for your client, then you need to 
determine which forms of relief from removal might be available to your client, and 
whether the criminal proceedings in which your client is involved might jeopardize such 
relief. 
 
Following is a brief overview and discussion of some of the more common types of 
waivers of inadmissibility and relief from removal.  Only the most common forms of  
waivers and relief from removal are discussed here.  For a more thorough discussion, 
refer to various of the resources discussed in section I.E., supra. 
 
1. Section 212(h) Waivers for Certain Grounds of Inadmissibility 
Related to Crimes. 
 
The main waiver of inadmissibility available to non-citizens who are charged with 
or have been convicted of crimes is found in Section 212(h) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act.761  If your client is concerned that a criminal proceeding 
might make him or her inadmissible to the United States, you will need to look 
carefully at the provisions of § 212(h) to determine if your client might be eligible 
for a waiver of grounds of inadmissibility and, if so, whether you can do anything 
during the course of the criminal case to preserve the availability of the § 212(h) 
waiver to your client. 
 
Think of waivers of inadmissibility as akin to pardons for past offenses.  In other 
words, a waiver is granted to a client who would otherwise be inadmissible to the 
United States if (1) the client is categorically eligible for the waiver and (2) the 
federal authorities in charge of adjudicating the waiver application decide to 
exercise discretion in the client’s favor and grant the waiver application. 
 
This is an important point about waivers: all of them are what Homeland Security 
and Department of State officials call “discretionary” benefits.  What that means, 
as a practical matter, is that even if an individual is categorically qualified for the 
waiver, the decision-maker can decide, in the exercise of discretion, not to 
approve the waiver application.  Therefore, while your main focus as a criminal 
defense lawyer is to preserve the client’s categorical eligibility for a waiver, you 
should, if possible, also emphasize any positive equities your client has during the 
making of what immigration authorities call the record of conviction: the 
information (or indictment), plea (or trial), judgment (or verdict), and sentence.  
Favorable comments, findings or evidence in any of these documents does have  
 
 
761  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
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an impact on immigration decision-makers, and will be a big help to your client 
when it comes time to apply for the waiver. 
 
a. Elements of Section 212(h) Waiver. 
 
(1) Grounds of Inadmissibility That Can be Waived. 
 
A § 212(h) waiver is available to waive the following grounds of 
inadmissibility: 
 
(1) Crimes involving moral turpitude;762 
 
(2) A single controlled substance offense relating to possession of 
marijuana of 30 grams or less;763 
 
(3) Multiple criminal convictions where the aggregate sentences to 
confinement imposed were five years or more;764 
 
(4) Prostitution or commercialized vice crimes;765 and 
 
(5) Certain non-citizens who are eligible for immunity from 
prosecution.766 
 
No other criminal grounds of inadmissibility can be waived by 
virtue of a § 212(h) waiver. 
 
(2) Those Eligible to Apply for a § 212(h) Waiver. 
 
(a) Non-Lawful Permanent Residents. 
 
The following non-LPRs are eligible to apply for a § 212(h) 
waiver: 
 
(1) Those who have a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent  
resident parent, spouse, son or daughter who will suffer  
 
 
762  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
763  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
764  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B). 
765  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D). 
766  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(E). 
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“extreme hardship” if the waiver is not granted to the  
person.767 
 
(2) Those who are inadmissible as the result of prostitution 
or commercialized vice crimes if: 
 
(a) The activities for which the person is 
inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before his 
or her application for admission; 
 
(b) The person’s admission to the United States 
would not be contrary to the national welfare, 
safety, or security of the United States; and 
 
(c) The person has been rehabilitated.768 
 
(3) The spouses or children of one who qualify as victims 
of domestic violence under the VAWA provisions of the 
INA, meaning that they have been abused by their U.S. 
citizen or LPR spouse or parent.769 
 
(b) Lawful Permanent Residents. 
 
Although the § 212(h) waiver is most often applied for by 
those who have not yet obtained permanent status in the 
United States, it is sometimes applied for by lawful 
permanent residents (green card holders) if inadmissibility 
is an issue for them.770  Ironically, the § 212(h) waiver is 
more difficult to get for LPRs than it is for non-LPRs.  
LPRs are eligible to apply for a § 212(h) waiver if: 
 







767  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). 
768  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(A). 
769  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(C). 
770  See section V.B.1.c, supra, for a discussion of when lawful permanent residents need 
to be concerned with inadmissibility. 
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(2) They have had lawful continuous residence in the 
United States for a period of at least seven years before the 
initiation of removal proceedings against them.771  
 
b. A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible § 212(h) Waiver 
Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
might be eligible for a § 212(h) waiver.  A flow chart to help determine 
eligibility is found at Attachment 3. 
 
(1) Is inadmissibility an issue for your client? 
 
(2) If so, is the crime with which your client is charged one of the crimes 
eligible for a § 212(h) waiver? 
 
(3) If so, is your client either (1) a non-LPR with a qualifying family 
member or (2) an LPR who has not been convicted of an aggravated 
felony and who has been in the U.S. continuously in lawful status for at 
least seven years? 
 
c. Preserving Eligibility for a § 212(h) Waiver. 
 
If your client is potentially eligible for a § 212(h) waiver, you should try to 
preserve your client’s eligibility for the waiver.  Some ways in which you 
could do this include: 
 
(1) If your client has been charged with a crime that is not one eligible for 
a § 212(h) waiver, you should attempt to negotiate for a charge that is 
eligible for a waiver. 
 
(2) If the client has positive equities, try to have those reflected in any 
documents constituting the Record of Conviction. 
 
(3) In general, a § 212(h) waiver will not be granted for those convicted of 
violent or dangerous crimes,772 so if your client is charged with such a 





771  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (last full paragraph). 
772  See, e.g., In re Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373 (AG 2002), denying a waiver in the exercise 
of discretion for a refugee seeking to become an LPR because she was convicted of second 
degree manslaughter in the death of her toddler relative. 
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2. Cancellation of Removal for Non-Permanent Residents. 
 
Certain individuals who are undocumented, and who are in removal proceedings, 
can apply for a form of relief from removal referred to as “non-LPR cancellation.”  
This form of relief from removal is akin to an affirmative defense to the removal 
proceeding.  The client must affirmatively apply for the relief, and carry the 
burden of proof to establish eligibility for the relief.  But the payoff for an 
undocumented individual is huge: if the cancellation application is approved, the 
person becomes a lawful permanent resident (i.e., gets his or her green card).  
The statutory provisions regarding non-LPR cancellation are found at INA § 
240A(b).773 
 
Pereida v. Wilkinson.774  In 2021, the Supreme Court issued an important 
decision regarding non-LPR cancellation of removal.  In Pereida, the Supreme 
Court held that non-LPR cancellation applicants bear the burden of proof to 
demonstrate that they were not convicted of any disqualifying crimes in order to 
qualify for non-LPR cancellation.  Here is a summary of the case. 
 
Mr. Pereida was an undocumented client who was placed in removal proceedings.  
He applied for non-LPR cancellation of removal. Because he had been convicted 
of attempted criminal impersonation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-638, there was a 
question about his eligibility for non-LPR cancellation; more specifically, the 
issue was whether his conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), 
which would disqualify him from receiving non-LPR cancellation.775  The lower 
courts found that § 28-638 was a divisible statute, with some sections describing 
CIMTs and some sections not.776 
 
This presented the parties with a dilemma because, although the government 
introduced a complaint of the information charging Mr. Pereida with a violation 
of § 28-638(a) for using a fraudulent Social Security card for the purposes of 
obtaining employment, there was no evidence in the record as to which section of 
the statute of which Mr. Pereida was actually convicted.  Mr. Pereida argued that, 
under the categorical approach as it relates to divisible statutes,777 it must be  
 
 
773  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 
774   Pereida v. Wilkinson, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 754, 209 L.Ed.2d 47 (2021). 
775    INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). 
776   More specifically, the courts, including the Supreme Court, agreed that a conviction 
for violating § 28-638(c) – carrying on any profession, business, or any other occupation without 
a license, certificate, or other authorization required by law – would not constitute a CIMT. 
777    See section V.C.3.b., supra. 
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assumed that he was convicted of the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a 
conviction under § 28-638, which would not be a CIMT. 
 
Ultimately, that position did not prevail.  The Supreme Court held that, in the 
context of an application for non-LPR cancellation, which is a form of relief from 
removal, the non-citizen client carries the burden of proof on all aspects of the 
case, including demonstrating that he was not convicted of a disqualifying 
offense.  In the context of an application for relief from removal, the Court held, 
the non-citizen cannot simply rely on the categorical approach to shift the burden 
of proof to the government to show that he or she was convicted of a 
disqualifying offense – he or she must affirmatively demonstrate, as part of 
carrying the burden of proof, that he or she was not convicted of a disqualifying 
offense. 
 
This obviously puts criminal defense counsel on the horns of a dilemma in 
deciding what strategy to employ during state court criminal proceedings.  In the 
case of a divisible statute containing both removable and non-removable offenses, 
it would be to the non-citizen’s advantage for the record of conviction to be silent 
as to which part of a divisible statute was involved in cases in which the 
government carries the burden of proof.  On the other hand, in cases involving 
applications for relief from removal, it is to the non-citizen’s advantage to, if 
possible, have the record of conviction specify that the client was convicted of a 
non-removal part of the divisible statute.  So how is criminal defense counsel to 
resolve this dilemma?  There is no one-size-fits-all answer to this question, 
because the strategy will vary in each case, depending on the facts and 
circumstances. 
 
Suppose that you represent a client who is charged with, and likely to be 
convicted of, violation of one section of a divisible statute, some parts of which 
involve removable offenses and at least one part of which involves a non-
removable offense.  If the specific offense involved is, in fact, a removable 
offense, and if the only issue on the immigration side of things is whether the 
client is removable, then keeping the record of conviction ambiguous is the best 
approach, since the government carries the burden of proof to show that the client 
is removable and, absent some specificity in the record of conviction, the 
categorical approach assumes that the client was convicted of the least culpable 
offense necessary to sustain a conviction – in this hypothetical case, a non-
removable offense. 
 
However, suppose you represent another client, charged under the same statute, 
but this client is eligible for some form of relief from removal that requires the 
client to demonstrate that they have not been convicted of a disqualifying offense.  
In such a case, the best strategy would be to have the record of conviction specify 
the part of the divisible statute of which the client was convicted (provided that 
the specific part of the statute involved a non-disqualifying offense). 
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In short, the default criminal defense strategy, post-Pereida, is to have the record 
of conviction specify the portion of a divisible statute of which the client was 
convicted, provided the client was convicted of the portion of a divisible statute 
that carries no adverse immigration consequences.  On the other hand, if the 
client is charged with a portion of a divisible statute that carries adverse 
immigration consequences, then the best strategy is to leave or make the record of 
conviction vague because, at least in the first instance (proving removability), the 
government carries the burden of proof. 
 
Let’s consider application of this strategy under the facts of Pereida, since it 
involved a conviction of a Nebraska criminal statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-638.  It 
is apparent from the strategy adopted by Mr. Pereida’s counsel that he was likely 
charged with, and convicted of, a portion of the divisible statute that was a 
CIMT.778  In such a case, keeping the record of conviction vague would be a 
good strategy in terms of make the government prove removability.  The problem 
with that strategy, in the context of the facts of this case, is that the government 
didn’t need to rely on a conviction to show that Mr. Pereida was removable – he 
was removable because he was present in the country without documentation.  In 
such cases, the easiest way for the government to prove up removability is simply 
to charge the non-citizen with being removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)779 – 
someone present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled into 
the country.  At that point, the only way to keep Mr. Pereida in the country is to 
find some form of relief from removability – in this case, non-LPR cancellation.  
But now the strategy becomes very different.  Since Mr. Pereida carries the 
burden of proof in the context of an application for relief from removal, he needs 
to show that he was not convicted of a CIMT.  And the only way to do that in the 
context of a divisible statute, is to have the record of conviction clearly reflect that 
he was convicted of the portion of the divisible statute that did not constitute a 
CIMT.780 
 
Although Pereida, doesn’t, as a practical matter, change the strategy 
considerations that preceded the opinion,781 it does re-emphasize the importance 
both of understanding how the categorical approach works in the immigration  
 
 
778   Most probably, § 28-638(1)(a). 
779   8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). 
780    Of course, this is not always possible.  If, in fact, the client is convicted of a CIMT, 
then no amount of subterfuge will help someone in Mr. Pereira’s situation – he is simply not 
eligible for non-LPR cancellation relief.  That is, in all likelihood, what happened in Mr. 
Pereira’s case. 
781   Most courts, including the Eighth Circuit, had reached the same result as the 
Supreme Court did in Pereida. 
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context and identifying a non-citizen client’s situation as soon as practicable in a 
criminal case so that the best strategy can be pursued. 
 
a. Elements of “Regular” Non-LPR Cancellation. 
 
In order to be eligible to apply for non-LPR cancellation, a client must 
meet the following requirements: 
 
(1) He or she must have been physically present in the United States for a 
continuous period of at least 10 years.  The period of physical presence 
begins when the client first physically enters the United States, even if 
such physical entry is without documentation.  The client stops accruing 
physical presence for purposes of non-LPR cancellation at the earliest of 
the following times: 
 
(a) He or she is served with a document placing him or her in 
removal proceedings (a Notice to Appear); or  
 
(b) He or she commits an offense listed in INA §§ 212(a)(2),782 
237(a)(2),783 or 237(a)(4).784 
 
(2) He or she must have been a person of “good moral character”785 
during the period of physical presence in the United States. 
 
(3) He or she must show that his removal from the United States would 
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his or her U.S. 





782  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 
783  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). 
784  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4).  Thus, even though an undocumented client’s primary issue 
is inadmissibility, rather than deportability, if your client is eligible for non-LPR cancellation, 
you should try to avoid having the client convicted of an offense listed in § 237(a)(2).  As an 
example, suppose you represent an undocumented client who is charged with a firearms offense.  
Such an offense is not a ground of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2) of the INA.  However, if 
your undocumented client is potentially eligible for non-LPR cancellation, you should try to 
avoid a deportable firearms conviction even though such a conviction, in and of itself will not 
subject the client to removal proceedings, because such a conviction would categorically bar 
your client from applying for non-LPR cancellation. 
785  8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
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(4) He or she is not inadmissible or deportable as a “terrorist” under INA 
§§ 212(a)(3)786 or 237(a)(4).787 
 
(5) He or she has not previously been granted non-LPR cancellation or 
suspension of deportation, which was the name of non-LPR cancellation 
before 1996. 
 
b. A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible Non-LPR 
Cancellation Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
might be eligible for non-LPR cancellation of removal.  A flow chart to 
help determine eligibility is found at Attachment 3. 
 
(1) Is your client undocumented? 
 
(2) If so, has he or she been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous 
period of at least 10 years before being placed in removal proceedings? 
 
(3) If so, is his or her criminal record clean in the sense that he or she has 
not previously committed a criminal offense that is described in           
§ 1182(a)(2) (criminal grounds of inadmissibility), § 1227(a)(2) (criminal 
grounds of deportability), or § 1227(a)(4) (terrorist grounds of 
deportability) before accruing 10 years of physical presence? 
 
(4) If so, does your client have a U.S. citizen or LPR spouse, parent or 
child? 
 
c. Preserving Non-LPR Cancellation Eligibility. 
 
If your client is potentially eligible for non-LPR cancellation, you should 
try to preserve your client’s eligibility for cancellation.  Some ways in 
which you might do this include: 
 
(1) Avoid convictions for any of the offenses described in the sections of 8 
U.S.C. set forth above; and 
 
(2) Avoid convictions of any offenses that would fall under 8 U.S.C. 





786  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3). 
787  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4). 
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d. Elements of Non-LPR Cancellation for Victims of Domestic 
Violence. 
 
In order to be eligible to apply for non-LPR cancellation, a client who is a 
victim of domestic violence must meet the following requirements: 
 
(1) He or she must fall into one of the following classes: 
 
(a) He or she is the spouse of a U.S. citizen or LPR and has been battered 
or subjected to extreme cruelty by the abusive spouse;788 
 
(b) He or she is the son or daughter of a U.S. citizen or LPR and has been 
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by the abusive parent;789 
 
(c) He or she is the parent of a child790 who was battered or subjected to 
extreme cruelty by the child’s U.S. citizen or LPR parent, even if s/he is 
not married to the abused child’s abusive parent;791 
 
(d) He or she was battered or subject to extreme cruelty by a U.S. citizen 
or LPR s/he intended to marry, but the marriage was not legitimate 
because of the abuser’s bigamy.792 
 
(2) He or she must have been physically present in the United States for a 
continuous period of not less than three years immediately preceding the 
date of the application for cancellation of removal;793 
 
(3) He or she has been a person of good moral character794 during the time 
of his or her physical presence in the U.S.;795 
 
788  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II). 
789  Id. 
790  “Child” is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) to mean someone who is single and under 
the age of 21. 
791  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
792  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(III). 
793  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(ii).  Issuance of a Notice to Appear (the charging 
document placing someone in removal proceedings) will not “stop the clock” on the accrual of 
the three-year residency requirement, as it would in “regular” non-LPR cancellation cases. 
794  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
795  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
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(4) He or she is not: 
 
(a) Inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2) (criminal grounds of 
inadmissibility) or 1182(a)(3) (terrorist grounds of inadmissibility); 
 
(b) Deportable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(G) (marriage fraud 
ground of deportability), 1227(a)(2) (criminal grounds of 
deportability), or 1227(a)(4) (terrorist grounds of deportability);796 
 
(5) He or she has not been convicted of an aggravated felony;797 and 
 
(6) He or she can demonstrate that removal from the U.S. would result in 
extreme hardship to himself or herself, or to his or her child or parent.798 
 
e. A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible “Domestic Violence” 
Non-LPR Cancellation Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
might be eligible for “domestic violence” non-LPR cancellation of 
removal.  A flow chart to help determine eligibility is found at 
Attachment 3. 
 
(1) Is your client undocumented? 
 
(2) If so, does he or she fall into one of the classes of abuse victims listed 
above? 
 
(3) If so, has he or she been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous 
period of at least three years before being placed in removal proceedings? 
 
(4) If so, is his or her prior criminal record clean in the sense that he or she 
has not done anything to make him or her inadmissible or deportable 
under any of the provisions listed above? 
 
f. Preserving “Domestic Violence” Non-LPR Cancellation 
Eligibility. 
 
If your client appears to be eligible for “domestic violence” non-LPR 
cancellation, you should try to avoid any pleas that would jeopardize such 
eligibility.  Pleas to avoid include: 
 
796  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
797  Id. 
798  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v). 
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(1) Any offenses that would preclude the client from demonstrating good 
moral character under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
 
(2) Any offenses that would make the client inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.  
§§ 1182(a)(2) (criminal grounds of inadmissibility) or 1182(a)(3) (terrorist 
grounds of inadmissibility), or deportable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1227(a)(1)(G) (marriage fraud ground of deportability), 1227(a)(2) 
(criminal grounds of deportability), or 1227(a)(4) (terrorist grounds of 
deportability). 
 
(3) An aggravated felony. 
 
3. Cancellation of Removal for Permanent Residents. 
 
If your client is a permanent resident (LPR or “green card holder”), and if he or 
she has been in the United States for at least seven continuous years, he or she 
may be eligible for a form of relief from removal called Cancellation of Removal 
for Permanent Residents.  The statutory provisions of LPR Cancellation are 
found at INA § 240A(a).799 
 
a. Elements of LPR Cancellation. 
 
In order to be eligible to apply for LPR cancellation, a client must meet 
the following requirements: 
 
(1) He or she must have been a lawful permanent resident (i.e., had a 
“green card”) for five years or more; 
 
(2) He or she must have been residing in the U.S. in some lawful status for 
at least seven years; and 
 
(3) He or she must not have been convicted of an aggravated felony. 
 
As with non-LPR cancellation, certain events will “stop the clock” on 
accrual of residence.  However, for LPR cancellation purposes, there are 
actually two clocks: the seven-year clock and the five-year clock. 
 
The Seven-Year Clock. 
 
What Starts It?  The seven-year clock starts once the client entered 
the U.S. in any lawful status.  That could include non-immigrant 




799  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
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What Stops It?  The seven-year clocks stops on the earliest of the 
following events: 
 
(1) The client is served with a Notice to Appear.  
 
(2) The client commits an offense listed in INA §§ 212(a)(2),800 
237(a)(2),801 or 237(a)(4). 
 
What Crimes Do Not Stop the Seven-Year Clock? 
 
If the client already has been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude (CIMT), but the CIMT fell under the petty offense 
exception,802 the seven-year clock does not stop until the second 
CIMT offense is committed.803 
 
If the client is convicted of a crime that makes him or her 
deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)804 the seven-year clock does not 
stop unless the crime is “referred to” in INA § 212(a)(2).805  This 
means, for example, that the seven-year clock does not stop for a 
client convicted of a firearms offense, which is mentioned in the 
deportable offenses section of the INA but not referred to in the 
inadmissible offenses section.806  Other offenses that appear in 
INA § 237(a)(2) that are not referred to in § 212(a)(2) include 
crimes of domestic violence, crimes of stalking, violation of a 
protection order, and crimes of child abuse.  However, if the 
offense of which the client is convicted is both a deportable and 
inadmissible crime (i.e., domestic violence offenses that involve 
infliction of serious bodily injury are also CIMTs), commission of 




800  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 
801  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). 
802  INA § 212A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). 
803  Matter of Deando-Roma, 23 I&N Dec. 597 (BIA 2003). 
804  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). 
805  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 
806  Matter of Campos-Torres, 22 I&N Dec. 1289 (BIA 2000). 
807  Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 206 L. Ed. 2d 682 (2020). 
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The Five-Year Clock. 
 
What Starts It?  The five-year clock starts at the moment the client 
becomes an LPR (i.e., gets his or her “green card”). 
 
What Stops It?  The five-year clock continues to run until the 
client’s removal proceedings are concluded, which would include 
all proceedings before the Immigration Court, the BIA, and, if the 
client obtains a stay of removal during any federal court appeals, 
until those appeals are finally resolved. 
 
b. A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible LPR Cancellation 
Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
might be eligible for LPR cancellation of removal.  A flow chart to help 
determine eligibility is found at Attachment 3. 
 
(1) Is your client a lawful permanent resident (LPR)? 
 
(2) If so, has he or she been an LPR for at least five years? 
 
(3) If so, has he or she been residing in the U.S. in some lawful status for 
at least seven years before being served with a Notice to Appear or before 
having committed a prior offense listed in the statutes outlined above? 
 
c. Preserving LPR Cancellation Eligibility. 
 
If the answer to all of the above questions is yes, your client may be 
eligible for LPR cancellation, and you should try to avoid any pleas that 
would jeopardize such eligibility.  Pleas to avoid include: 
 
(1) Any offense that would stop the seven-year clock from running, if the 
client has not already acquired seven years of continuous presence. 
 
(2) An aggravated felony. 
 
4. Adjustment of Status. 
 
Some clients may be eligible to get green cards, usually as the result of their 
relationship to a qualifying relative who has immigration status.  Certain clients 
may be eligible to adjust status (i.e., get a green card while remaining in the 
United States).  Other clients may be required to leave the United States to get a 




Adjustment of status is a form of relief from removal, in the sense that if a client 
is eligible to adjust status, and he or she is in removal proceedings, he or she can 
file the adjustment of status application as a defense to the removal case and, if 
the application is granted, he or she will avoid removal.  Fortunately, the land 
mines of which criminal defense counsel must be aware are the same, whether the 
issue is adjustment of status or consular processing.  In essence, you must try to 
avoid having the client convicted of a crime that will render him or her 
inadmissible under INA § 212,808 which is a part of your baseline analysis in any 
event. 
 
The ability to adjust status depends in part on the client’s immigration status.  
“Regular” adjustment of status proceedings are first discussed below, and then 
adjustment of status proceedings for refugees. 
 
a. Elements for “Regular” Adjustment of Status. 
 
There are many ways a client may be eligible to adjust status.  The 
discussion here focuses on eligibility based on a family relationship, 
which is the most common way in which a client would be eligible to 
adjust status. 
 
In order to be eligible to adjust status, a client must meet the following 
requirements: 
 
(1) He or she must have entered the United States with inspection and 
authorization. 
 
(2) He or she must fall into one of the following categories: 
 
(a) The client must have a U.S. citizen spouse. 
 
(b) The client must have a U.S. citizen child age 21 or older. 
 
(c) The client must be under age 21 and have a U.S. citizen parent. 
 
(d) The client must have an approved visa petition filed by another 
qualifying relative with a current priority date.809 
 
808  8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
809  Unless the client falls into one of the first three categories (1) through (3) above, he 
or she will have to wait a number of years for a visa petition filed by another qualifying relative 
(for example, a U.S. citizen brother or sister) to become current.  That is because there are long 
waiting lists in most visa categories.  To be eligible for adjustment of status, a client must have 
an approved visa petition with a priority date that is current.  There are various resources online 
that explain how to read and interpret the Visa Bulletin.  For one example see 
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(3) He or she must not be inadmissible, or must be eligible for a waiver of 
any grounds of inadmissibility. 
 
b. A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible “Regular” 
Adjustment of Status Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
might be eligible for “regular” adjustment of status.  A flow chart to help 
determine eligibility is found at Attachment 3. 
 
(1) Did your client enter the United States with inspection and 
authorization? 
 
(2) If so, does he or she have a U.S. citizen spouse or U.S. citizen child 21 
years of age or older?  
 
(3) If not, is the client under age 21 and does the client have a U.S. citizen 
parent? 
 
(4) If not, is the client the beneficiary of an approved visa petition with a 
current priority date which was filed for him or her by another qualifying 
relative? 
 
c. Preserving “Regular” Adjustment of Status Eligibility. 
 
To preserve your client’s eligibility for adjustment of status, try to avoid 
pleading to any crimes that will make your client inadmissible under INA  
§ 212.810  If you are unable to avoid this, determine if the client is eligible 
for a waiver of any of the grounds of inadmissibility implicated by the 
crimes of which he or she is convicted.  Most often, this means 
determining whether your client is eligible for a § 212(h) waiver.811 
 
d. Elements for Refugee Adjustment of Status. 
 
If your client is a refugee and is eligible to adjust status under INA        
§ 209812 because he or she has been in refugee status for at least one year, 
 
https://www.novacredit.com/resources/how-to-read-the-visa-bulletin/ (last visited October 16, 
2020). 
810  8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
811  See section VI.A.1., supra. 
812  8 U.S.C. § 1159. 
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you have a little more leeway in terms of what crimes will make your 
client ineligible to adjust status.  Although any crime that makes a client 
inadmissible could be a problem, the waiver of inadmissibility available to 
refugees who seek to adjust status is very generous.813  It essentially 
allows waiver of all crime-related grounds of inadmissibility except drug  
trafficking offenses,814 certain espionage offenses,815 and terrorist 
activities.816 
 
In order for your refugee client to be eligible to adjust status, he or she 
must meet the following requirements: 
 
(1) He or she must have been admitted to or paroled into the United States 
as a refugee; and 
 
(2) He or she must have been in refugee status for at least one year. 
 
e. A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible Refugee Adjustment 
of Status Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
might be eligible for refugee adjustment of status.  A flow chart to help 
determine eligibility is found at Attachment 3. 
 
(1) Was your client admitted or paroled into the U.S. as a refugee? 
 
(2) If so, has your client been in refugee status for at least one year? 
 
f. Preserving Refugee Adjustment of Status Eligibility. 
 
If you are unable to avoid a conviction that makes your client 
inadmissible, you should strive to avoid the convictions listed above that 
cannot be waived for refugees seeking to adjust status. 
 
5. Asylum/Withholding of Removal. 
 
Asylum and withholding of removal are two forms of relief from removal that are 
 
813  INA § 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c). 
814  INA § 212(a)(2(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C). 
815  INA § 212(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A). 
816  INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).  There are actually two other 
grounds of inadmissibility that can be waived under § 209(c) but they do not relate to state 
crimes, and they are not mentioned here. 
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potentially available to individuals who fear that if they return to their home 
country they will suffer persecution, either by their government, or by a group or 
groups their government is unwilling or unable to control. 
 
Asylum and withholding cases are extremely complex, both factually and legally.  
The purpose of discussing them here is simply to make you aware of which 
criminal convictions would jeopardize such claims.  You should certainly not 
trouble yourself with trying to determine the validity of any possible asylum or 
withholding claim your client may ultimately wish to assert to avoid removal.  
That will be the job of the client’s immigration lawyer if and when the time 
comes. 
 
a. Elements of the Claims. 
 
Asylum.  The elements of an asylum claim are that the client either has 
been persecuted or has a well-founded fear of being persecuted by the 
government or by a group or groups the government is unable or unwilling 
to control.  The feared persecution must be on account of the client’s race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.  The Supreme Court has held that the “well-founded” fear 
standard can be met by as little as a ten percent chance that the persecution 
will actually occur.817  Additionally, unless some very limited exceptions 
apply, a client must file an asylum claim within one year of the date the 
client last entered the U.S., or s/he cannot pursue an asylum claim.  
Finally, asylum claims can be filed affirmatively (before a client is in 
removal proceedings) or defensively, as a form of relief from removal in 
removal proceedings. 
 
Withholding of Removal.  The elements of a withholding claim are the 
same as for an asylum claim.  The difference between the two forms of 
relief lies in the burden of proof.  While it is enough to show a “well-
founded fear” of persecution to win an asylum case, a client must show 
that it is more likely than not he or she will be persecuted in order to win a 
withholding case.  This burden of proof is essentially the “preponderance 
of the evidence” burden of proof that exists in most civil cases.  Unlike 
asylum claims, withholding of removal claims can only be filed 
defensively in the context of a removal proceeding.  Additionally, 
withholding claims do not have a one-year statute of limitations, so they 
can be asserted even after the client has been in the U.S. for a year. 
 
b. A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible Asylum or 
Withholding of Removal Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
 
817  I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). 
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might be eligible for asylum or withholding of removal.  A flow chart to 
help determine eligibility is found at Attachment 3. 
 
(1) Has your client expressed a fear of being persecuted if he or she must 
return to his or her home country? 
 
(2) If so, does the client fear being persecuted because of his or her race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion? 
 
c. Preserving Eligibility for Asylum/Withholding of Removal. 
 
If the answers to these questions are yes, your client may be eligible to 
raise an asylum or withholding claim as a defense to removal when the 
time comes.  You should try to avoid any pleas that would imperil such 
relief. 
 
Asylum. There are two crime-related bars to asylum. 
 
(1) Aggravated felony.  Anyone convicted of an aggravated felony 
is barred from receiving asylum. 
 
(2) Particularly serious crime.  A client who is convicted of a 
“particularly serious crime” is ineligible for asylum.  For purposes 
of the asylum analysis, a “particularly serious crime” includes all 
aggravated felonies.  However, a crime may be a “particularly 
serious crime” even if it is not an aggravated felony.818  
 
Withholding. There are two crime-related bars to withholding of removal. 
 
(1) Aggravated felony + five-year term of imprisonment.  Anyone 
convicted of an aggravated felony and, as a result of the 
conviction, is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years or 
more is barred from receiving withholding of removal. 
 
(2) Particularly serious crime.  A client who is convicted of a 
particularly serious crime (as defined above) is ineligible for 
withholding of removal. 
 
6. Temporary Protected Status.819 
 
Certain non-citizens are entitled to an immigration benefit called Temporary 
 
818  See section V.E.2., supra. 
819  See the discussion of TPS at section III.I.1., supra. 
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Protected Status (TPS).  In essence, TPS is permission from the United States 
Attorney General to non-citizens from certain countries that allows them to 
remain in the U.S. until and unless the Attorney General determines it is safe for 
them to return to their home country.  TPS is most often granted to individuals 
from countries that have suffered significant natural disasters.  As an example, 
the Attorney General granted TPS to Haitians in January 2010 who were in the 
United States at the time of the earthquake that devastated Haiti.  A complete 
current list of all countries for which the Attorney General has designated TPS 
can be found on the USCIS website.820 
 
a. Elements of a TPS Claim. 
 
The way in which a client can initially qualify for TPS is complicated and 
is not necessary to this discussion.  For purposes of your Padilla analysis, 
all you need to know is whether your client is a current TPS recipient or is 
eligible for TPS under a recent designation by the United States Attorney 
General.  You can determine if your client has been granted TPS by 
asking to see any paperwork from USCIS granting TPS to the client.  
Alternatively, the client may have an employment authorization document 
(“work card”) issued by USCIS.  The category listed on the work card 
would be (c)(19).  You can determine if the Attorney General has recently 
designated your client’s country as being eligible for TPS by checking the 
USCIS website referenced in the previous footnote. 
 
b. A Quick Checklist to Screen for TPS Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
might have received TPS.  A flow chart to help determine this status is 
found at Attachment 3. 
 
(1) Is your client from one of the countries currently designated by the 
U.S. Attorney General as eligible for TPS? 
 
(2) If yes, has your client actually received a grant of TPS and/or an 
employment authorization document from USCIS? 
 
c. Preserving TPS Eligibility. 
 
In order to be eligible for TPS, a client must not have been convicted of 
any felony, or two or more misdemeanors.821  If possible, avoid any plea 
to a felony, or to a second misdemeanor. 
 
820  U.S.C.I.S., Temporary Protected Status, 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last visited October 15, 2020). 
821  INA § 244(c)(2)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i). 
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7. Deferred Action.822 
 
There are two major types of deferred action:  (1) Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA); and (2) VAWA deferred action.  Each one will be reviewed 
below.823 
 
As a reminder, deferred action is a program or policy of the DHS that allows ICE 
to defer or postpone any action to remove someone from the United States who 
would otherwise be removable.  With the exception of Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), there are no official forms on which a client applies 
for deferred action and there are no permanent formal rules governing the 
granting of deferred action.  It is essentially a matter of administrative grace 
being given to certain persons who DHS believes present compelling 
humanitarian factors or other positive equities.  DACA, on the other hand, is a 
much more formal program and has prescribed forms and guidelines that 
applicants must use and meet in order to qualify for DACA relief. 
 
a. A Quick Checklist to Screen for DACA Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
might be eligible for DACA or might have been approved for DACA.  A 
flow chart to help determine this status is found at Attachment 3. 
 
(1) Did your client come to the U.S. before he or she turned 16? 
 
(2) If so, had he or she continuously resided in the U.S. for at least five 
years as of June 15, 2012? 
 





822  See the detailed discussion of Deferred Action at section III.I.3., supra. 
823  Prior to the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 187 
(AG 2018), the Board of Immigration Appeals also recognized that prosecutorial discretion in an 
Immigration Court context could take the form of administrative closure of the removal case.  
See Matter of Avitisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012).  But Castro-Tum overruled Avitisyan.  
However, as of this writing, the future of Castro-Tum is unclear as federal court litigation 
continues.  At least two circuit courts have held it was wrongly decided.  Meza Morales v. 
Barr, 973 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2020); Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019).  Notably, the 
Seventh Circuit opinion in Meza Morales was written by Judge Amy Coney Barrett. 
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(4) If so, is he or she currently in school or did he or she graduate from 
high school, obtain a GED, or is an honorably discharged veteran of the 
Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States? 
 
(5) If so, was he or she under age 31 as of June 15, 2012? 
 
If the answers to all of these questions are yes, then your client may be 
eligible for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.  
 
b. A Quick Checklist to Screen for VAWA Deferred Action 
Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
might be eligible for or have received VAWA deferred action.  A flow 
chart to help determine this status is found at Attachment 3. 
 
(1) Has your LPR client filed a self-petition (USCIS Form I-360) in order 
to obtain legal status on his or her own behalf without the assistance of his 
or her USC or LPR abusive spouse? 
 
(2) If so, is an immigrant visa immediately available to him or her under 
the Visa Bulletin? 
 
(3) If not, has USCIS granted your client deferred action, as evidenced by 
USCIS Form I-797 and/or an employment authorization document, 
category (c)(14)? 
 
(4) If not, has the client recently filed the I-360 with USCIS but not yet 
heard if he or she will be granted deferred action? 
 




In order to preserve DACA eligibility, your client must not plead 
to or be convicted of any felony offense (i.e., a Class IV felony or 
higher in Nebraska), must not plead to or be convicted of any 
“significant misdemeanor offense,” and must not have three or 




Because there are no hard and fast rules on when USCIS will grant 
VAWA deferred action to an applicant, it is difficult to lay down a 
hard and fast rule on how criminal proceedings may affect 
eligibility for this type of deferred action.  However, since 
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deferred action is a discretionary benefit, it is safe to assume that 
any type of criminal conviction has the potential to affect a client’s 
continued eligibility for it. 
 
The more serious the felony conviction, the less likely it is that 
your client will be given prosecutorial discretion.  Therefore, try 
to avoid pleading to any felonies altogether, and certainly try to 
avoid those that involve violence. 
 
Also, if anything in the record of conviction indicates any possible 
gang ties or membership, you should try to expunge such 
references in order to maximize your client’s chances to obtain 
prosecutorial discretion.  
 
8. Voluntary Departure. 
 
Voluntary departure824 is a form of relief from removal that allows one to leave 
the United States at his or her own expense in lieu of being involuntarily 
removed.  Because voluntary departure involves a person agreeing to leave the 
U.S., it is often a form of relief from removal of last resort. 
 
The benefit of voluntary departure is that it allows a client some time to wrap up 
his or her affairs before leaving the country, allows the client to take as much 
property as the client wishes (since he or she will be paying for his or her own 
transportation) and, most importantly, does not place the client under a 10-year 
bar on returning to the U.S., which would be the case if the client left pursuant to 
a removal order. 
 
a. Elements of Voluntary Departure. 
 
Pre-Conclusion Voluntary Departure.  In order to be eligible for voluntary 
departure requested before the conclusion of removal proceedings (i.e., at 
the Master Calendar stage), a client must not be deportable as an 
aggravated felon or as a “terrorist.”825 
 
Post-Conclusion Voluntary Departure.  In order to be eligible for 
voluntary departure at the conclusion of removal proceedings, a client 
must meet the following requirements: 
 
(1) He or she must have been physically present in the United States for at 
least one year before being served with a Notice to Appear; 
 
 
824  INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c. 
825  INA § 240B(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a). 
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(2) He or she must have been a person of “good moral character” for at 
least five years before the date he or she applies for voluntary departure;  
 
(3) He or she must be not deportable as an aggravated felon or as a 
“terrorist”; and 
 
(4) He or she must establish by clear and convincing evidence that he or 
she has the means to depart the U.S. at his or her own expense and intends 
to do so.826 
 
b. A Quick Checklist to Screen for Voluntary Departure 
Eligibility. 
 
Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client 
might be eligible for voluntary departure.  A flow chart to help determine 
this status is found at Attachment 3. 
 
Pre-Conclusion Voluntary Departure. 
 
(1) Has your client been convicted of an aggravated felony? 
 
(2) Is your client deportable as a “terrorist” under INA § 237(a)(4)(B)?827 
 
Post-Conclusion Voluntary Departure. 
 
(1) Was your client physically present in the U.S. for at least five years 
before being served a Notice to Appear by ICE? 
 
(2) If so, has your client been a person of “good moral character”828 for at 
least the past five years? 
 
(3) If so, is your client’s criminal background free of any aggravated 
felony convictions or “terrorist activity”? 
 
(4) If so, does your client have the ability to depart the U.S. at his or her 
own expense when the time comes? 
 
If the answers to all of these questions are yes, then your client may be 
eligible for voluntary departure and you should do what you can to 
preserve that eligibility. 
 
826  INA § 240B(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b). 
827  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B). 
828  INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
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c. Preserving Eligibility for Voluntary Departure. 
 
The main way in which you can preserve your client’s eligibility for 
voluntary departure is to avoid conviction of an aggravated felony or  
“terrorist” offense, since either such conviction will bar a client from 
receiving either type of voluntary departure. 
 
Ultimate caution would also entail avoiding conviction of any offenses 
that would bar the client from demonstrating “good moral character.” 
 
9. Orders of Supervision (OSUP).  
 
Clients who are under orders of supervision are essentially living on the 
administrative grace of ICE.  Usually, these are clients who have final orders of 
removal but for whom ICE has been unable to obtain travel documents because 
the governments with which ICE is dealing are either unable or unwilling to issue 
such travel documents.  More details are spelled out in the regulations,829 but 
among the factors that ICE considers in deciding whether to release a client under 
an Order of Supervision are whether the client is a “non-violent person,” whether 
the client is likely to pose a threat to the community if released, and whether the 
client is a flight risk.  Obviously, any serious criminal offense (that is, anything 
beyond traffic infraction or the like) will imperil a client’s ability to remain free 
under an Order of Supervision.  Certainly any DUI offense is likely to result in 
the client losing OSUP privileges.  So while there are no hard and fast rules 
about which convictions to avoid, it is important to understand that running afoul 
of the law will put a client with an OSUP in a perilous situation. 
 
10. Prudential Revocation of Non-Immigrant Visas. 
 
This topic is discussed in greater detail earlier in this Guide.830  But recall that 
even a charge of DUI will put a non-immigrant’s visa in peril.  Other convictions 





Although naturalization (i.e., the process by which a permanent resident becomes 
a United States citizen) is technically not a form of relief from removal or waiver, 
it is something you should have your eye on if you are representing a client who is 
a permanent resident. 
 
829 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 generally deals with orders of supervision, while 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e) 
contains the criteria for release that ICE considers in deciding whether to release a detained 
client under an order of supervision. 
830  See section V.C.2., supra. 
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In terms of representing a client in a criminal case, the only issue for you as 
criminal defense counsel is to try to avoid having the client convicted of an  
offense that would preclude him or her from demonstrating “good moral 
character” under INA § 101(f).831   
 
VII. CRITICAL CATEGORIES IN IMMIGRATION LAW. 
 
This portion of the Guide discusses the "critical categories" within the spectrum of criminal 
conduct or convictions that enhance immigration penalties for non-citizen clients.  When 
analyzing a criminal offense, practitioners are urged to think about which, and how many, of 
these “critical categories” may be triggered if the client is convicted of the offense being 
analyzed.  Some categories carry more severe consequences than others, and practitioners 
should take these differentials into consideration. 
 
A. Category 1 -- Lack of Good Moral Character. 
 
As discussed above,832 commission of an act or conviction of a crime that brings one 
within the provisions of INA § 101(f)833 will prevent that person from establishing "good 
moral character."  Although such a prohibition, in and of itself, does not have any 
negative immigration consequences, it can make certain immigration benefits 
unavailable.  And remember that some of the acts or convictions that prevent a person 
from demonstrating good moral character also have other, and immediate, negative 
immigration consequences, such as inadmissibility or deportability. 
 
B. Category 2 -- Juvenile Offenses. 
 
Juvenile delinquency offenses are not "crimes" for purposes of the INA, and therefore 
cannot serve as the basis for inadmissibility or removal.834  Obviously, then, it would be 
best if your client is charged in juvenile court as a juvenile rather than as an adult.  But 
what if your juvenile client is charged as an adult?  Does that automatically mean that if 
he or she is convicted of the non-juvenile offense he or she has been convicted of a 
“crime” for immigration purposes?  No.  He or she has only been convicted of a 
“crime” if the state offense does not qualify for treatment as a juvenile delinquency 
offense under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA).835 
 
 
831  8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
832  See section V.E.1., supra. 
833  8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
834  22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000). 
835  18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-32. 
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In Matter of Devison-Charles836 and the cases cited therein, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals has repeatedly held that whether a juvenile has been convicted of a “crime” 
depends on whether a state criminal offense qualifies for treatment as a juvenile offense 
under the FJDA.  The FJDA generally defines juvenile delinquency as violation of a law 
of the U.S. committed by a person before reaching age 18 if such act would have been a 
crime if committed by a person over age 18.837  The FJDA also provides that any person 
under the age of 15 can be subject to prosecution as an adult if such a person is alleged to 
have committed certain crimes of violence or certain controlled substance offenses.838  
If, however, a person is alleged to have committed certain specified crimes of violence or 
used a firearm in the commission of certain offenses, a person age 13 and older might be 
subject to being charged as an adult.839 
 
One of the valuable lessons of Matter of Devison-Charles is that the state statutory 
scheme for dealing with juveniles does not have to be an exact match with the FJDA in 
order for the state scheme to qualify as “comporting” with the FJDA.  The New York 
scheme at issue in Devison-Charles, for example, proceeded with an adjudication of guilt 
before determining the offender’s status.  However, if the offender was found guilty but 
also found eligible to be treated as a “youthful offender,” then the conviction was 
automatically vacated.  This, the BIA held, was the equivalent of a direct reversal on 
appeal, and therefore the offender had never been “convicted” of a criminal offense, as 
that term is defined in INA § 101(a)(48)(A).840  Further, the BIA held that when the 
juvenile violated his probation and was re-sentenced, he was still a juvenile offender, 
even though his re-sentencing took place when he was 25 years of age.841 
 
It is therefore very clear that if your client is adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent under 
the Nebraska Juvenile Code, the client will not have been convicted of a criminal offense 
for immigration purposes.  However, if the prosecutor seeks to treat your under-18 year-
old client as an adult and you are unsuccessful in having the case transferred to the 
juvenile court under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1816, the disposition of such a criminal charge 
will not necessarily be considered a conviction for purposes of immigration law.  Under 
the BIA precedent discussed above, such a conviction will only be treated as a conviction 
of a crime for immigration purposes if your client would have been eligible to be 
prosecuted as an adult under the FJDA.  So it is important to be aware generally of the 
test employed by the FJDA even if your client is prosecuted as an adult under Nebraska 
 
836  22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000). 
837  18 U.S.C. § 5031. 
838  18 U.S.C. § 5032. 
839  Id. 
840  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48). 
841  Devison-Charles, 22 I&N at 1372-1373. 
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law.  You may be able to shape the case in such a way that your client could be 
considered a juvenile under the FJDA, and therefore any state court conviction would not 
carry with it negative immigration implications.  
 
C. Category 3 -- Convictions.842 
 
Generally speaking, it is in a client's best interests not to have a conviction on his or her 
record.  In other words, if counsel can make arrangements, such as pretrial diversion, 
that will not result in the client having a "conviction" entered against him or her, the 
negative immigration consequences for the client may either not exist at all or, at the very 
least, are likely to be less severe. 
 
D. Category 4 -- Petty Offenses. 
 
If you are unable to prevent a criminal conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, 
try to make the crime fit under the “petty offense” exception to inadmissibility, found at 
INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).843  Although such a conviction will not necessarily prevent 
your client from facing removal proceedings,844 it will relieve him or her from having to 
deal with an additional ground of inadmissibility if and when he or she is eligible in the 
future to apply formally for admission into the U.S. 
 
E. Category 5 -- Particularly Serious Crimes. 
 
Although conviction of a “particularly serious crime,” in and of itself, carries no direct 
consequences regarding deportation or inadmissibility,845 such a conviction does carry 
collateral consequences.846  In order to preserve immigration options for clients for  
whom this is an issue (i.e., those clients who may be eligible or need to apply for either 
asylum or withholding of removal), you should be sensitive to this issue. 
 
842  See the definition and discussion of what constitutes a “conviction” in section 
V.D.2., supra. 
843  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).  See section V.C.3.d.(2), supra, for a discussion of 
this topic. 
844  For example, if your client was formally and legally admitted into the U.S. and is 
deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) because she or he is convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude within five years of his or her last entry into the U.S. and the crime of which she 
or he was convicted carried a possible sentence of a year or more, the fact that she or he is 
convicted of a “petty offense,” in and of itself, will not stop ICE from beginning removal 
proceedings. 
845  That is, unless the nature of the crime makes it the type of crime that does have 
direct deportation or inadmissibility consequences. 
846  See section V.E.2., supra. 
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F. Category 6 -- Significant Misdemeanors. 
 
We put this category ahead of “regular” misdemeanors since it will affect a client’s 
ability to either qualify for or maintain DACA status.847  If your client either has DACA 
status or might be eligible to apply for DACA, then you should avoid convictions for any 
“significant misdemeanors,” as defined by the DACA guidelines.  Also, recall that 
conviction of three or more misdemeanors of any type will affect eligibility for DACA. 
 
G. Category 7 -- Misdemeanors. 
 
Not surprisingly, it is normally better if a client is convicted of a misdemeanor rather than 
a felony, since a felony conviction usually carries with it more severe immigration 
consequences than a misdemeanor conviction.  However, this is not universally true, and 
you need to distinguish among the different types of misdemeanors to find out which are 
less harmful. 
 
1. Not Involving Moral Turpitude. 
 
If your non-citizen client is going to be convicted of a misdemeanor, then it might 
as well be for this type of a misdemeanor.  Most of the time, conviction of a 
misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude will have less severe immigration 
implications.  However, there are exceptions. 
 
Conviction of a misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude will make a client 
inadmissible if the client was previously convicted of another crime and if the 
aggregate sentences to which the client were sentenced are five years or more.848  
And conviction of virtually all misdemeanor drug offenses will render your client 
both inadmissible and deportable.849  Finally, some misdemeanors actually fit the 
definition of aggravated felonies.850  Obviously, conviction of a misdemeanor not 
involving moral turpitude that is included in the definition of an aggravated felony 






847  See section III.I.3.a., supra. 
848  INA § 212(a(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B).  See section V.C.4., supra. 
849  See sections V.C.5. and V.D.7., supra. 
850  See section V.D.6., supra. 
851  Id. 
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2. Involving Moral Turpitude. 
 
Conviction of even one crime involving moral turpitude at the misdemeanor level 
can make your client both inadmissible and deportable.852  However, if your 
client's conviction is not within five years of his or her last entry into the U.S., he 
or she can only be deported if he or she is convicted of two or more crimes 
involving moral turpitude that do not arise out of a single scheme of criminal 
conduct.853  If your client is facing a second conviction for a crime involving 
moral turpitude, you can minimize the deportation (but not the inadmissibility) 
consequences by trying to characterize the conviction, if possible, as arising out of 
the same scheme of criminal conduct as the first conviction.  
 
H. Category 8 -- Domestic Violence Offenses. 
 
Conviction of a domestic violence offense854 or violation of a protection order results in 
the client being deportable under § 237(a)(2)(E) of the INA,855 but does not make him or 
her inadmissible under § 212 of the INA856 at the time he or she seeks to re-enter the U.S.  
Conviction of a domestic violence offense may also implicate other grounds of 
deportability or inadmissibility, such as those dealing with crimes involving moral 
turpitude,857 and may also result in a finding that the client lacks good moral character.858  
Such consequences should be considered when counseling a client facing such a charge. 
 
I. Category 9 -- Firearms Offenses. 
 
Conviction of a firearms offense will make your non-citizen client deportable.859  
Deportation as a result of such a conviction leaves an immigration practitioner very few 




852  See sections V.C.3. and V.D.4., supra. 
853  See section V.D.5., supra. 
854  See section V.D.9., supra, for a definition of “domestic violence offense.” 
855  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E). 
856  8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
857  Matter of Tran, 21 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 1996). 
858  See INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3).  See also section V.E.1., supra. 
859  INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).  But recall that, in Nebraska, most 
firearms offenses will not make the client deportable because the Nebraska definition of 
“firearm” is overbroad.  See section V.D.8., supra. 
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Conviction for a firearms offense makes one deportable, but there is no comparable 
ground of inadmissibility.  But conviction of a firearms offense, depending on the facts 
of the case, might implicate some of the other grounds of inadmissibility, particularly if 
the conviction is at the felony level.860 
 
Whether or not it is a good idea to accept a plea regarding a firearms offense depends a 
great deal on your client's immigration status.  For example, if she or he has the ability to 
re-enter the U.S. immediately because of some qualifying relationship, then a conviction 
of a firearms offense, in and of itself, is not a bar to immediate readmission and may 
cause less problems for a client than, say, a conviction of a second crime involving moral 
turpitude.861  Of course, such a result is counter-intuitive, since most practitioners would 
naturally assume that conviction for a firearms offense is more serious than a conviction 
for theft.  But that is not necessarily the case in an immigration context. 
 
J. Category 10 -- Controlled Substance Offenses. 
 
Conviction of any drug offense, with the exception of a single conviction of simple 
possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana,862 will have drastic immigration 
consequences for a non-citizen client.  Conviction of a drug crime renders a client both 
deportable863 and inadmissible.864  Additionally, if the client is convicted of a drug 
trafficking crime, she or he has committed an aggravated felony.865 
 
The immigration stakes are quite high where drug convictions are concerned.  With the 
exception of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana, if a client is convicted 
of a drug crime, whether it be simple possession or drug trafficking, she or he is not only  
deportable, but permanently inadmissible as an immigrant.866  In other words, such a 
 
860  For example, if a firearm is involved in a conviction for second degree assault in 
Nebraska under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-309(1)(b), such a conviction would constitute an 
aggravated felony, since a "crime of violence" is involved.  Most courts would also hold that 
such a crime is a crime involving moral turpitude under the “assault plus” rationale articulated by 
various courts and discussed in section V.C.3.c.(1), supra. 
861  Unless, of course, the firearms offense can also be considered a crime involving 
moral turpitude for some reason. 
862  See sections V.C.5.(inadmissibility) and V.D.7. (deportability), supra. 
863  INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
864  INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
865  INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
866  Under some circumstances, the client may be able to return to the U.S. as a non-
immigrant, but, as the law stands now, she or he will never be able to return again as an  
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client will be deported from the U.S. and will never be able to return legally as a 
permanent resident.  In addition, there are very few forms of relief from deportation 
available to a client convicted of a drug offense.  Drug offenses are truly a kiss of death 
for non-citizen clients. 
 
K. Category 11 -- Aggravated Felonies. 
 
Needless to say, conviction of an aggravated felony should be avoided, almost at all 
costs.  A non-citizen client who is convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable867 and 
is also ineligible for most forms of relief from deportation.868 
 
immigrant.  See INA § 212(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d), for the provisions regarding waivers of 
inadmissibility available to non-immigrants. 
867  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  In fact, it is a virtual 
certainty that such a client will be deported. 
868  For example, as discussed earlier, an aggravated felon is ineligible to apply for 
asylum, cancellation of removal, or voluntary departure.  See INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.       
§§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i); INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3); and INA § 240B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229c(a)(1), respectively. 
 
 ATTACHMENT 1 
 
 CHECKLIST TO HELP DETERMINE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES  




I. Use Questionnaire (Attachment 2) to gather information related to the steps in this 
Checklist 
 
II.  Determine client's citizenship/immigration status. 
 
A. United States citizen (unless renounced or revoked -- see section III.B.e.) 
 
B. Legal permanent resident (verified by I-551 card, a/k/a "green card") 
 
C. Conditional permanent resident (verified by I-551, CPR Resident Alien card) 
 
D. Non-immigrant (verified by Form I-94) 
 
E. Parolee (verified by Form I-94) 
 
F. Refugee (verified by stamp in passport, refugee document or employment 
authorization document) 
 
G. Asylum recipient (verified by asylum document or employment authorization 
document) 
 
H. Special categories of immigrants (see section III.I.) 
 
1. TPS recipients 
2. Deferred Action recipients 
a.  DACA 
b.  VAWA 
c.  Prosecutorial discretion 
3. Voluntary departure recipients 
4. Cancellation of removal recipients 
5. Clients released under an order of supervision (OSUP) 
6. Stay of removal recipients 
 
I. Undocumented client (entered without inspection or initially entered with 
inspection but authorization to remain in the U.S. has since expired) 
 
III.  Explore follow-up information. 
 
A. If client is a legal permanent resident or conditional permanent resident, 
determine the day, month and year the client obtained such status and verify that 





B. If client is a non-immigrant, determine type of non-immigrant (i.e., student, 
visitor, temporary worker, etc.) and the date on which client's non-immigrant 
status will expire (stated on I-94 form). 
 
C. If client is a refugee or asylum recipient, determine when such status was 
conferred on client and how long client has been residing in the U.S. 
 
D. If client is undocumented or out of status, determine the following: 
 
1. The date on which client last entered the U.S. 
 
2. Whether client has ever been in removal proceedings (if so, get dates and 
details, including information on whether a removal order was entered 
against client). 
 
3. Determine citizenship/immigration status of client's spouse or adult 
children (children age 21 or older), if applicable. 
 
IV.  Categorize crime with which client is charged. 
 
A. Crime involving moral turpitude1 
 
B. Drug offense2 
 
C. Aggravated felony3 
 
D. Domestic violence offense4 
 
E. Firearms offense5 
 





1  See sections V.C.3. and V.D.4., supra. 
2  See sections V.C.5. and V.D.7., supra. 
3  See section V.D.6., supra. 
4  See section V.D.9., supra. 
5  See section V.D.8., supra. 
6  See sections V.C. and V.D., supra. 
 
V. Determine what "critical categories" are present that should be considered. 
 
A. Has client been charged with crime that could result in "bad moral character"?7 
 
B. Is there a possibility of working out an arrangement that would not result in a 
"conviction" for immigration purposes?8 
 
C. Could client be charged as a juvenile rather than as an adult?9 
 
D. If client has a previous criminal conviction, will crime with which she or he is 
charged have immigration consequences?10 
 
E. Has the client been charged with a “significant misdemeanor”?11 
 
F. If client is charged with a misdemeanor, is it a "crime involving moral 
turpitude"?12 
 
G. Is the client charged with a "firearms offense"?13 
 
H. Is the client charged with a "domestic violence offense"?14 
 
I. Is the client charged with a "particularly serious crime"?15 
 
J. Is the client charged with a drug offense?16 
 
 
7  See section V.E.1., supra. 
8  See section V.D.2., supra. 
9  See section V.C.d.(1)., supra. 
10  See sections V.C.4. and V.D.5., supra. 
11  See section V.E.3., supra. 
12  See sections V.C.3. and V.D.4., supra. 
13  See section V.D.8., supra. 
14  See section V.D.9., supra. 
15  See section V.E.2.., supra. 
16  See sections V.C.5., and V.D.7., supra. 
 
K. Is the client charged with a crime that is an "aggravated felony"?17 
 
VI. Determine if the client has been convicted of any previous crimes, and get details on all 
such crimes (jurisdiction where committed, statute(s) involved, sentence(s) imposed, 
possible penalty(ies), etc.).  Determine how, if at all, such prior offenses may affect the 
client’s inadmissibility or deportability if the client is convicted of the offense(s) with 
which she or he is charged. 
 
VII. Determine if the charge the client faces or the plea the client is considering will 
potentially affect any relief from removal for which the client might be eligible.18 
 
17  See section V.D.6., supra. 
18  See section VI., supra. 
 
 ATTACHMENT 2 
 







Client Name:   
Date of Birth:  
Country of Birth:   
Country of Citizenship:  
Country of citizenship 
of both parents: 
 
Date of FIRST entry 
into U.S.:  
 
Place of FIRST entry into U.S. (name of airport, U.S.-Mexico border, etc.): 
 
Manner of entry into U.S. (i.e. without inspection, tourist visa, employment based visa, 
student visa, green card, etc.):  Attach copies of all available documentation. 
 
If client entered with inspection, when does/did period of authorized stay in the U.S. 
expire (i.e. date on I-94 form or other period of authorized stay)?  Attach copies of all 
available documentation. 
 
Dates of ALL exits and re-entries from and to U.S. since first entry, in chronological 
order: 
 




What is client’s current immigration status (permanent resident, student, refugee, TPS 
recipient, asylee, over-stay, no status, etc.)?  Attach copies of all available 
documentation. 
 
Does client have an employment authorization document (“EAD”)?  If yes, what is the 
expiration date and category on the EAD? Attach copy of any EAD in client’s possession. 
 
Is client married?  If yes, when?  What is spouse’s immigration status? 
 
Does client have any children?  If yes, dates and places of birth of each child and 
immigration status of each child. 
 
Has client ever filed any application with Immigration?  If so, what type of application, 
when was it filed, and what was the result of the application?  Attach copies of any 
available documentation. 
 
Has client ever been detained by Immigration or put in removal (deportation) 




Has client ever been detained by Immigration at the border and returned to their home 
country?  If yes, when?  What exactly happened?  Attach copies of any available 
documentation. 
 
Has client ever been a victim of a crime in the U.S.?  If yes, provide date(s) and details.  






Complete table on page 4. 
 
List (1) ALL crimes client has been charged with or convicted of, (2) the dates of each underlying act resulting in charges and/or 
convictions, (3) the number of each statute under which the client was charged/convicted, (4) the case number of each case in which 
the client was charged/convicted, and (5) the final disposition of each charge or conviction.  Include all foreign convictions.  Attach 






Case # Final Disposition 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 ATTACHMENT 3 
 
 FLOW CHARTS FOR TYPES OF WAIVERS OF INADMISSIBILITY AND RELIEF 



























Section 212(h) Waiver 
Is inadmissibility an issue for client? 
Is client Non-LPR with qualifying 
family member? 
Is client a LPR not convicted of an 
aggravated felony who has been in 




Not eligible for § 212(h) 
Waiver. 
Eligible for § 212(h) Waiver.  
































Continuous physical presence in U.S. 
for 10 years? 
Prior crimes as described in  
§§ 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(4) 
of INA? 




Not Eligible for Non-LPR 
Cancellation. 
Eligible for Non-LPR Cancellation. 































DV Non-LPR Cancellation 
Client undocumented? 
Domestic Violence victim? 
Continuous physical presence in U.S. 
for 3 years? 
Inadmissible under §§ 212(a)(2), 
212(a)(3), or deportable under §§ 237 
(a)(1)(G) or 237(a)(2)-(4) of INA? 
Person of Good Moral Character 





Not Eligible for DV Non-
LPR Cancellation. 
Eligible for DV Non-LPR Cancellation. 

































LPR for 5 years or more? 
Residing in the U.S. in some lawful 
status for 7 years or more? 
Convicted of aggravated felony? 
Yes 
Yes 
Not Eligible for LPR 
Cancellation. 
Eligible for LPR Cancellation. 






























Adjustment of Status 
Client entered U.S. with inspection 
and authorization? 
Client has USC spouse 
or 
USC child 21 or older? 
Client is under 21 and has USC 
parent? 
Client is the beneficiary of approved 
visa petition with current priority 
date? 
Yes 
Not Eligible for Adjustment 
of Status. 
Eligible for Adjustment of Status.  

































Refugee Adjustment of Status 
Client was admitted to or paroled 
into U.S. as a Refugee? 
Client has been in Refugee status for 
at least 1 year? 
Yes 
Not Eligible for Refugee 
Adjustment of Status. 
Eligible for Refugee Adjustment of 






























Client has fear of being persecuted in 
home country on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political 
opinion? 
Client convicted of aggravated 
felony? 




Not Eligible for Asylum. 































Withholding of Removal 
Client has fear of being persecuted in 
home country on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political 
opinion? 
Client convicted of aggravated 
felony with imposed sentence of 5 
years or more? 




Not Eligible for Withholding 
of Removal. 
Eligible for Withholding of Removal. 






























Temporary Protected Status 
Client from country designated for 
TPS by U.S. Attorney General? 
Client current TPS recipient or 
eligible to file for TPS? 
Yes 
Not Eligible for Temporary 
Protected Status. 
Worry about preserving TPS eligibility. 





    DACA  
Client Came to U.S. Before Age 16? 
Continuously in U.S. for 5 Years 
Before 6/15/12 and Present in U.S. 
on 6/15/12? 
Currently in High School, High 
School Graduate, GED Recipient or 
Honorably Discharged Veteran? 
Older than 30? 
Convicted of Felony, “Significant 
Misdemeanor,” 3 or more 
Misdemeanors, or threat to national 





Not Eligible for DACA. 
Eligible for DACA.  
































VAWA Deferred Action 
Client has filed I-360 self-petition for 
LPR status based on abuse by LPR 
spouse? 
Immigrant visa is immediately 
available under Visa Bulletin? 
USCIS has affirmatively denied 
VAWA Deferred Action to client? 
USCIS has either (1) not yet told client if it 
will grant VAWA Deferred Action or (2) 




Not Eligible for VAWA 
Deferred Action. 
Client either has or is eligible to 
receive VAWA Deferred Action. See 






























Pre-Conclusion Voluntary Departure 
Client convicted of aggravated 
felony? 
Deportable “Terrorist” under  
INA § 237(a)(4)(B)? 
No 
Not Eligible for Pre-
Conclusion Voluntary 
Departure. 
Eligible for Pre-Conclusion Voluntary 





























Post-Conclusion Voluntary Departure 
Client present in U.S. at least 5 years 
before served with NTA? 
Person of Good Moral Character 
under INA § 101(f)? 
Client deportable as aggravated felon 
or “Terrorist” under INA 
§§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) or 237(a)(4)(B)? 
Ability to leave U.S. at own expense 
and intent to leave? 
Yes 
Not Eligible for Post-
Conclusion Voluntary 
Departure. 
Eligible for Post-Conclusion Voluntary 
Departure. See Outline for Strategies. 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
